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ABOUT THE COVER


Layout by Julia Anne Mari R. Catalan
ABOUT THE JOURNAL

In accordance with the mission and vision of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas, i.e. cultivating a research oriented culture, the Concilium Philosophiae, the official organization of the undergraduate students of philosophy of the UST Faculty of Arts and Letters, established TALISIK: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy in order to foster a research mentality among the undergraduate students of philosophy. As a research platform primarily for undergraduate philosophy students in the Philippines, the journal seeks to publish articles across the whole range of philosophical topics, but with special emphasis on the following subject strands:

• The history of philosophy (East and West)
• The branches of philosophy, such as, logic, metaphysics, cosmology, epistemology, ethics
• Philosophical schools, such as, rationalism, empiricism, phenomenology, existentialism
• Contemporary philosophical issues and trends

TALISIK is a Filipino word. It is a contraction of “Talas” [Keenness] and “Saliksik” [Search]. TALISIK then means “Katalasan ng isip na umunawa ng anuman” [Keenness of the mind to understand anything] and “Malaliman at matalinong pagdalumat sa kahulugan ng anuman” [In-depth and intelligent search for the meaning of anything]. Based from the definition of TALISIK, the Concilium Philosophiae intends to demonstrate the acumen of undergraduate students of philosophy through their research undertakings. The journal primarily caters to the works of the UST undergraduate students of philosophy, but also welcomes contributions from other fields and institutions.

TALISIK publishes issues annually.
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“Learn to write by learning to read, and then you will see what I mean by enjoying life, and here I mean the life of philosophy.” (Abulad, 2017) Reading, writing, and doing research are the main core of any discipline, more so in philosophy. Publication, on the other hand, can be considered as the concretization of the abovementioned. In line with this, it is with great pleasure that we present the fourth volume of TALISIK: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy. Similar to the approach we had in the previous volumes, we collated articles that do not adhere to a singular theme or philosophical period so as to be inclusive of the various interests of both our contributors and readers. However, unlike the previous volumes of TALISIK, the May 2017 issue showcases some articles by philosophy students from another university, i.e. University of the Philippines – Los Baños.

We, the Editorial Board of TALISIK A.Y.: 2016-2017, would like to extend our deepest gratitude to the contributors of this volume. We thank them for the time and effort they have dedicated to the editorial process. We are forever indebted to them for helping us in providing a platform for the exchange and dissemination of philosophical research in the undergraduate level. Furthermore, TALISIK would not be possible without the guidance of Dr. Paolo Bolaños and Dr. Roland Theuas Pada, along with our advisory board. Without their commitment in helping us navigate through the difficult field of publication, none of this would have been possible. We would also like to thank Dr. Jove Jim Aguas and Dr. Romualdo Abulad for aiding us in the selection of articles to be published. Their contributions were fundamental in producing the journal. Thank you to Mr. Ranier Abengaña for his invaluable advice and recommendations. Lastly, we would like to acknowledge the previous Editor-in-Chief of TALISIK, Mr. Daryl Lawrence Abarca, for formulating the current editorial process of the journal.

To our readers, we hope you will enjoy reading this volume as much as we have enjoyed producing it.

Many thanks and regards,
Editorial Board of Talisik A.Y. 2016-2017
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**REUBEN JOHN B. VALENTIN** will obtain his Bachelor’s Degree in Philosophy at the University of Santo Tomas. He is interested in animal ethics, particularly of Max Horkheimer’s, and philosophy of religion, particularly that of Soren Kierkegaard, Simone Weil, and Martin Buber, drawing its inspiration from his religious affiliation. However, he cannot disregard Bruce Lee and the Chinese philosophers who have enkindled a light for him to pursue philosophy in the first place; especially the former whom he wanted to write a thesis about.

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WHY UNDERGRADUATES SHOULD READ, WRITE AND DO RESEARCH: A TRIBUTE TO THE UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY MAJORS OF UST

Br. Romualdo E. Abulad, SVD, Ph.D.
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First of all, I would like to thank you for the honor of this invitation. I don’t think I know of any college or university offering an undergraduate major’s program in philosophy which has a publication like *Talisik*, exclusively philosophical, managed and edited by the student majors, and whose contributed articles are also exclusively written by undergraduate students. I should add, by way of commendation, that *Talisik* has now appeared quite regularly for the last three or four years; that, of course, is not yet long enough to gauge its survival power; we can perhaps decide that with more or less finality after 10 years of regular publication. You can make 10 years your magic number, and after that we can be more optimistic and claim for the journal its power to endure. Incidentally, I am also not aware if there is, at all, any other undergraduate class, in our school or elsewhere in the country, that has a similar professional journal as what you have. I know of journals produced on the graduate level, but hardly any by undergraduates of any discipline other than philosophy. I could be wrong, of course, and I wouldn’t mind being corrected later, especially by our visitors from the other schools. May I take this opportunity to acknowledge the presence of the students from the other schools, especially those from the University of the Philippines, both of Los Baños and Diliman, St. Paul Seminary Foundation of Silang, Cavite (I suppose), and the Ateneo de Manila. I thank you, on behalf of our department, for your participation in today’s academic event. It’s quite exhilarating to observe that our activities are getting to be more national in scope; this is, for me, a new experience. This is one reason why I did not have second thoughts about accepting the honor of your invitation and I would like to congratulate you, the *Concilium Philosophiae*, especially your hard-working officers, for what you have been achieving thus far. This is proof that philosophy is very much alive today not only in our university, but indeed also in our country.

According to your invitation, you would like to hear my opinion on the status and direction of philosophy in the Philippines. On the whole, my attitude is, as you can see, optimistic, in fact not only locally but also globally. Other disciplines may come and go, but not philosophy. And when any discipline matures to the fullest, it will surely realize the value of understanding itself in its very foundations, which is what philosophy is about. This is why philosophy is presupposed by all disciplines, and no discipline is strong enough to hold itself without the justification that philosophy can provide at its very groundwork. The word ‘groundwork’ is therefore not a carelessly chosen word. For instance, the word is found in such unforgettable classic as Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. You won’t mind my dallying a bit on this. Let me assure you that Kant is in this book interested not so much in formulating any theory of ethics, such as utilitarian, eudemonian, intuitionist or virtue ethics; his interest rests in the uncovering of that which lies at the bedrock of all ethics, whatever may be its theoretical superstructure. In other words, he wants to explore what ultimately supports and forms the basis of any concept or theory of good and evil, that is, its groundwork. Allow me to explain this further by means of a current example.
Recently, in connection with the question of what the media calls extra-judicial killings or EJKs and the endless criticisms that President Duterte has received as a consequence of it, whenever I am given the chance to articulate my stand on the issue publicly, I would first ask the question squarely: Where, in the first place, did we get the idea that killing is bad? Or are we just taking it for granted as something given, something which we must take for granted? Indeed, what is the reason for our sometimes passionate belief that killing is bad, that there is no way it could possibly be right? When we ask such question, we are inquiring into the fundamental reason of our belief, into the ground, or yes, the groundwork of even the most revered of our conventions. Then, we will recall that even the great St. Thomas Aquinas, the very patron of our university, has shown killing to be not really such an absolutely bad thing, for there are exceptions to the rule of it being an evil in itself, including self-defense.

What makes us, then, so sure that killing is bad? This is a question we all now have to face squarely. My suspicion is that most of us are coming from the ground of morality as established by our Christian, even biblical, interpretation of it; I mean, of course, the ten commandments. The ten commandments are (I imagine) the basis for our conventional thinking that killing is bad, something that belongs to the Old Testament tradition, to the Law of Moses as contained in the Torah. This was later simplified, in the New Testament, by Jesus himself, through what we may now refer to as the Commandment of Love. What is the Commandment of Love? First expressed in a twofold fashion (“Love God above all things, and love your neighbor as you love yourself”), this was then simplified even more by Jesus as “Love one another as I have loved you.” This commandment of love is equivalent to what Kant calls the groundwork or fundamental principle of all ethics, as hinted at in that ever-memorable opening line of his important work, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*: “Nothing in the world, nor outside of it, can be considered good without any qualification, except good will.” This is a philosophical, if you wish metaphysical, formulation of Christ’s commandment of love. Anything that is done out of the good will is good, and anything (even it looks good) that flows from a bad will is bad. This good will of Kant is, of course, inspired by the general will of Rousseau, which the latter describes, in the *Social Contract*, as always correct, never in error.

Why am I telling you this? Because it is the vocation of philosophy always to alert people of the fundamental ground of all our assertions, such as the stuff of the universe among the Greeks, the principle of knowledge among the moderns as exemplified by its father, René Descartes, and now, the groundwork of morals, among us who are politically split on the correctness of Duterte administration. I shall not discuss this issue further because that’s not my role today, but I would only like to impress on you the importance of philosophy in providing the ground for any issue that comes our way, personally or socially. Time was when there was only philosophy; whether they are aware of it or not, the different sciences are offshoots of philosophical thinking; then came the time when, mostly during the modern times, like prodigal sons, these sciences walked away from their source and sought their respective destinies, resulting in the incredible progress that each one has accomplished, especially by way of science and technology. This is the heritage of the West to the world and there is no more turning back; we can no longer go back to the past of typewriters and slow postal mails. Technology has certainly improved the lot of men and there is no more turning the clock of time to a past which is purely, or almost purely, manual exertion. Yet, the West has also reached the end of the line and produced the limits of growth. The paradigm shift to postmodernity has given a new voice to what used to be marginalized in the past – the voices of women, of the poor, of those who are weak, of the disabled, of the other genders, and even of the helpless environment which we have dominated without mercy, all for purposes of gain and profitability.
Ours are different times, times in which differences matter. And the first to recognize this paradigm shift are our philosophers who have ceaselessly toiled and reflected in order to advance the movement of the human spirit. This is why I make a lot about our shift to postmodernity. These, our times, are the postmodern times, what Martin Heidegger calls the second beginning, after the completion of that first beginning which commenced among the Greeks whose initial questions dictated the directions of the next two millennia of Western domination. With my students I would single out Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* as the completion of the first beginning, at the same time the signal for the commencement of what Heidegger claims to be the second beginning, what I here refer to as postmodernity. The Church has officially joined it when Pope John XXIII convened the Second Vatican Council in 1963, and the Philippines had officially taken the same step when it mounted the justly famous EDSA Revolution through the People Power of 1986. Both the Second Vatican Council and the EDSA Revolution are unfinished and still ongoing. I dare say that any work, including any philosophical work, that is not according to the spirit of these momentous events could most likely not make any contribution to history-in-the-making.

I have no doubt that our Philippine society is in the process of its own self-creation. Just as, as Sartre tells us, man is what he makes himself to be, so also our country is what we collectively make of it. Existentialism, in particular, situates philosophy in the world, which is why you will recall Heidegger calling us Dasein, literally being-there, where? In the world. We can no longer philosophize in an ivory tower, as Marsilio Ficino used to do when he was doing his researches on the divine Plato. A disembodied philosophy makes no sense today; it, too, is in the world, that is, as Hannah Arendt would put, it is in action. This is the reason why Sartre correctly avers that the one system which all contemporary philosophy has to overcome is Marxism. What is philosophy today without Marx? Marx is grounded in an ever-recurring revolution that will never grow stale for as long as there are injustices and forces of oppression in our society. Philosophy, in short, contrary to what people are wont to say, is, perhaps the most universally useful preoccupation we can ever engage in. Again, as Sartre puts it, even the most abstruse of philosophies (such as, for example, Kant and Hegel) are truly most fundamentally radical and useful.

That brings us to the work before us. As in all other disciplines, we need experts, and for this we need students who will tirelessly work to master their craft, in our case in philosophy. In other words, as Confucius says, we need students who rectify their names. “Let the prince be as prince, let the minister be as a minister, let the father be as a father, let the son be as a son,” says Confucius. We do not philosophize on top of our head. We do not become original overnight by simply thinking aloud whatever comes to our mind. We have to listen, and we have to read. And while you still have the time, you must read incessantly, because when you are no longer students, when you are already burdened with so much administrative, domestic and clerical things to do, you will have very little time, if at all you have time, to read. So, hone yourself to become the best that you can be, and the time to do that is not tomorrow but today.

So join me in my advocacy and let’s encourage everybody to allow no day to pass without reading. Reading is the best exercise for you now, even as you are still mastering the craft of writing. Indeed, you cannot write well if you do not read, and read voraciously. I am not suggesting that you do not enjoy your life, because I want you to enjoy your life as much as I had enjoyed my life, but I think you will eventually see how much of life you might have failed to enjoy by not doing what you should be doing now as students – that is, study and read.

That’s *a conditio sine qua non* for philosophy; I don’t know of how else to do apprenticeship in philosophy other than by reading. In the beginning, reading would of course be a chore, as difficult as it is boring; but, as in all other pursuits, your enjoyment of it increases as you do more of it. As they
say, you don’t learn swimming except by actually swimming, or biking except by actually biking. That goes, too, with basketball and boxing. So, those of us in philosophy cannot properly learn to appreciate what we have gotten ourselves into except by actually doing philosophy, and that is by reading – and then by writing.

It’s not yet too late to learn how to write, and write well. But it is not possible in our discipline to write well if we don’t read well; the two go together. Those of you who don’t read and write well will never know what you are missing, and there’s nothing we can do about it. If you really want to help build our country through philosophy, there’s no shortcut to it. Learn to write by learning to read, and then you will see what I mean by enjoying life, and here I mean the life of philosophy.

Now I can tell you why I welcome the much talked about educational reform, better known as K to 12. Indeed, I welcome any genuine reform effort that will offer our much decrepit system of education a chance to effect its own paradigm shift. So far, everybody is groping and playing it, so to speak, by ear. Nobody really knows what he or she is doing, and everybody simply moves on, as the wind blows, as they say, hoping that we will eventually learn what this is all about in the process. One thing is certain, that we hope to see the day when the line will finally be clearly drawn between basic education and higher education. College and university are supposed to belong to higher education whose essence is research. Basic education provides the fundamental knowledge and skills, product of original and innovative thinking, for the improvement not merely of existing knowledge and skills but of life in general – individual life as well as social life.

Research and writing is the stuff of which higher education is made, and we – in the Department of Philosophy UST – seem to be on front in this regard. I can only help you in the little way I can, while I still have the energy to do what I can, the least of which is to wish you the best and to pray to the Lord that you will continue to pursue all earnestness as a contribution not only to your personal success but also to the we-being of our people in the Philippines, especially the majority of us who are poor, weak, ignorant and speechless. Again, thank you for your invitation; this is, for me, an honor and privilege.

God bless you all.

1 This paper was presented in the “Undergraduate Philosophy Conference 2017” held at Beato Angelico Auditorium, University of Santo Tomas last 6 April 2017.
A Critique of Critical Legal Studies’ Claim of Legal Indeterminacy

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Abstract: This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies’ (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims are only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. It will show that CLS assertions of legal indeterminacy are only grounded on ambiguity. On one hand, the main concept of legal formalistic logic and language grounded with sub-arguments, namely, inherent generality of legal language, reasoned elaboration, and neutral principles, are used to refute the CLS claims of legal indeterminacy. On the other, it is maintained that the CLS’s main reason of legal indeterminacy, ‘law is politics’, is merely a statement of fact that currently happens in society; it is sentimental and weak, and these assertions will be proven through counterexamples.

CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. It maintains that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power; thus, the assertion: law is politics. Consequently, CLS maintains that this results to indeterminacy of law. Legal indeterminacy can be summarized as contrary to the common understanding that legal materials, statutes and case law, do not really answer legal disputes. Legal principles and doctrines, as CLS scholars claim, are said to be indeterminate, for they are riddled with gaps, conflicts, and anomalies that are widely present even in simple cases. Legal indeterminacy also rises because of the underlying political power – law is politics – which implicates law as merely a tool for oppression.

Keywords: law, jurisprudence, philosophy, critical legal studies, indeterminacy

This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. This paper will also refute CLS’ main ground for claiming legal indeterminacy, the concept of ‘law is politics’, by offering counterexamples.

CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power.
CLS is a kind of postmodern theory of law. It is a philosophical study of law within the scopes of postmodern theoretical outline such as poststructuralist, neo-pragmatist, or post-Freudian psychoanalysis. Together with CLS, postmodern theories of law also include ‘work within law and society theory, law and literature studies, sociological jurisprudence, semiotic legal theory, feminist jurisprudence, and critical race theory’. Furthermore, these theories view modernist theories of law ‘as incoherent, descriptively inadequate, or normatively problematic, and incapable of securing freedom, equality, and justice’. In addition, they also tend to be ‘non-comprehensive, culturally and historically specific, interdisciplinary, rhetorically ambitious, and overtly political’. Living in a pluralistic society maintained by postmodern theory means differences of the collective in wealth, gender, ethnicity, etc. In many instances, these differences often lead to conflicts. According to William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman, the myth is that the state does not take sides, it remains neutral. The legal order is a self-serving system to maintain power and privilege. This position is very different from Natural Law and Legal Positivism. In contrast to postmodern theories of law, there is a universal acceptance and agreement on what laws should be. However, the myth claims that powerful groups impose their will upon the collective by controlling the law inside a certain society.

Legal Realists assert that judges hold the key to the influence of law. They further claimed that judges are guided by their interpretation of the law; however, being human means being influenced by other factors such as feelings, moods, alliances, and preferences. They also highlight the fundamental importance of personality in the outcome of dispute. The CLS scholars used the ideas and legacy of Legal Realism that sought to challenge the existing convention in the legal system.

Legal Realism is a school of legal philosophy that is generally connected with the attack on the orthodox and conventional claims of late 19th century classical legal thought in the United States. Its most important legacy – the challenge to the classical legal claim that legal reasoning was separated and autonomous from moral and political discourse – was then used further and improved by the Critical Legal Studies.

CLS began in the mid-1970s with its early proponents from Harvard Law School faculty. In the beginning, many proponents of the American CLS scholars were immersed in legal education. By that time, they were influenced by their experiences from different movements: civil rights movements, women’s rights movements, and the anti-war movements of the 1960s and 1970s. From these different protests against the domestic politics, CLS began and eventually translated into a critical stance towards the dominant legal ideology of the modern Western society. Both the British and American version started roughly at the same time. They both wanted to explain what is wrong in the legal thought and practice.

The movement operated around a number of conferences held annually, particularly the Critical Legal Conference and the National Critical Lawyers Group. Since then CLS has steadily grown in influence and permanently changed the landscape of legal theory. Among the noted CLS theorists are Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Robert W. Gordon, Morton J. Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy, and Katharine A. MacKinnon.

Like most schools and movements, CLS has not produced a single, monumental body of thought. Although there are several common themes and subjects that can be traced to different adherents’ works. The first theme is that legal materials, such as statutes and case law, do not totally determine the result of legal disputes. Second is the idea that ‘law is politics’. The arguments take aim at the positivist conception of law being separated from
politics and morality. Third is the traditional claim that the law tends to serve the interests of the wealthy and powerful by protecting them against the demands of the poor and the subaltern, women, ethnic minorities, working class, indigenous people, disabled, homosexuals, etc., for greater 'justice'. Fourth are the claims that legal materials are inherently contradictory. Finally, they question the central assumption of law that an individual, a judge or a lawyer, is an autonomous individual; that they are able to make unbiased decisions based on reason detached from political, social, or economic constraints. CLS scholars hold that individuals are intrinsically tied to their epoch, socio-economic class, gender, race, and other conditions of life, temporary or permanently. Therefore, they question the idea of 'free' and partial decision-making.

However, as stated earlier, CLS, as a legal theory, shows different weaknesses as a critique of the legal system. One of their main claims states that due to the politics of law, its contradictory character, and other external factors, law becomes indeterminate. Nevertheless, this claim is grounded on the ambiguity of confections, ideas, and concepts.

This thesis uses a legal formalist logic and language critique of CLS claims of legal indeterminacy. It maintains that laws are inherently objective, stable, and therefore determinate. It states that the CLS claims of legal indeterminacy is excessive, using a legal formalist logic and language as the main counter-argument, backed by grounds as follows: inherent generality and neutrality of legal codes, reasoned elaboration, centrality and institutionalized process. In addition, this thesis refutes the main premise of CLS claims of legal indeterminacy – which is the assertion that 'law is politics'. It will be done through offering counterexamples that will uphold law as an entity that is not purely politics.

The idea of ‘formalist’ throughout the thesis does not exclusively imply the school of legal formalism, for it also means a ‘strict adherence’ or ‘observance of’. Although it will not dwell on CLS concerning its postmodern approach and view, it will discuss the weaknesses of postmodernism applied to legal jurisprudence, to serve as a supplementary critique to its flaws. Again, the critique’s focus is on CLS’ main assertions on legal indeterminacy, concentrating on the legal theory they proposed.

Correspondingly, the aim of this paper is to use CLS theory’s potential. Their approach or way of looking into the nature of law can be used to develop a viable alternative theorization that is capable of providing a new direction for legal scholarship and legal institutions as a whole. Moreover, in showing the weaknesses and strengths of CLS, the paper will offer a resolution that will further answer the problem with the legal system as a whole.

This thesis also offers examples of statutes, laws, and legal cases in the Philippine context. These examples will further help the reader in contextualizing the theories posited by the paper. For further elucidation, an overview of each chapter follows:

After the introduction on the first chapter, the second chapter exemplifies the current CLS movement’s knowledge, substantive arguments, as well as theoretical and methodological contributions. In addition, it shows the concepts, views, subjects, and themes that the CLS movement has by tracing them from the existing adherent works. It starts with the impression of postmodernism using a chapter on postmodern legal theories from Emmanuel Fernando’s *A Course on Legal Theory*. A brief analysis of the most prominent forerunners of Legal Realist thought, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., and one of his main works, *The Common Law* follows. This is succeeded by a brief examination of Roberto Unger’s major works, *The Universal History of Legal Thought*, *Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory*, *The Critical Legal Studies*
Movement, and What Should Legal Analysis Become?
Then, the discussion narrows down to the CLS’ main assertions – its grounds, claims, and warrant – concerning their statement of law as indeterminate and purely political.

The third chapter states the paper’s main arguments against the CLS movement’s claim of legal indeterminacy. This paper shows that CLS’ assertions are based on ambiguity, stating that, their claim of legal indeterminacy is founded only in a confusion between generality and contradictory. The paper uses arguments that move around the idea of legal formalism, logic, and language. It is then reinforced by sub-arguments that will further support the main assertion of legal formalist logic and language, which includes inherent generality and neutrality of legal language, institutionalized and centralized process, and reasoned elaboration. In this chapter, the paper also refutes the CLS’ main grounds for legal indeterminacy – the idea of ‘law is politics’ – is refuted through counterexamples. Further claiming that the idea is merely a statement of fact that currently happens in society and using this as a ground for legal indeterminacy being sentimental and weak.

The last part offers the conclusion that CLS fails in demonstrating the indeterminacy of law. This is proven by refuting their claim of contradictions in law through legal formalism. Then, with the use of legal formalist logic and language, together with the sub-arguments: ‘reasoned elaboration’, inherent generality and neutrality of legal language, centralized and institutionalized process and settlement, this thesis refutes the claim of personal, partial, and subjective legal decisions. Nevertheless, it still considers CLS as a legitimate legal theory, and maintains that it can be used as a viable theory for the advancement and benefit of the jurisprudence.

Critical Legal Studies

Critical Legal Studies (CLS) began with the concept and ideas of postmodernism. The postmodern legal theory sought to dismantle the meta-narratives of modernity, which in this case is the legal institution as a whole. They want to ‘disrupt the foundations of the now conventional, comforting certainties.’ In this situation the ‘comforting certainties’ are the theories that include legal positivism and natural law theory which offers a certain definition and nature of law.

This paper will focus on the CLS’ claims of legal indeterminacy and legal impartiality as the main point of the critique. Postmodernism with its externality and anti-foundationalist character can also be used in analysing the CLS’ claims against legal institutions.

Positive and Negative Jurisprudence

An overview of the postmodernism legal theory will help, for this is the style and character of CLS. Emmanuel Fernando examined the general orientation of postmodern legal theory as a collective movement in legal studies. He contrasted the postmodern approach to legal theory with the approach taken in Anglo-American legal theory. Fernando claimed that the postmodern approach is excessively external and anti-foundationalist. He added that the modern approach also ends the nagging problem of infinite regress, which haunts all efforts to establish a political or legal platform. Fernando maintains that one critique of postmodernism is its ‘destructive character’, and it offers nothing or hardly anything constructive. However, this kind of approach against the CLS seems futile since CLS is a postmodern legal theory. This means that this kind of legal theory does not really offer any structural framework of what is and only criticizes the existing conventions. It will depend on the individuals to formulate their solution about the criticized aspect of the subject. Fernando coined the positive and negative jurisprudence in assessing postmodern legal theory. On one hand, positive jurisprudence ‘refers to any legal theory which provides a basis for judicial action in a particular case or situation
and/or recommends the basic structures for a just state'. It specifically demands justice in particular legal controversies such as abortion, affirmative action, privacy, and the proper extent of taxation. In addition, it also suggests the nature of laws as a social phenomenon, and how decisions should be made in particular cases. Their work is positive in the sense that they offer a ‘normative framework for future action by legislators and judges’.

On the other hand, negative jurisprudence operates critical insights about the law, but it does not offer a positive plan for action. CLS stands on this realm of jurisprudence, for it only criticizes the existing notion of law, but it does not offer any plan of action. This is also where the critique of externality is founded.

The issue then is which is better between the two approaches: positive or negative jurisprudence. CLS scholars claim that it is better to replace normative appeals with ‘description and criticism’ together with a more critical approach to law. However, as claimed by Fernando, normativity may be partially correct at some point, but positive jurisprudence is more essential. He added that CLS scholars who analyse the normative conceptions tend to also use the concepts they ridicule i.e. justice, fairness etc. Therefore, due to the lack of foundation, they lean towards a foundation unintentionally, which then results to a sort of contradiction. Another reason stated by Fernando in support of positive jurisprudence is that legal decisions are made internally, and not by revolutionary sociologist. He further maintained that a purely external critique without a normative component of what should be done is useless, for it cannot be really applied to legal practice. He added that, to change the law, positive jurisprudence is required. The solution then is for CLS to seek and not disregard a foundation that is strong enough and supported with normative claims. Deconstructing the foundational thinking in law seems to be a failed attempt because in each case there is a retreat to foundations of anew but unworkable sort.

External and Internal Viewpoint

Externality of law is the view that tends to take a third-person (observer’s) view of the legal system. This is in contrast with the internal view, which includes legal practitioners: lawyers, judges, legislators. The external view of law looks at the big picture; it answers the larger question of ideology. It may be argued that this kind of approach is as essential as the internal viewpoint; however, it is also seen as rather irrelevant. According to Dworkin, ‘theories that ignore the structure of legal argument for supposedly larger questions of history and society are therefore perverse. They ignore questions about the internal character of legal argument, so their explanations are impoverished.’ Generally, an excessively external viewpoint in law is irrelevant, and it does not categorically affect legal institution. Conversely, according to Alan Hunt, a CLS scholar:

The dominant tradition of contemporary legal theory is epitomized by H.L.A Hart and Ronal Dworkin that insists upon the adoption of an internalist perspective. It exhibits predisposition to adopt the self-descriptions of judges or lawyers as primary empirical material. There is thus a naïve acceptance of legal ideology as legal reality. Internal theory is simply too close to its subject matter.

Hunt’s point revolves around the warrant that legal practitioners, as a rational individual part of a certain society, have their own biases. It includes all external factors that influence the judging process like gender and class. This is one of the main assertions purported by the CLS scholars as their grounds on their claim of ‘law as politics’, which will be further discussed on the next chapter.
Legal Realism

Many theories claim that CLS was rooted from the Legal Realism’s legacy because of their almost similar doctrines. There is a general claim or a popular belief that CLS is a maturation of legal realism. The challenge to the classical legal claim that legal reasoning was separated and autonomous from moral and political discourse was then used further and improved by the Critical Legal Studies. As part of the main influences of CLS, a review on the most prominent forerunners of American Legal Realist thought, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s *The Common Law* will help. This is the book where the legal realists found its battle cry, where it commenced the most famous aphorism: ‘The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.’ This aphorism, together with whole book itself, created various discussions and debates whether it is a denunciation of all efforts to exemplify law as science, or an attack to the orthodox conception of law as a coherent system of fixed axioms from which particular rules and decisions could be deduced.

The main goal of legal realism and CLS seems similar, but the problem comes from their historical background. Jeffrey Standen claimed that CLS is actually not of a legal realist descent, but of an anti-positivist influence. In ‘Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon’, Standen notes that the CLS approach to law traces its lineage back to the natural law tradition of ancient Greece and Rome. He further contends that in both its philosophy and its methodology, CLS stands not as an extension of legal realism but as its antithesis. This creates the difference between the two schools. Legal Realism has based its critique on a positivist belief that law and morals are separate; whereas CLS is based on Natural Law. This also creates another weakness on the part of CLS because of the weak historical foundation from Classical Natural Law, which will be dealt with in the third chapter.

By the early 1990s, the CLS conference had dissolved, yet the CLS movement continued its influence on the work of numerous legal scholars in different fields: legal and constitutional theory, legal history, labor and employment law, international law, local government law, and administrative law.

Critical Legal Studies Scholars ‘Crits’

Consequently, adherents of CLS sought to destabilize traditional conceptions of law, and to unravel and challenge existing legal institutions. Over the following two decades after the sixties, from the civil rights and feminist movements and even in art, architecture, literature, and language, CLS did not leave legal theory untouched. The trend for proponents of CLS is mainly of a postmodern attack, meaning CLS attempts to disrupt the all-embracing theory of origins and structure of law.

The Brazilian philosopher, social theorist, and politician, Roberto Unger, leads the Critical Legal Studies Movement. They seek to rebuild legal institutions for human equality permanently, and not just a temporary truce in a brutal struggle against the legal injustices. They seek to change the traditional views of law and legal doctrine, revealing the hidden interests and class dominations in the existing and prevailing legal frameworks. As one of the founding members of the movement, most of his works reflect the ideology CLS demonstrates.

Unger starts with *The Universal History of Legal Thought.* He relates law as the doctrinal quest for normative order, law as the will of the sovereign, and law as the unexplained and unjustified structure of society.

Unger’s second book is the *Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory.* It is used to examine how his legal theory develops as it is now. It is a study of the place of law in societies, and the criticism of social theory. It answers different inquiries about law and society, the
conditions of different kinds of law, the bases of the rule of law, the significance of studying law, social hierarchy and moral vision, the struggles of the rule of law, and the lastly, the changes in the legality and legal thought. These are the questions that Unger dealt with through a broad range of historical settings. Generally, it claims the resolution of its internal dilemmas; however, he did not offer a legitimate solution, but more of a metaphysical one.

In *The Critical Legal Studies Movement*, Unger shows the incongruity of formalism and objectivism. He discussed how laws and legal discourse hide the social inequalities and political biases that so interest philosophy and revolutionary politics. He first maintained the main objection to the approach or view of the critical legal studies movement, that "there is a formidable gap that suggests between the reach of their intellectual and political commitments, together with the constraints upon their situation." In *What Should Legal Analysis Become?*, Unger argues for the reconstruction of legal analysis as a discipline of institutional imagination. He added that changing the practice of legal analysis has an effect in re-imagining and reshaping the dominant institutions of representative democracy, market economy, and free civil society. The search for basic social alternatives, largely abandoned by philosophy and politics, can find in such a practice a new point of departure. He then criticized the dominant, rationalizing style of legal doctrine, with its obsessive focus upon negotiation and its urge to suppress or contain conflict or contradiction in law. Further, he shows how we can turn legal analysis into a way of talking about the alternative institutional futures of a democratic society. Overall, the major concern of the book is to search how professional subjects such as legal thought can inform the public or the collective down to the masses.

Equally important, a compilation of interviews with the legal intellectuals and scholars edited James R. Hackney Jr., *Legal Intellectuals in Conversation: Reflections on the Construction of Contemporary American Legal Theory*, shows the fundamental theoretical questions in legal academia. For the Critical Legal Studies part, Hackney interviewed Duncan Kennedy, a Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School, and one of the founders of CLS. In the interview, Kennedy stated the difference between realist and Crits. He claimed that ‘realists had been so committed to policy science and policy analysis, which they would preserve the law and politics distinction’, and further claiming that ‘they were never able to take their own critique seriously.’ He shortly mentioned the difference between the legal realist and crits. That they are doing a critique against the legal realist stand with regards to analysing policy. The main difference that he added is that legal realists are not getting rid of the formalism. He added that CLS have something that is hard to substitute, which is ‘rational policy thinking’. However, on this claim, there is no clear definition or explanation of the so-called rational policy thinking.

Brian Tamanaha has another approach with CLS. In his article *The Failure of Crits and Leftist Law Professors to Defend Progressive Causes*, he mentioned an economic problem that might explain one of the CLS movement’s major themes – the legal system is largely built by elites. Tamanaha introduced the pricing structure of legal education that shows an intense class implication, for the tuition is too high for the middle and working class. Consequently, this creates an economic barrier, therefore placing the elites in higher legal positions.

Duncan Kennedy also maintained Tamanaha’s claim of economic inequality in the legal education. Kennedy further stated that one of the major goal of CLS was to transform legal education. *Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy*, self-published as a pamphlet in 1982, is Kennedy’s critique of the American legal education. In it, he argues that American legal
education reinforces class, race, and gender inequality. He argued that everything about law school: curriculum, course material, teaching styles, grading system, class ranking, treatment of secretaries, how people dress and talk, on-campus hiring system, etc. ‘train students to accept and participate in the hierarchical structure of life in law.’

Kennedy further argued that because of these, the educators must take ‘personal responsibility’ for the legal hierarchy for the legal education per se is a crucial part of perpetuating the system.

CLS’ Major Themes and thoughts

As introduced earlier, the CLS scholars as a whole do not offer a monolithic body of thought, but several common themes can be traced in its members’ works. First, there is the idea that all ‘law is politics’. This means that legal decisions are not legal at all, for they are political. It takes aim at the positivist idea that law and politics is separated. Given their claim of the politics in law, there is a usual strand for CLS scholars that law tends to serve the interests of the wealthy and the powerful by protecting them against the demands of the poor and subaltern: women, ethnic minorities, working class, disabled, and homosexuals. Generally, they all argue that law is used as tool for the elite’s protection.

Critical theorists argue that actual judges and legislatures produce predictable results. These results, mostly, are tilted towards the benefit of the elite. As Morton Horwitz argued, since 19th century courts changed legal rules to spur economic competition and assisted the elite merchants for power and wealth. Also as early as 19th century to 20th century, courts remade and repealed property rules to permit owners to exclude people from access to commercial and other enterprise business mainly for racial reasons. As stated by Alan Freeman, law reforms implemented are at the perspective of the perpetrators themselves rather than the perspective of the victim. It is given the idea that the ones who are placed, appointed, and are able to be on the legal realm are the elite, again using law as their tool for protection.

Most CLS scholars seek to demonstrate historical, socioeconomic, and psychological analyses to identify how these particular groups and institutions benefit from legal decisions. They also want to expose how the legal analysis and legal culture mystify outsiders; moreover, making it work to make legal results seem legitimate.

In addition, CLS claims that individuals’ decisions are based on reason that is attached to political, social, or economic constraints. Therefore, law practitioners do not really create a decision solely based on the law, but it is influenced by their political, social, and economical factors down to even their current state while deciding. For instance, external factors like weather, his or her breakfast, socio-economic class, gender, race, and all other conditions of life, affect the judge’s decision in a certain case. Duncan Kennedy, one of the most noted proponents, acknowledges that these stated psychological and social dimensions of judicial roles exist as a constraint for the legal adjudication.

Legal Indeterminacy and Politics

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the Critical Legal Studies’ (CLS) main assertion of legal indeterminacy. Here we shall state that it is only grounded on ambiguity and confusion about the legal process and decision. Particularly, it is also founded on the confusion of inherent generality of laws as contradictory, incoherent, and vague. Furthermore, this chapter also refutes the CLS claim of ‘law is politics’ as their grounds for positing legal indeterminacy.

Contrary to the critical scholars’ claim of laws being indeterminate, this paper offers an account and proof for law’s determinacy through an overarching principle of a legal formalist logic and language. This paper comprises the sub-arguments that will support the main assertion of legal formalism that includes inherent generality.
of legal language, reasoned elaboration, and neutral principle.

The focus of this paper revolves around the idea of legal indeterminacy which states that contrary to the common understanding, legal materials, statutes and case law, do not really answer legal disputes.

Legal principles and doctrines, CLS scholars claim, are said to be indeterminate in two ways. First, the legal rules in force contain substantial gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities. They maintain that these existing gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities are not anomalies or exceptions, but are widely present even in simple cases. Second, legal indeterminacy also rises because of the underlying norms that include stability and predictability, and also fairness and utility.

Furthermore, CLS theorists do not claim that legal indeterminacy branched out because of the absence of structure. Alternatively, they argue that legal indeterminacy results from specific kinds of structure that run throughout law.

To demonstrate the indeterminacy of legal doctrines, some critical scholars used the methods of semiotics. They used it to deconstruct theories, and further unearth a deep structure of categories and tensions about the legal system as a whole. For instance, Duncan Kennedy maintains that various legal doctrines revolve around a structure of binary pairs of opposing concepts: self and other, private and public, subjective and objective, freedom and control. For Kennedy, such pairs limit the legal doctrines to two sides only. Further, he maintains that this is a manifestation of the indeterminacy of legal doctrines as it developed through history.

Kennedy also argues that instead of replicating existing social power relations, classrooms could be an arena for political analysis and struggle. He further claims that law schools should expose the indeterminacy of legal doctrine. They need to teach law students to unbundle and reframe legal arguments on behalf of those with less power.

According to some critical scholars, most existing legal theories are too committed to the law being determinate, objective, and neutral. The problem, according to them, is that neither of these ideals can be obtain in legal practice. ‘Law is neither, objective, nor neutral.’ Critical scholars have been especially critical of law’s claim to objectivity. Looking into most works of critical scholars, they developed extensive arguments concluding that law is radically indeterminate, incoherent, and contradictory. Critical scholars maintain that the areas of law embody conflicting principles that cannot be balanced. The principles and counter-principles are manifestations of larger social visions or ‘prescriptive conceptions of society’ which are themselves inconsistent. Some critical scholars claim that unresolvable conflicts arise in nearly every case. In addition, according to CLS, law is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack single right answers.

Furthermore, the concept of ‘law is politics’ is one of their main grounds to their claim of legal indeterminacy. Since the 1920s, Legal Realism started to develop the indeterminacy argument. It was then revised and updated in the 1980s by the proponents of the CLS movement to serve as their spearhead. Then, they employed this argument to claim that the rule of law was a myth designed to maintain the illegitimate domination of society by the economically and politically powerful or the elites.

Legal formalism

This thesis uses the main principles of a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion. Legal formalism is a theory that legal rules stand separate from other social and political institutions. According to this theory, once lawmakers produce rules, judges apply them to the facts of a case without regard to social interests and public policy. Lawrence Solum
describes it as commitment to a set of ideas that more or less states: 48

(1) The law consists of rules.
(2) Legal rules can be meaningful.
(3) Legal rules can be applied to particular facts.
(4) Some actions accord with meaningful legal rules; other actions do not.
(5) The standard for what constitutes following a rule vel non can be publicly knowable.

Legal formalism started around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 49 It was the era of the ‘classical legal consciousness’ where they view judicial decision-making as ‘a scientific, deductive process by which preexisting legal materials subsume particular legal cases under their domain, thus allowing judges to infer the antecedently existing right answer to the case at bar.’ 50 Therefore, it is implied, using this formalistic approach, that judges decide cases objectively and impersonally by logically deducing the correct resolution from a definite and consistent body of legal rules. Thus, the judge does not make the law; rather, he or she merely applies the law that had been created by the legislature.

The possibility of using a deductive process of resolving a legal case has been clearly described as follows:

Predominant legal theory claimed that reasoning proceeded syllogistically from rules and precedents that had been clearly defined historically and logically, through the particular facts of a case, to a clear decision. The function of a judge was to discover analytically the proper rules and precedents involved and to apply them to the case as first premise. Once he or she had done that, the judge could decide the case with certainty and uniformity. 51

Further, another illustration of how the act of legal reasoning can be shown in structure to pure deduction:

Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction. The figure of its reasoning is the stating of a rule applicable to certain facts, a finding that the facts of the particular case are those certain facts and the application of the rule is a logical necessity. The old syllogism, ‘All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore he is mortal’, states the exact form of a judicial judgment. The existing rule of law is: Every man who with malice aforethought kills another in the peace of the people is guilty of murder. The defendant with malice aforethought killed A.B. in the peace of the people; therefore, the defendant is guilty of murder. 52

Therefore, it may be established that the language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. Then, given the logical method and form, it may also be concluded that it is founded also of certainty. Consequently, this possibility denies the claim of critical theorist judges cannot produce a certain answer or decision. In addition, this kind of legal reasoning also provides certainty, stability, and predictability to the law.

**Inherent generality of laws**

Another concern for the critical theorist is the vagueness of language used in legal rules e.g. ‘reasonable’, ‘due process’, ‘fair value’ etc. However, their claim of legal indeterminacy as founded on the vagueness of language is simply a confusion with the inherent generality of legal language. Laws are inherently general. It is to allow the legal practitioners in reading it as broadly or as narrowly as necessary to achieve a desired result.

In addition, it will be irrational to claim that all laws are supposed to be specific to be applied on each legal cases, for it will never and cannot reflect the exact reality of events that happen in a
certain society in which it is applied. That is to say, with the complexities of events, crimes, definitions, individuals, etc. laws exist to be general and overlapping for it to match the complexities to which it is to be applied. According to Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, laws are supposed to be general for better application. Codes and rules are composed of general provisions from enforcement, application, and penalties. He further claims that the law is coherent, clear, and discoverable in most cases. He specifically argues that the legal rules are necessarily worded in generalities so that they will apply to a broad variety of cases. This leaves an ‘open texture’ quality of rules for an element of judicial discretion in cases where law is unclear.

In *The Concept of Law*, Hart maintains that there are some cases in which the rules of the legal system do not clearly specify the correct legal outcome. Hart claims, ‘Penumbra of uncertainty’ is derived from the vagueness and open texture of the legal language. The judges apply existing rules created by the legislature. Take note that judges apply rules for adjudication, not just a single rule. Given the existence of pluralistic events, the penumbra of uncertainty and the open texture of the legal rules or legal language as whole is crucial. For Hart, the indeterminacy of law is a peripheral or an outlying phenomenon in a system of rules, which provide specific outcomes to cases.

For instance, a quick analysis of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines or the Act No. 3815 will help in illustrating legal codes’ generality. In its first book, it is initially stated that it will use general provisions with its date of enforcement and application, together with its offenses, liabilities, and penalties. Laws are made specific only on the note of its articles and sub-articles. The problem, perhaps, rises from the vague terms on its defining article. In the example, the key term that needs to be defined is ‘deceit’. According to Article 3 – Definitions, ‘felonies’ are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa). Further, it defined deceit as when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. This act shows that in general, it corresponds to all acts of felonies by deceit and fault, and at the same it also corresponds to a more specific case through the extension stated through its sections. The existence of vague terms does not necessarily suggest the indistinctness of law, but it shows the inherent generality of the legal language. These kinds of gaps are for judges to fill in; however, it may be debatable that judges may tend to fill in these gaps in accordance to his or her biases therefore making the law not neutral at all.

Moreover, another concern is the idea of ‘precedence’. The term precedence in the situation of legal institution may mean different things. First, it can be about the possibility of a new law created with a certain section contradicting or matching an old law. For instance, the R.A. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women (MCW) and the R.A. 10354 or the Reproductive Health Law (RH Law) are relatively new. The MCW was approved on year 2007, while the RH Law on 2012. The former, as it recognizes the realities that affect the women’s condition, promotes comprehensive plans, policies, programs, measures, and mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in all aspects of life of women. The latter, which mainly focuses on reproductive health, still stated and allotted a section against discrimination that already exists on the precedent laws passed. The problem with these is the legitimacy of what law is to be cited: the new or the precedent. The response is the newer law is more updated, therefore it is more valid. However, this does not remove the legitimacy of the precedent or the older law, for given in the example, some certain sections of the RH Law point towards the MCW for a more comprehensive focus on gender discrimination. Moreover, this kind of example shows that precedence always drives on the new and updated act, but this does not claim
illegitimacy on the previous act. These kinds of complications were answered by the court postulation that the legislature was implicitly or explicitly implicating that it repeals the older law. Again, the said complications on the old and new laws do not entail law as indeterminate.

Second, since the Philippines has a hybrid of common and civil law legal system, a precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous legal case that is either binding for a court or any other tribunal when deciding a certain case with similar issues or facts. It is established by following earlier judicial decisions or a system of judicial decisions like the Supreme Court Annotated (SCRA) volumes here in the Philippines. SCRAs are the decisions created by previous justices on their previous cases. A certain judge may seek a case written comparable to his or her case in need of adjudication; then by knowing the previous decision, the judge may come up with his or her own to be considered as a valid decision. However, according to the critical scholars, these acts create and generate indeterminacy on the part of statutes. Thus, the idea of reviewing SCRAs for judicial decisions is not for direct pronouncement, but merely as a guide for consistencies.

Again, legal cases may be comparable, and these similarities can be used for consistencies on decisions for easier judicial process.

Consequently, laws do not really contradict, but they only overlap due to their generality. ‘Overlap’ does not necessarily suppose that it ‘contradicts’. The CLS conception of contradictory of laws is based on ambiguity, for it may be claimed that their stance of contradictory is nothing but laws’ inherent generality.

Reasoned Elaboration

Additional argument against the critical theorists’ claim of indeterminate legal decisions is the rise of the Legal Process School that is widely associated with materials and thoughts developed by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. This serves as an explanation against critical scholars’ claim of judicial decisions being personal. Within this realm, the legal process theory maintained judges could decide cases through the process of ‘reasoned elaboration’. Further, it will answer questions against the indeterminacy of laws through the elaboration of principles and policies contained within precedent and legislation.

As discussed earlier, legal codes and statutes often have general language, but that does not mean that the officials should simply interpret this ambiguous language to reflect their own political values. Legal practitioners should apply a ‘general directive arrangement’ must elaborate the arrangement in a way which is consistent with the other established applications of it, and ‘must do so in a way which best serves the principles and policies it expresses.’

It may be conceded that judges have their own bias in judicial decision-making, and that the adjudication is not merely a mechanical deduction from precedents and statutory texts. However, with the idea of reasoned elaboration, judges ideally reason from legal materials using principles that are neutral together with the defined set of facts. Using the legal process concept:

The integrity of the judicial process may be compromised if the cases that are decided on extend further than the case at hand…only by insisting on a level of generality, some distance between the reasons and the facts of the case at hand, can one be certain that judges are actually reasoning from legal materials rather than indulging their own preference.

Furthermore, according to Hart, the court should focus on applying and interpreting, and not on creating laws. He added that it is part of the legal duties to develop a ‘reasoned application of basic principle’ to a certain case. He maintained that a court should base its action, not on a free judgment of relative social advantage, but on the
reasoned development of authoritative starting-points i.e. statutes, prior judicial decisions.\textsuperscript{68} Besides, creating or modifying the existing statutes to come up with a decision will result to fading of written laws, since it will not be used appropriately.

Therefore, the problem of indeterminacy is not really plaguing the concept of law per se. Nevertheless, the problem seems to be derived on the way judges interpret laws. It may be conceded that, in reality, judges do in fact make decisions based on their political bias. However, laws can be neutral with its inherent generality. As maintained by Wechsler, courts can make such determinations based on the type of ‘reasoned explanation’ with intrinsic judicial action.\textsuperscript{69} He added that if judges would decide cases strictly on the basis of such neutral principles rather than being result driven, judicial decision could be both extracted determinate and politically neutral.\textsuperscript{70} Courts should respect legal procedures and materials, carefully consider the arguments of both parties, and justify the result with a honest and reasoned judicial opinion that provides a reasoned elaboration of the purposes behind the law being interpreted.\textsuperscript{71}

In addition, Dworkin also added that by correctly identifying the ‘best’ interpretation of these materials, judges are and can be able to render determinate outcomes to legal controversies even in those cases in which appeal to the rules alone would provide ambiguous results.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{Institutionalized System}

Every judicial and legislative institution has its own protocol. It is composed of system, framework, and protocols. For instance, in the Philippines, the court system is composed of Review Courts, Trial Courts, and Special Courts like Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Sharia Courts.\textsuperscript{73} These variety of courts are laddered with hierarchy. Each court has their own obligations and responsibilities depending on the type of the case. This is where the idea of judicial review rises. If an individual wants to make an appeal, his or her case will be transferred to a higher court for another review, assuming that it will be accepted for reopening of case.

These institutionalized systems create a stronger foundation of the legal system; therefore, making law more determinate and stable.

\textbf{‘Law is politics’}

One of the main premise for CLS claim of legal indeterminacy is their claim of ‘law is politics’. The critical scholars’ claim of ‘law is politics’ is founded on the idea that since laws are written, implemented, and decided by predominantly Christian, white, males—then laws are ‘political’. They mainly criticized the law through this argument, further maintaining that this adds up to the reason why the law is indeterminate.

This thesis acknowledges the existence of political bias of legal practitioners from the creation, implementation, and judicial extension of laws. However, the claim that ‘law is politics’ is excessive. It may be true that there is politics in law, but law is not purely politics. ‘Law is politics’ is the same form as ‘A is B’. Therefore, it proposes identity between the two different concepts. Furthermore, the claim overly reduces law as purely a political entity, which it is not.

Politics exists in every part of society. The law is part of society as a human artifact and it is also tainted with politics. Laws cannot stand on their own, for legal practitioners interpret them. Using the definition of ‘politics’ as power, the politics of law indeed exists. However, the taint of politics came from the legal practitioners, and not on the notion of law itself. It only serves as a tool, for the individuals, as the critical scholars claim, the elites. The existence of politics in law does not necessarily cause indeterminacy of laws.

Counterexamples will help refute the claim that ‘law is politics’, and it is the developments that happened in legal system. For instance, societies used laws to legitimate developments for social justice. The best example is the changes about
slavery in different societies. Others may argue that slavery still exists, but the developments since the ancient times until now are pronounced. The elites prominently benefited with slavery, and laws were used to halt these discriminations.

Another example is the constitution. The constitution is committed to social and distributive justice. Using the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it has articles that directly address human rights through Article 3 Bill of Rights. In this article, from Section 1 to Section 22, it addresses every right of an individual – life, liberty, property, privacy, freedom, equal protection of the laws, etc. The Article 13 was even dedicated to social justice and human rights. In addition, the government distributes wealth using taxation laws like the National Internal Revenue Code, Tariff and Customs Code, and Real Property Tax Code. It may be claimed that deprived citizens still exists, but this taxation laws’ primary goal was to redistribute wealth through government projects that everyone in society can use.

The problem with this criticism of law as a legal theory is that it merely states the current political state of law. It does not add any strong point to the indeterminacy of law, for the problem only lies on the collective and not on the notion of law itself.

**CLS’ Response**

Given the stated arguments on this chapter, a contemporary critical scholar may offer the following response:

First, a critical scholar may respond to the critics of CLS through claiming that they are part of a certain society, therefore they are also blinded or in denial of being affected by politics and dominant ideology of their epoch. This is comparable to the idea false consciousness in Marxist ideology where the masses are not aware of the oppression. However, this response may be also used against the critical scholars since they are likewise part of that certain society affected by a dominant ideology.

Fernando’s idea on internal and external perspective of law may be used for this issue since it involves different characters with these two different approach or view towards law. Critical scholars may be guilty of being too external in looking into or analyzing the legal system. Likewise, critics of CLS and other legal philosophers from other schools of thought e.g. Legal Positivism, Classical Natural Law are also guilty of viewing the legal system with merely an internal perspective. Therefore, in creating a critique of the legal system, there should be a hybrid experience and approach – both external and internal perspective – in order to provide a comprehensive view of the legal system.

Second concern is with the issue regarding the degree of how politics affects law. If perhaps a certain critical scholar recreated or revamped their excessive and identical claims that law is politics into law merely affected by politics, then it will remove the excessiveness of their claim. However, using their idea of politics, it still does not really offer a sturdy support towards indeterminacy of law. Even if law is affected by politics, it does not entail that it is not determinate and legitimate.

Still, the notion of bias exists. Critical scholars may respond that given the existing bias, judicial decisions are tainted. They may argue that the existence of bias is inherent to every individual. Those individuals implicitly and unintentionally use their bias on every decision and choice they take, for it is essential innate for every individual. Therefore, judicial decisions are all politically tainted with bias. However, the problem with this kind of response is the excessive reduction of law to judicial decisions only. Law is a larger institution – a human artifact. It cannot be merely condensed to legal process and decisions. With regards the inherent existence of bias or prejudice, as stated earlier on this chapter, the idea of reasoned elaboration, neutral principles, and institutionalized systems and protocols will help in decreasing, if not completely eliminate, prejudice. Through mechanical deduction,
judicial decisions can be impartial and balanced as possible.

Legitimacy of laws

The CLS claims of legal indeterminacy do not necessarily result to illegitimacy. Legitimacy may not be the only factor why legal determinacy is important, but it is the most significant feature of law. If CLS could show that the legal system is indeterminate and therefore illegitimate, then it is powerful. To further demonstrate, a logical structure of the assumptions and claims of CLS to the existing liberal legal theory follows:

1) Citizens have consented to rules duly enacted by legislature and are therefore obligated to obey them.
2) When judges apply legislative rules, citizens are obligated to obey those decisions in consequence of
3) All judicial decisions are applications of duly enacted statutes.
4) Therefore, citizens are obligated to obey judicial decisions
5) Thus, making laws legitimate.

Again, regardless of laws being legally indeterminate as the critical theorists’ claim, legitimacy plays a more vital role to law. The determinacy or indeterminacy of law does not necessarily dictate if a law will be legitimate or not. Even if the CLS will be successful in the future in proving that laws are essentially indeterminate, it does not completely bombard the law’s core, which is its legitimacy.

Conclusion

Critical Legal Studies’ (CLS) main assertion of legal indeterminacy is only based on ambiguity and confusion about the legal process and decision. Their claim of legal indeterminacy is founded on the confusion of inherent generality of laws as contradictory, incoherent, and ambiguous.

Since CLS is a postmodern legal theory, the weaknesses of the postmodern approach may also be considered. First is the postmodernist external approach that creates a gap in interpreting laws. They are merely criticizing the legal system without a systematized framework of how to start and overturn the ideas they want to overturn. Second is its antifoundationalist character wherein critical scholars tend to use the concepts they ridicule. They disregard normative principles, and use another foundation of an unworkable sort.

The critical scholars’ claim of legal indeterminacy has been refuted by this paper’s claim of inherent generality of the legal language for better application and interpretation – further showing that their claim of contradictory laws are not contradictions, but inherent generality. Then, with the use of legal formalism and logic as the legal language, it refutes the claim of personal, partial, and subjective legal decisions. Together with ‘reasoned elaboration’ and neutral principles, and institutionalized systems and protocols, it shows that laws are capable and indeed clear, objective, neutral, and determinate.

Concerning the main reason for the CLS’ claim of legal indeterminacy – law is politics – this thesis showed the claim is excessive, for law is not purely politics. It offered counterexamples further maintaining that laws can be used for the good of the many through legal statues and codes for the development of society. It may be true that there is political bias from the creation, implementation, and judicial extension, but the law per se is inherently objective, impartial, and determinate. The claim – law is politics – is merely a statement of a problem in a certain society. It is not a decent ground for claiming legal indeterminacy; therefore, Crits failed to maintain a strong stand about the indeterminacy of law.

Legal legitimacy is the most important factor for a law to be a law. Consequently, the CLS claim of legal indeterminacy does not potently result to
illegitimacy of law. CLS, as a legal theory, failed to show that their claim of indeterminacy would essentially cause the law to be a meaningless artifact of society.

Further, their goal of overturning the hierarchical structures of domination in the modern society’s legal institution is problematic, for they are offering an indirect and difficult solution through eradicating the capitalist and elitist society. But then again, with an internal translation of their works partnered with a strong foundation, it may be possible.

Given the radical and postmodern approach, the CLS critique of the legal system is essentially a critical legal theory that entails the betterment of the society. It may be hard to analyze CLS because of its lack of a systematic framework, but their method and approach may serve as an example for the members of society and the good of the legal system. It further encourages an individual to come up with his or her own way of looking into the legal institution. As a member of society, there is a need to work out ways in which the collective can live amicably and harmoniously with the existence of a legitimate law.

Overall, CLS may have failed in showing the indeterminacy of law, but they can be successful in showing the flaws of the law. Given the possible weaknesses, CLS, as a legal theory, can still be used as a viable alternative theory to the advancement and benefit of the jurisprudential future.

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Martin Buber’s Dialogical Method to Marriage Partners’ Psychotherapy

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Abstract: This paper shall endeavor to discover the relational perspective of the individual using Martin Buber’s concept of an I-Thou relation applied to marriage partners i.e. between husband and wife. A dialogical method to marriage partners shall be unveiled, which motivates these partners to move toward a more collective connection, which is emphasized in the aforementioned philosopher’s I-Thou concept. Furthermore, this paper shall be divided into three major parts. Primarily, the writer shall discuss Buber’s philosophy of dialogue, which would be the foundation of this paper. Secondly, the writer shall present the connection between Buber’s philosophy to marriage partners’ psychotherapy. This part shall be divided into three segments: (1) towards a collective partnership, (2) towards a mysterious partnership, and (3) towards an empathic partnership. Finally, the third part of this paper shall conclude all the aforementioned arguments.

Keywords: Buber, dialogical method, I-Thou relation, marriage partners

A profound departure from the psychoanalytic perspective of the individual was established by Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue during his time. By underscoring the relational possibility of individuals in his concept of an I-Thou relation, he rivaled this with the I-It relation, which is governed by the ego and self-interest. According to him:

The I of the basic word I-You is different from that of the basic word I-It. The I of the basic word I-It appears as an ego. The I of the basic word I-You appears as a person. Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos. Persons appear by entering into relation to other persons.

In the conference entitled, “Martin Buber’s Contribution to the Humanities,” Jacobs discusses that therapists who are involved in a dialogical method must modify their presence to the progressive inclination of their patient, which would be of great help in the start of the actual psychotherapy. He begins his paper by stating that:

In the practice of psychotherapy, philosophy and psychotherapy are intimately intertwined. Therapeutic interventions are guided as much by a therapist’s philosophy as they are by an understanding of psychology and psychotherapeutic principles. Both philosophy and psychology attempt to address the question of what it means to be a human being.

Through the lens of Buber’s philosophy, the I-It relation involves perceiving the other through one’s own needs. Hence, this relation could manifest through various relationships such as international organizations, cooperatives, and functional relationships. However, this relation could also manifest itself through oppressive relationships such as domestic violence and child
exploitation. In oppressive relationships, the other is perceived with the foundation of needs, which neglects the destruction inflicted to the other.

The aforementioned perspective understood that there is a time and place for the I-It relation. If not, then it would be burdensome if every individual operation were encumbered with the ceaseless demands of the said relation, which interacts with others in terms of the fullness of their respective egos. However, the threatening consequences of disregarding the I-Thou and interacting with others only through the I-It relation, is also emphasized in this perspective. The threat is that one can eradicate the humanity of the other.

The I-Thou relation is a relation to another individual and also to God, while I-It is a relation to a thing, to the world, and to everything that is not human. The individual is conscious of the complete otherness of the partner in dialogue in the I-Thou relation. According to Buber, the term “relational” in the I-Thou relation indicates a common attribute. He writes: “The “meaning is to be found neither in one of the two partners nor in both together, but only in their dialogue itself, in this ‘between’ which they live together.” Fishbane further vindicated this by writing: “Buber defines “between” as the intersubjective or “interhuman” sphere, the space where two individuals meet. He differentiates the interhuman from the psychological, which is more concerned with the experience of the individual self. He also differentiates the interhuman from the social, which is broader and includes casual affiliation between people.”

Buber conveyed his philosophy of dialogue when a moment of mismeeting between him and a student occurred. It was stated that when he and his student were talking, he was not completely focused on what his student was saying to him. Therefore, when this student was slaughtered in the war, he experienced a sense of remorse on his part, bearing in mind that he lacked ample “presentness” throughout their final meeting. Because of this, he considers the magnitudes for each relationship (e.g. domestic partnership) when there are moments of mismeeting and absence of understanding and/or connection.

The Application of Buber’s Dialogical Method to Marriage Partners’ Psychotherapy

A dialogical method is mainly significant to relations, particularly to married couples. According to Jacobs:

One of the arts of therapy is the attempt to bring your presence forward in a way that addresses the patients current particular relational need. A developmental perspective on dialogue would assert that there is a natural developmental thrust towards dialogue. If the therapist can provide the ground by being available for various kinds of ‘meeting’ as new developmental sequences emerge, then the full-bodied turning-toward-the-other will emerge.

The above-mentioned statement would be evident in the latter division of this paper, particularly on Towards a Mysterious Partnership. The foremost challenge of psychotherapy is to facilitate a dialogue between the husband and wife throughout the actual therapy. Buber writes: “The therapist must feel the other side, the patient’s side of the relationship, as a bodily touch to know how the patient feels it.” Even though these couples commence psychotherapy with an unconditional detachment from one another, another significant challenge in the aforementioned treatment is the permission of each partner to be their genuine self. Buber argues that to have a genuine relation of dialogue, both partners should acknowledge the Thou of his or her partner.

a. Towards a Collective Partnership

The existence of a competition, which is evidently prevalent in our society, also invades a
couple’s relationship. Because of this, couples tend to let their pride get in the way with their argument, which leads them to doing and saying anything they could to prove that they are right, even though they are essentially wrong. Some therapists of couples feel caught between the conflicting plans and assertions of each partner. Possibly the primary challenge of psychotherapy is to help the marriage partners move from a competitive type to a more collective type, in which either both partners win or they both lose.

The psychotherapist requests the husband and wife to think of their marriage as a team effort, which recommends that they are accountable for the “We” of their relationship. These couples shall be encouraged to view one another as their own lifetime partner, which would mean that they would be there for each other in every challenge they would potentially encounter. These couples are also encouraged to think of the consequences for their relationship of whichever assumed attitude, conduct, and language they could involve in with each other. Hence, this presents a new level of attention as marriage partners, considering what impression their discourse or act will have on their relationship, not just how it will disturb the other or their own plan. Therefore, their challenge is to understand and care for the between of their married life.

The couple is invited to think about what kind of relationship they would want to have and how to improve it from then on. If they would want to have a long-lasting marriage, then they should realize that nothing would progress in their relationship if they would continue to view one another as a rivalry. They are encouraged to be the pioneers of their own relationship, to be mindful of the between. To be the pioneers of their own relationship is to enable liberation in their lives, which would also enable them to begin anew. They would also have the audacity to choose where their relationship would lead to, which would either make or break themselves and their relationship.

Therefore, if they were successful enough to move to a more collective partnership as husband and wife, they would then be perceived as an encouraged pair with the space to cultivate themselves independently and then together.

b. Towards a Mysterious Partnership

Another challenge in psychotherapy is to encourage the couple to move from their feeling of dissatisfaction towards each other. This primarily means to accept that change is inevitable in their relationship. Hence, the role of the therapist, which is to encourage the couple to overlook the honeymoon stage of their relationship, is quite crucial.

Furthermore, the therapist could encourage them to become conscious of the mystery of their partner, to get to know their partner as a total individual. This would be evident if the partner would frequently go alone together to reconnect. This view that allows the couple to move toward a sense of mystery suggests the demonstration of an I-Thou relation. Buber writes:

As long as love is “blind” – that is, as long as it does not see a whole being – it does not yet truly stand under the basic word of relation. Hatred remains blind by its very nature; one can only hate part of a being. Whoever sees a whole being and must reject it, is no longer in the dominion of hatred but in the human limitation of the capacity to say You.

Moreover, Buber explains what happens when a couple confronts one another in the I-Thou relation:

In each of them the will is stirred and strengthened to be confirmed in their being as what they are really are and nothing else. We see the forces of real life at work as they drive out the ghosts, till the semblance vanishes and the depths of personal life call to one another.
Understanding the desire to be established in a relationship is essential for Buber. 20 This understanding is valuable when working with couples undergoing psychotherapy. The magic of early relationships lies in the sense that one is understood and established to the very core of an individual. Buber explains:

For the inmost growth of the self is not accomplished, as people like to suppose today, in man’s relation to himself, but in the relation between the one and the other, between men, that is, preeminently in the mutuality of the making present—in the making present of another self and in the knowledge that one is made present in his own self by the other—together with the mutuality of acceptance, of affirmation and confirmation.21

If the other feels otherwise, this would immediately trigger an argument between the two. For example, in the earlier parts of their relationship, the husband would frequently surprise his wife with things such as dinner dates, new clothes, or flowers. But when their relationship starts to lengthen, the husband would often forget to surprise his wife, even forgetting their special occasions such as their wedding anniversary. An individual would want to feel the consistency of his or her partner and to feel disregarded is to cause resentment in their being. This is most likely to be the wife’s problem because women tend to be more sentimental and emotional over the little things. They would want to feel that nothing has changed and that the love of the husband is always concretely manifested through material things. But then again, this does not generalize women. This could most probably be applicable to materialistic types of women. Going back, the angst over establishment could completely disregard the couple’s capability to relate to one another dialogically, in mystery.22

Buber writes:

The basis of one’s life with [another] is twofold, and it is one—the wish of every [person] to be confirmed as what [s/he] is, even as what [s/he] can become, by [another]; and the innate capacity in [persons] to confirm others in this way... On the other hand, of course, an empty claim for confirmation, without devotion for being and becoming, again and again mars the truth of the life between persons.23

An authentic dialogue demands for both partners’ enthusiasm to be genuinely oneself in their relationship and to likewise see their partner’s genuineness. Justifying this, Buber writes: “Genuine conversation, and therefore every actual fulfillment of relation between [persons], means acceptance of otherness. The strictness and depth of human individuation, the elemental otherness of the other... is affirmed from the one being to the other.”24 Furthermore, accepting the other’s independent otherness is the foundation of a relation. 25 Hence, Buber recognizes the independence that allows for dialogue and genuine relation. 26 Well-defined restrictions between the self and the other are absolutely fundamental for understanding and communal respect in a relationship.27

C. Towards an Emphatic Partnership

The beginning when the couple is stuck in disenchantment and blame is the effort contained from moving to magic to mystery. Several procedures could help the couple to move from blame to empathy. Buber defines empathy as: “The exclusion of one’s own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation in life, the absorption in the pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates.”28 Friedman explained this further by expressing that:

To be fully real the I-Thou relation must be mutual. This mutuality does not mean simple unity or identity, nor is it any form of empathy. Though I-Thou is the word of relation and togetherness, each of the members of the relation really remains himself, and that means really different from the other.29

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This move shall support them to see one another more genuinely and to relate themselves in a dialogical method. In the beginning of their session, couples are in the state where they blame one another. For instance, the materialistic wife would often blame her partner for the inability to provide her requests, which is what her partner promised her in the beginning of their marriage. Because of this, her partner would often experience the feeling of guilt for his inability to provide the requests of his wife. The feeling of guilt experienced by the husband is one of the reasons why empathy is non-existent in their relationship. They see the other as accountable for the continuous desolation they are facing in their relationship. In this perspective, it is expected that couples in this state could not deal with one another in the I-It relation.

Three lessons may arise from this instance: (1) To take more accountability so that they would not feel like a casualty towards their partner, (2) to help the husband and wife to move past the state of blaming themselves for demanding too much from their partner and their relationship in general, (3) and to carve in themselves that their partner is less responsible for their personal contentment in life. However, as this transpires, respective sides become more and more responsible to themselves and to their relationship. Hence, blame is becoming ambiguous in their relationship.

In order to develop empathy towards their partner, they must engage themselves in the thought that they have concern for one another, which Fishbane elaborates that: “underneath the fighting and weariness, care deeply for each other are quite protective of each other.”

**Conclusion**

As established in the beginning, the goal of this paper is discover the relational perspective of the individual using the existentialist philosopher Martin Buber’s concept of an I-Thou relation between marriage partners i.e. between husband and wife. The aforementioned philosopher’s thoughts on the subject instituted a profound departure from the distinctive perception of the person. Perceiving couples’ problems in relational terms and helping them to work toward a more collaborative, mysterious and collaborative partnership are at the heart of the therapeutic method exhibited. I have endeavored to acknowledge the various fields of development and psychotherapy that share a social perspective of the individual.

To finally conclude this paper, according to Friedman:

Step forth out of his protected professional superiority into the elementary situation between one who asks and one who is asked. The abyss in the patient calls to the abyss, the real, unprotected self, in the doctor and not to his confidently functioning security of action. The analyst returns from this paradox as one for whom the necessity has opened of a genuine personal meeting between the one in need of help and the helper.

Ultimately, the relational approach that is used by the therapists with a couple also reduce their numerous assumptions and roles that make this work hypothetically unsatisfying, and tolerates for a respectful relationship between the problematic couple and their therapist.

2 Ibid., 41.


5 Fishbane, 1998, 42.


8 Fishbane, 1998, 42.


10 “The life of dialogue is not one in which you have much to do with men, but one in which you really have to do with those with whom you have to do. It is not the solitary man who lives the life of monologue, but he who is incapable of making real in the context of being the community in which, in the context of his destiny, he moves. Being, lived in dialogue, receives even in extreme dereliction a harsh and strengthening sense of reciprocity; being, lived in monologue, will not, even in the tenderest intimacy, grope out over the outlines of the self.” Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 23-24.


14 Ibid., 45.

15 Ibid., 46.


17 Ibid., 46.

18 Buber, 1970, 67-68.

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Existence as Suffering and Dissatisfaction: On Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Pessimism

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Abstract: The world, as Schopenhauer would say, has not been the work of an all loving Being, but rather that of a devil. In this world, creatures are brought up in order to suffer. He, being the Philosopher of Pessimism, claims that the inner nature of the world is an aimless blind striving. For the will itself has no goal, therefore impossible to satisfy. With it not being satisfied it continues to struggle, to be in conflict, to be dissatisfied. Thus the title, “Existence as Suffering and Dissatisfaction”. In doing so, first, this paper will briefly discuss Schopenhauer’s life. Next, further discussions on his notion of suffering and Will-to-live will be shown. In relation to this, Schopenhauer’s notion of love in which supports the Will-to-live by the means of striving – constantly needing to renew one’s self thus produce an offspring, is the next to be shone light upon. After discussing and strengthening his idea that life is suffering, I would explicit the two solutions he gave in order to escape from this “suffering” life and become truly happy in the end. That even in the midst of all these sufferings, there is still hope for humankind, there is still a way towards satisfaction.

Keywords: pessimism, suffering, will, happiness, love

Life is a constant struggle in attaining happiness. In everything that a person does; in every attempt done to achieve happiness, the happiness gained would only serve as a fleeting moment. Afterwards, cravings would soon emerge once again. Thus, the continuous cycle of the struggle towards happiness. As Arthur Schopenhauer mentions in his book On the Suffering of the World: “In the first place, no man is happy but strives his whole life long after a supposed happiness which he seldom attains, and even if he does it is only to be disappointed with it.”

Being the philosopher of pessimism, Schopenhauer sees the world as something which gives suffering to man; and for him, life itself is suffering. It is for the reason that man always wants but is never satisfied. Thus, he will be in a state of unfulfilled striving.

Schopenhauer, most particularly in his work The World as Will and Representation, speaks of how he views mankind as such. Moreover, he says that the sole essential reality in this universe is the will. And that the stuff that this universe is made up of are products of representations of each living individual. The Will, as Schopenhauer would define, is the desire, the wanting, the urging which comes from man’s innermost nature of life. With man having the Will as the innermost nature of life, and the Will being the one which wants, and urges, means that man’s nature is of the Will to live, of the Will to strive. But since desires and wants cannot be fully satisfied, Schopenhauer then views life as
suffering. However, through the course of his philosophy, Schopenhauer will suggest two solutions in order to elude such problem of existence and say that life is not all suffering.

The construction of such philosophy that Schopenhauer built was not made merely by the use of the construction of ideas within the bounds of his intellect alone. His life and his experiences play the utmost significant role in the building of such ideas. Thus, this paper will briefly discuss Schopenhauer’s life. Next to that, his philosophy of pessimism will be tackled, mentioning that the inborn human error is that we exist in order to be happy. Therefore, world and life are not arranged for the purpose of being happy. But even with this outlook on life, Schopenhauer proposes solutions to such problem of existence, those which are Art and Sainthood. With these solutions, Schopenhauer says that even in the midst of all these sufferings, there is still hope for humankind to escape from this “suffering life” and become truly happy in the end.

**Schopenhauer’s Life**

People are honed into who they are in their early age. Whatever thus is experienced during childhood will be, or may be, one of the factors on how a person came to be. “Childhood is the time of innocence and happiness, the paradise of life, the lost Eden, on which we look longingly back through the whole remaining course of our life,” claimed Ben-Ami Scharfstein. It is in one’s youth that one develops their being. This does not only apply to philosophers, but this also applies to everyone, to every people here in the world. Dr. David Elkind, a Jewish-American child psychologist says,

> Early childhood is a very important period of life. It is a period when children learn an enormous amount about the everyday world. It is also the time during which young children acquire lifelong attitudes toward themselves, toward others, and toward learning.6

It is of primary importance then to let children feel that they are loved; that they are wanted; that they are important for them to grow, probably, into respectable and good beings. But that, in the case of Schopenhauer, did not go out very well.

Arthur Schopenhauer, the philosopher of pessimism, is only one of the philosophers on whom has his philosophy heavily rooted in his life. He was born in a rich Hanseatic merchant family in Danzig on February 22, 1788. His father’s side was said to have had a streak of insanity. While his mother, one of the popular novelists of her days, is not in good terms with him to the point that she even pushed Schopenhauer down the stairs during their quarrel. Upon the death of his father, which was said to be suicide, he moved to Weimar to study at the Gotha gymnasium.

With his annoyance towards his mother, he cannot bear anymore to be with her due to their quarrels. He then decided to moved out never to see her again. As he resided in Gottingen, he studied at the University of Gottingen where he pursued metaphysics and psychology. From there, he moved to Berlin after two years attending lectures of different sorts, most of which are scientific subjects.8

In the writing of his first book, which is also his doctoral dissertation in 1813 entitled, “On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, his mother told him that his work was incomprehensible and that no one will buy a copy. The same publishing company that his mother was acquainted with was the publishing company in which Schopenhauer published his dissertation. In 1818, after finishing his magnum opus, _The World as Will and Representation_, that same publishing company helped in publishing his work. But that time, no one even ever bought a copy of his work. In 1820 he became a lecturer at the University of Berlin. However, by
scheduling his lectures in parallel to Georg Hegel’s during that time, only five students turned up during his lessons. With that, he dropped out of the academia and wrote “On University Philosophy” in order to express his resentment towards the academic system.

After a cholera epidemic broke out in Berlin in 1831, Schopenhauer left and permanently resided in Frankfurt. For the rest of his life he lived alone with his dogs Atman and Butz. Schopenhauer then died alone at 1860 due to pulmonary-respiratory failure.

Starting from the death of his father, the quarrels he had with his mother, the lectures he had which only a few attended and chose Hegel’s instead, to the inability of his magnum opus The World As Will and Representation to be sold to the masses the time it was published, Schopenhauer indeed had a rough run throughout his lifetime. But even with that, he is still one of the few pessimistic thinkers with a heroic resolve to encounter the darker truths of life. And that the “life illuminates the doctrine and the philosophy is an expression of man.” With this, Schopenhauer’s philosophy is mainly aimed towards the deeper investigation of individual motivation, individual motivation to life, that is. And that motivation that Schopenhauer says, that motivational force, is non-other than the Will.

**Suffering and the Will-to-Live**

It is said that the world as Will can be defined as the interplay that shows the very ground of a person’s quest of meaning here in the world. That is to say that it is in Will that the striving of an individual is found. Tracing back Schopenhauer’s influence, that which is Immanuel Kant, the Will can be compared to Kant’s noumenon, that which is the thing-in-itself. In furthering this, a brief discussion on Kant will be deliberated. In the Preface of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason he writes,

> Human reason has a peculiar fate in one kind of its cognition: it is troubled by questions that it cannot dismiss, because they are posted to it by the nature of reason itself, but that it also cannot answer, because they surpass human reason's very ability.

In expounding this, peculiar fate is said to be belonging to human reason and that it is fated to end up in uneasy situations. But even so, it is that which one cannot ignore it because it springs from the very nature of human reason itself. That is to say, it is peculiar but is natural to beings. It comes from reason itself despite the powers of reason not being able to answer it. He, Kant, says that it is peculiar for those are reasons which are not gathered from outside the self but from the very nature of the self, of one’s reason. And if one cannot ignore reason, it follows that this peculiar fate cannot be ignored as well. By nature, one raises such questions yet are not able to answer them. The questions here that Kant is referring to are those questions of the class of knowledge, that which is Metaphysics (God, Freedom, Immortality). Here, Kant claims that this cannot deal with something that one cannot know. Metaphysics is something that man cannot know for it resides in the transcendental dialectic; it resides in pure reason with no actual basis in reality; it lies in the stormy sea of illusions; it is in the arena of endless controversies.

Objects must conform to our knowledge rather than our knowledge conform to objects for one cannot know the object in itself. No matter what one does, the knowledge of the object depends on the intuition and concepts; one only knows the phenomenon and never the noumenon; only the thing as it has been perceived in the phenomenon through one’s consciousness. One can never know the thing in itself, one cannot know that in which is pure reason, thus, one cannot know Metaphysics.

Being heavily influenced by Kant, Schopenhauer based the foundation of his philosophy on this.
For Schopenhauer, there are two aspects of the world, Will and Representation. As he said in his book, “This will alone constitute the other aspect of the world, for this world is, on the one side, entirely representation, just as, on the other, it is entirely will.”

His concept of Will can be correlated to Kant’s noumenon, while his Representation can be compared to Kant’s phenomenon. “The world is my representation,” mentions Schopenhauer in the first line of his *The World as Will and Representation*. This is also to say, in relation to Kant, that the world is the idea of the knower. That the objects conform to the mode of recognition and it is so for a person can only know a thing from one’s point of view. The Will, on the other hand, is the unknowable. Similar to the noumenon, it is the thing-in-itself of every individual person. For Schopenhauer, that Will is in the interest in which knowledge arises.

The Will is a blind striving towards a rational end, a blind Will to live. “The Will-to-live... is the only true description of the world’s innermost nature.” And as what have been said, the Will is that in which strives, desires, and wants. Schopenhauer states,

> It always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself it goes on forever.

Since it always strives and always wants for more, it will only lead a person to dissatisfaction. Will and cravings knows no final satisfaction. For each satisfaction, that is, when one reaches well-being, happiness, and joy, that feeling of “satisfaction” is only a starting point towards a new striving. The existence of this Will is said to be a restless, never satisfying striving. It has a ceaseless tendency through ever-ascending forms. When it reaches an end, that end becomes a new starting-point; and this repeated ad infinitum – no end; no final satisfaction.

Thus, this makes the Will-to-live, the Will-to-strive, or the Will-to-life to endlessly Will without having any particular end. And this dissatisfaction that the Will gives a person is that which is called suffering. Suffering occurs when one’s Will is hindered. When one is struggling, it is necessary to nourish and preserve the body in order for it not to cease living. What one Wills is something that one does not have, that urge in which it springs from is that of the lack, the deficiency, and thus, the suffering. Fulfillment may bring this to an end but then again, with every satisfaction, a new dissatisfaction arises. This world in which one lives in is in itself Willing. And since to Will is to suffer, it means to say that this world is in itself suffering. This world is suffering. Schopenhauer illustrates this with the use of a pendulum. He says that,

> Life swings like a pendulum to and fro between pain and boredom, and these two are in fact its ultimate constituents. This has been expressed very quaintly by saying that, after man had placed all pains and torments in hell, there was nothing left for heaven but boredom.

When one overcomes that struggle that one has underwent, given for example a college student who has given his all writing his paper in, for instance, his subject on philosophy. After he has written, after his struggle, his “all-nighter” nights, his emotional breakdowns and feeling of being lost while writing, after the paper is done, after the output has been passed, then the pain ceases. The suffering is no more. The suffering has ended. But that does not seem to be so. For after one task, either one would feel bored for there is nothing else to do, or feel in pain again for there are a lot more tasks lined up in order to be worked on, in order to be done. The moment in which he finished his task is where his happiness, his satisfaction, his well-being comes in. But that only occurs for a very short period of time compared to that time he takes when he struggles, when he suffers. This is what Schopenhauer meant when he said that life
swings like a pendulum. A pendulum towards pain on one side, and boredom on the other side. With this, it is to say therefore that “life is positively suffering and negatively pleasure.”

However, as undesirable this suffering may seem, it is still essential to life. As Schopenhauer writes in his On the Sufferings of the World,

If the immediate and direct purpose of our life is not suffering then our existence is the most ill-adapted to its purpose in the world: for it is absurd to suppose that the endless affliction in which the world is everywhere full, and which arises out of the need and distress pertaining essentially to life, should be purposeless and purely accidental.27

Suffering is the very foundation of the nature of life, as Schopenhauer says. It is what lies in the very core of life, making it real, essential, and inevitable.28 With this argument of his, it makes him question Leibniz in in proclaiming that “this is the best of all possible worlds.”29 How could a world full of suffering and discontentment be the best of all possible worlds? With this negative view of Schopenhauer on life and human existence, this is what makes him the philosopher of pessimism. Life here in the world is full of suffering, that is because life and even the world itself is indeed, suffering.

Love

The Will results to suffering for the reason that it is never contented. It always asks for more; it always asks what is does not have; it always wants what it is not. In other words, its task is to continually thrive and strive for life. One aspect of the Will-to-live that Schopenhauer has mentioned is love. For him his metaphysics of love is also a metaphysics of sex. He reduces love of almost every kind to sex.30 He equates love with sexual desire in saying that all romantic love is sexual.31 And again, striving is what the Will does. In line with that striving of that Will-to-live the common instinct is then to continue life, to continue living. The continuation of life therefore can be done through love, sex, reproduction. Love (or sex) is the ultimate goal of almost all human effort. As said, the Will tries to overcome death for the reason that that Will is the Will-to-live, and it does so by self-reproduction – the reason why sexual urge is strong in all beings.32 Schopenhauer mentions,

For all amorousness is rooted in the sexual impulse alone, is in fact absolutely only a more closely determined, specialized, and indeed, in the strictest sense, individualized sexual impulse, however ethereally it may deport itself.33

This eagerness for a person to pursue love is essential for the propagation of the next generation human beings. Again, quoting Schopenhauer,

The collected love-affairs of the present generation taken together are accordingly the human race’s serious meditation on the composition of the future generation on which in their turn innumerable generations depend.34

With the aim of the lovers to propagate, the tendency is couples pick each other in the light of reproducing alone; in the light of striving for the Will alone. Human beings are said to instinctively pick their partner for the sole purpose of bearing a child, for producing an heir, and for nurturing another human being.35 Therefore, making this “unification”, if it may be called as such, of a male and a female to be of sexual union alone. That his love, so as to speak of, Schopenhauer deals with merely the subtle contrivances of the Will-to-live.36 Thus, after exhausting oneself with this sexual union, after the bearing of the child, after the propagation of species, the couple may then experience misery and dread. And that is so for the original aim that was focused upon was the continuation of species and not the pleasure and good of the individual.37 “Marriages contracted from love prove as a rule unhappy, for through them the
coming generation is provided for at the expense of the present,” says Schopenhauer.  

Therefore, this attempt to continue to strive and to continue to Will, is then, once again, faced with dissatisfaction. Even if to love is said to be the best possible constitution of species, it is still faced with desires, with longings, with cravings, that one cannot possibly attain if the couple marriage is grounded on the propagation of species alone.

If in continuing to Will never gives solution to man, never removes man from their suffering, then the logical thing to do is to stop Willing. But how is that so? Is not that Will the innermost nature of life? Is not that Will inherent, and important in one’s being? How can one therefore remove that in which is most essential in man? But again, one should remember that it is in Willing that suffering occurs, it is in Willing that man continues to strive then become satisfied only in order to be dissatisfied then strive once again. With this, Schopenhauer aimed to find solutions to such suffering here in the world. And, indeed he did. Those solutions are: in the form of art, and in living the life of sainthood.

Solutions to the Problem of Existence

The world is Will. And Willing is suffering. Therefore, the world is suffering. This is the pessimistic view of Schopenhauer, thus gaining the title the “philosopher of pessimism”. However, his philosophy is not just all about suffering and failing to achieve happiness. It is not all failing to be satisfied. As what has been said above, his philosophy is mainly about the investigation of individual motivation. With this, he sought some methods of salvation and escape of this suffering or on how to achieve freedom from the demands of the will-to-live. The first solution that he gave is through the experience of art. With the encounter of art “a momentary experience of freedom from the demanding and oppressive will-to-live” occurs. Again, emphasis on “momentary.” Art for Schopenhauer can be compared to Plato’s take on Ideas. For Plato, the Platonic Ideas are those ideas which are the “immediate and adequate objectivity of the thing-in-itself.” In going back and comparing to Kant’s, that is the noumenon. For Schopenhauer, it is the Will. The Will objectifies itself as Ideas. Remember that the Will is that in which is the unknown; that in which is in the thing-in-itself; therefore, that in which is the Idea. Going back to Plato’s allegory of the cave, the Ideas mentioned there are those which are the Truth, the original picture, and not the reflection. That is in which every image is copied upon, where every form is based on. When it comes to Schopenhauer’s notion of art, he mentions that the Will is the Idea. With art, one loses himself in the idea, in the actual thing. Thus, making oneself blinded in the sense of being exposed to the truth; being able to see what a thing actually is. “Schopenhauer’s aesthetics is said to have a special kind of consciousness which is uniquely aesthetic.” Meaning, in order to appreciate art, one must disregard the ordinary consciousness that one has and allow to dwell in the art itself. That very act of being lost in the object; that very act of being immersed in the perception of an object is the way in which one forgets about one’s Will, about one’s unsatisfying desire in order to possess or consume the art, that is, for a while. The objects that one is contemplating on, that of the art, acts as the middle ground between how the world appears and how the truth is. That is to say that art is a product of the artist’s idea. Meaning, that that art is once in the artist and in which he detached it from himself in order to let the other see and try to let others experience. Through that art, one actually feels what it is like to experience that kind of Idea. One becomes a “pure will-less subject of knowledge in the gaining of such objective knowledge that one obtains from the art.”

In art, the denial of the Will is done but only temporarily. One cannot look at art for the rest of their lives. There is possibly no movie in
which will go on for a lifetime, or music in which
never fades away. With art, it proves that one can
emancipate and detach one’s self from this
Will, to be able not to be guided by it, to be able
not to suffer from it, but then again, only
temporarily. However, art is not only the way in
order to deny the will. Another solution that
Schopenhauer had given is that of Asceticism.

The denial of the Will is needed in order to
escape this Willingness state of man. When one
denies the Will, one comes to the summit of
ethical life. For Schopenhauer, his denial of this
Will is described as asceticism. When one
realizes all the hardships, all the sufferings of the
misery of existence, when one knows that life is
all about continual striving, and continuous
thriving, this will lead to the repulsion of the
human condition. With this repulse, one will
realize the pointlessness of striving for this Will,
and thus with this, one may eventually lead to
living a life of simplicity, of chastity. This kind of
life is that of asceticism. Willing, living, existing
as an individual human being are the occasion
for lamentation. But, as persons, the total
annihilation of the Will-to-live is an impossibility
while one is living. Therefore, to attain this
certain kind of state, a state not of annihilation
but of “quieting” or “calming down,”
moderation should be practiced. With
moderation and with the reduction of the Wills,
this will close the entry of suffering in one’s life
and will then strive no more.

However, this is not the case for Schopenhauer.
In objection to that, he proclaims that there is a
need of total abnegation of the Will. “He or she
can no longer proceed as if this individuals’
gaining such and such willed end, or suffering
such setback in its willing, were worth anything
at all.” That the Will much prefers to choose
complete non-existence. This therefore opens
Schopenhauer’s notion on death. In the
discussion on the denial of the Will to live, he
mentions that this is the practice of death:

We see him know himself and the world,
change his whole nature, rise above
himself and above all suffering, as if
purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable
peace, bliss, and sublimity, willingly
renounce everything he formerly desired
with the greatest vehemence, and gladly
welcome death.

However, it is not suicide that is the solution to
the sufferings of life. For suicide only intensifies
one’s Will-to-live rather than to deny it. Thus, he
goes back to asceticism. It is in the abandonment
of suffering that one becomes truly happy.
Happiness comes from letting go – letting go of
material things, of sexual desire. This is then
what Schopenhauer means of a true philosophic
life. To be able to suppress one’s desires, to deny
the Will, to live a life of asceticism, all of these
are done in order for a person to get rid of
sufferings and be happy in the end.

Conclusion

The inner nature of the world is an aimless blind
striving. It has a Will in which has no goal. It has
a Will in which has no end or purpose. In the
attempt to achieve satisfaction with this blind
striving, one attains happiness only as a fleeting
moment. And then again returns to
dissatisfaction from the satisfaction that one has
attained. Man is never content; man is never
satisfied. It is already in the essence of man to
always want what he is not and this is for the
reason that every man has this Will-to-live. One
prominent instance of man as striving to live is
portrayed in relationships, most particularly in
romantic ones. All of Schopenhauer’s notion of
romantic metaphysics is automatically equated
with sexual metaphysics. In love (or sex), one is
pursuing the Will-to-live by the continuation and
propagation of life. Man is in fuss; man is at
noise; man has this urgency, uproar, anguish, and
exertion when it comes to the topic of love. And
all of these are because of the Will-to-live; that
love, or propagation is important and should be
dealt with more seriousness compared to the
other aims of life that there is. However, love,
being another aspect of the Will-to-live, would lead to suffering in the end. For the aim, originally, is for propagation alone and not for individual satisfaction in the long run.

Schopenhauer then, with all the sufferings here in the world gave solutions in which could help escape that blind striving. If one suffers because of the Will-to-live, the denial of it will then prevent suffering to occur. The first solution in which Schopenhauer gave is that of the experience of art. When one experiences art, one loses his own Willingness and becomes absorbed in the aesthetic experience. One only does so when one disregards one’s ordinary consciousness that one has and allows one to dwell in the art itself. It is that of pure will-less subject of knowledge, of the aesthetic art experience that one gains such objective knowledge; that from the Idea of the artist itself, he, as a genius, shows to the person who looks at his art his Idea. That in which dwells in the world of forms, he placed down for people to experience it, and still, as an Idea. However, aesthetic experience only gives off a short-lived escape or transcendence from this suffering world. The other solution in which Schopenhauer gave is that of asceticism. In asceticism one frees himself from all worldly attachment, may it be material things or even that of the sexual desire. With the detachment of the person from those, there will be no more Will-to-live and when that inner nature of man is gone, suffering will cease.

There is a need of a total annihilation of the Will. That is to say that there is no room for moderation when it talks about such denial. From the pessimism of a person towards life, from a person’s disgust on how the things in the world are, results to the denial of the Will. And to deny the Will is to have an authentic attitude towards the world. Nonetheless, this asceticism is not permanent for it may be possible for a person to strive in Willing once more. It is important, therefore, to practice such denial of the Will constantly. As Schopenhauer said, the denial of the Will is a constant struggle. And quoting what Spinoza said, “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”

If a person wills to be happy, he will let go of his desires and of his Will in order to get away from suffering. Because again, happiness comes from letting go.

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3 “The world is my representation.” Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* vol 1, 3.
9 Schopenhauer’s essay “On University Philosophy” is about the resentment of him against academic philosophy. It is said of him to decry the state of philosophy in German universities. David E. Cartwright, *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy* (Maryland: The Scarecrow Press), 187.


Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol I, 4.

Ibid., 3.

Edman, “Introduction to the Philosophy of Schopenhauer,” 3.


Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, vol I, 308.


Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol I, 196.

Ibid., 312.

Schopenhauer, On the Suffering of the World, 1.


Original text: "...that if there were not the best (optimum) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any." Freiherr von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, ed. and intro. Austin Farrer, trans. E.M. Huggard (United States of America: Bibliobazaar, 2007), 131.


Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol II, 533.

Ibid., 534.


Krishnananda, “A Comparative Study of Some Western Philosophers; Arthur Schopenhauer.”

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Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol II, 557.

Original text: “For that interest in the special constitution of all species... forms the root of all love affairs.”

Ibid., 559.

Schopenhauer mentioned in his magnum opus: “He who marries for love has to live in sorrow.” Relationships and marriage for Schopenhauer then should not be grounded on love alone if the couple wills to have a harmonious relationship all throughout their life.

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Formulating Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Searle’s and Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness

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Abstract: This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle’s and Dennett’s can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle’s biological naturalism and Dennett’s multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness.

It will be revealed in this research that consciousness can have different brands. Dennett’s as one brand, operational consciousness, and Searle’s as another, sui generis consciousness. It shall be concluded that Searle’s theory of mind outweighs Dennett’s if we take the two theories to answer what human consciousness is. This is due to two reasons: (1) Sufficiency of Explanation, where Searle has more comprehensively explained what consciousness is and (2) Pragmatic Picture of Reality, where Searle’s theory can fit more in the social reality.

Keywords: Searle, Dennett, Theory of Mind, Consciousness

Consciousness is a complex theme not only in philosophy, but also in the hard sciences. Psychology makes an attempt in fully understanding the topic, but what they find are only traces of descriptions those which we can correlate with what consciousness is. The descriptive question tailing the theme consciousness is still an on-going debate. What is this consciousness they are talking about? Is it some sort of metaphysical entity? Is it just a product of neuron firings just waiting to be interpreted? Is it a processed data, or maybe just a process? As we use consciousness in an ordinary language, it means the state of being alert of one’s self and one’s environment, thus the sub-thesis that confines the attribution of the term to the living things. It also pertains to ‘having knowledge’ thus the sub-thesis that only animals (or only humans) are attributed with consciousness. But, these sub-thesis are not final in the sense that they are entirely true and entirely acceptable. Debates on consciousness continue to grow and sub-thesis such as above are simultaneously proven and contested. One
of the most popular correspondences that inquire about consciousness is between John Searle and Daniel Dennett. We know consciousness. We are very much aware of it. But, with all these knowledge we have of consciousness, we lack full understanding of it. John Searle and Daniel Dennett are two philosophers of mind with contrasting opinions concerning consciousness. While Searle claims that consciousness consists of *qualia*, Dennett claims it does not. This paper shall investigate which theory then can better explain human consciousness.

**Dualism and Materialism**

Dualism and materialism are contrasting theories especially when it comes to their description of consciousness. Dualism treats consciousness as independent from the physical body. It creates a clear distinction between mind and body. Materialism, being simpler, treats consciousness as being a part of the brain system. It discards the premise that there is such a thing called ‘mind’ (or if there is, it is reducible to physics) and everything is just a function or a part of the physical body. On the one hand, since dualism assumes an entity independent from the physical body, it consequently implies the possibility of a soul or a soul-like entity independent from the physical body. On the other hand, materialism denies this. Since everything is a part of a physical body, there cannot be any entity independent from it — thus the denial of a soul independent from the body.

Writings on dualism can be traced back to the time of Plato. Plato described the mind as an ideal and abstract thing and thus it belongs to a world he intuited — the ‘world of Forms’. This mind is what we call ‘soul’. It is there as we are living, and as we die, it stays in the world of Forms. This world of Forms houses all the ideal things not only the concept soul, but so are the concepts love, justice, and other ideal concepts such as ‘chairlessness’, ‘tableness’, and ‘treeness’. Dualism is more explained by a later philosopher Rene Descartes. For him, there are two kinds of substance in the world: the mental and the physical. He described the mind as non-physical substance distinct from the body, and the body as a non-mental substance distinct from the mind. We can see how they are distinct from looking at their features.

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First, the mental aspect is indivisible. We cannot cut or group the mental into smaller groups or pieces. Meanwhile, the physical aspect is infinitely divisible. This view of the physical aspect is closely related to scientific theories originating from Leucippus and Democritus stating that everything is divisible into the tiniest particles called *atomos*. Second, the mental aspect is free while the physical aspect is determined. The distinction is best illustrated as: while the physical aspect can be physically measured thus the limits we can perceive it bears, mental aspect comprises ideas, thoughts or imaginations—abstract things which are physically immeasurable. Third, the mental aspect is known directly by means of *Cogito Ergo Sum* while the physical aspect is known indirectly. Descartes’ thesis *Cogito Ergo Sum* means in English “I think, therefore I am.” It is the first certainty to cure his skepticism. He found himself while meditating according to his book *Meditations*. He said:

> But finally here I am, having insensibly reverted to the point I desired, for, since it is now manifest to me that even bodies are not, properly speaking known by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are
not known from the fact that they are seen or touched, but only because they are understood, I see clearly that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my mind.4

Descartes’ theory poses different problems. First is, “How can the two interact?” or “How can the two causally affect each other?” What Descartes only provided were the descriptions of the mind and body—that they are distinct—missing the question in between, the interaction between the mind and the body. Second is whether the mind is really free or not. The notion of the will is in question since if the mind is free and the body determined, it looks as if the freedom of the mind makes no difference.5

Third is the problem we have when we think of other minds; since, only the self’s mind can be known directly by means of Cogito. This will in turn bring forth another question: “Can we really know anything about the external world?”. The fourth and last problem is general to dualism, that which supposes a metaphysical necessity—a soul that is removed from the body. Cartesian dualism is contemporarily known as substance dualism. This kind of dualism is largely contested, but a few philosophers stick with the theory such as W.D. Hart and Richard Swinburne.

The quest in finding what is consciousness is still in discussion as most has thrown away what Descartes has theorized—largely due to inconsistencies and lack of explanations. Another more modest version of dualism arose in the contemporary era. Property dualism discards the ontological weight Substance dualism bears. Property dualism bears its dualistic characteristics in the distinction between two aspects or properties. One property is the physical property while the other property is the conscious property. These conscious properties are neither identical with nor reducible to physical properties but can be instantiated by the same things that instantiated with physical properties. One example is a Chalmers’ version of property dualism. He claims that conscious properties are on a par with fundamental physical properties such as electromagnetic charge. The interaction is bounded by physical and causal laws, but their existence is neither dependent upon, nor derived from any other properties.6

Monism, contrary to dualism, claims that there is only the mental, known as idealism, or only the physical, known as materialism. Idealism, popularized by Berkeley,7 holds that only the immaterial mental substances do exist. Serious objections for it arose as it utterly denies the existence of the external world.8 The opposite, known as materialism, has a more general support as it closes itself in with science and it has less metaphysical problems to think about. It discards the existence of a mind distinct from the body and presumes that there are only the physical aspects.9 Materialism, in its quest to find what consciousness is, brought forth several, different, and contesting theories, one of these is behaviorism. One variation of behaviorism, methodical behaviorism is foundational to psychology. Another variation, logical behaviorism, is a theory of mind claiming that any statement about the mind is equivalent in meaning to a set of statements about behavior.10

Although a theory solely based on the physical/bodily aspects, behaviorism failed to find the causal connection between the mental and the physical. It still bears the same deficiency dualism has in explaining consciousness. Also, its main thesis can be easily defeated with counterexample as there is an instance wherein what one thinks is different from what one’s behavior is. As an attempt to improve behaviorism, physicalism claims that physical states are identical to mental states.11

This would mean that there is no more need for the causal connection between the mental and the physical, since they are one and the same. Another theory materialism brought forth for the inquiry of consciousness is functionalism. In functionalism, everything is reduced to functions which are mostly mathematical appropriations and expositions.12 It claims that there is an
internal causal relation among the elements of the system, of the mind. On the one hand, functionalism is being treated by philosophers as a black box since we do not know anything of its internal processing. On the other hand, some philosophers claim that those internal processing consists of computation, as in advanced computers, thus the said possibility of conscious machines.

Searle’s Biological Naturalism

Searle’s theory of mind coined as Biological Naturalism begins by claiming that consciousness is a biological phenomenon, putting it at the ranks of digestion or photosynthesis. It is distinct from the physical aspects, but it is not a soul-like entity that has no clear connection with the body. The relationship is that: consciousness, the mind, is a higher-level biological phenomenon that is caused by the lower-level neuronal processes, or the physical aspect.

To grasp Searle’s theory of consciousness, we must also articulate clear dichotomies that his theory bears. One is the dichotomy between mental as higher level phenomena and neurophysiologic as that lower level. His theory opposes the thesis that consciousness is reducible to computations. The thesis claiming that consciousness is reducible to computations holds that if that is the case, then it is also possible for computer programs to be programmed for it to be conscious. That is not the case for Searle. For him, mental states are real, irreducible and cannot be doubted as also according to the Cartesian principle Cogito Ergo Sum. Additionally, he explained this by showing another dichotomy, the dichotomy between the syntax and semantics. Starting with a thought experiment, the ‘Chinese Room Argument’, the thought is as follows:

Imagine that a bunch of computer programmers has written a program that will enable a computer to simulate the understanding of Chinese. So, for example, if the computer is given a question in Chinese, it will match the question against its memory, or data base, and produce appropriate answers to the questions in Chinese. Suppose, for the sake of argument that the computer's answers are as good as those of a native Chinese speaker. Now then, does the computer, on the basis of this, understand Chinese, does it literally understand Chinese, in the way that Chinese speakers understand Chinese? Well, imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating these Chinese symbols. Suppose that you are given a rule book in English for manipulating these Chinese symbols. Suppose, furthermore, that the programmers are so good at designing the programs and that you are so good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon your answers are indistinguishable from those of a native Chinese speaker. You are locked in your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and passing out Chinese symbols in response to incoming Chinese symbols. On the basis of the situation as I have described it, there is no way you could learn any Chinese simply by manipulating these formal symbols.

By being inside the Chinese Room, the person without completely learning Chinese, is able to behave as if he does understand Chinese. In a language schema, this counts as the syntax. Syntax, as compared to semantics, is formalistic in nature. It is only composed of values devoid of any meaning. The behavior of the one inside the Chinese Room only counts as one of syntax,
Searle described consciousness through what happens when we pinched our skin. According to him:

A few hundred milliseconds after you pinched your skin, a second sort of thing happened, one that you know about without professional assistance. You felt a pain... This unpleasant sensation had a certain particular sort of subjective feel to it, a feel which is accessible to you in a way that it is not accessible to others around you. This accessibility has epistemic consequences—you can know about your pain in a way that others cannot—but the subjectivity is ontological rather than epistemic. That is, the mode of existence of the sensation is a first-person or subjective mode of existence, whereas the mode of existence of the neural pathways is a third-person or objective mode of existence; the pathways exist independently of being experienced in a way that a pain does not. The feeling of the pain is one of the qualia... Furthermore, when you pinched your skin, a third sort of thing happened. You acquired a behavioral disposition you did not previously have.¹⁹

It is crucial to note that Searle’s notion of consciousness is of subjective nature—not epistemic subjective but ontologic subjective. Epistemic subjectivity pertains to subjective thoughts that one knows to know. For example, I thought of my own thoughts. I have the idea of it. This thinking of my own thoughts then is caused yet by another round of neuron firings. Ontologic subjectivity, however, comprise that feelings we get just as we get a particular sensation. It is subjectively distinct since it is only observed by its thinker. Commonly, it is called as qualia. To further look at it, he divided the thought process into three. First is the physical activity wherein one will react to, for example a pinch. The pinch made a neuron reaction in the skin and it travels to the brain. This unpleasant sensation has epistemic implications—that the subjective feel of it is accessible only to the person in a way that others cannot. Second is a first-person sensation, in this case, it is pain. It was caused by the first entirely physical neuronal activity. This is also known as the qualia. Third is the behavioral disposition caused by the second, first-person sensation. The input signals cause the pain, and pain in turn causes behavioral disposition.

For Searle, the problem that needs to be focused on by philosophy and natural sciences when it regards consciousness are those first person and subjective feelings.²⁰

**Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model**

It is important to note that Dennett denies the qualia.²¹ He said:

> Just what are "phenomenal qualities" or qualia? (Qualia is just the Latin for qualities; the singular is quale, usually pronounced kwah ‘lay.’) They seem terribly obvious at first—they’re the way things look, smell, feel, sound to us—but they have a way of changing their status or vanishing under scrutiny.²²

Qualia, according to Searle, are those second features of consciousness. The feeling of something at the moment we start to get the physical input of, for example, pinching, and by that we get the feeling of pain. Dennett denies this sort of subjective quality Searle is pointing out. To support this, Dennett introduced the
Cartesian Theatre. Cartesian theatre is the space in which we view our consciousness, or how we perceive things in general wherein everything we perceive are 'screened' or being shown to us while we start to be on the centre of that consciousness just watching. And, as we see things, everything that is around us, we create the line or the boundary in which at the other side is the self while on the other side is that which we are conscious of—this he calls Cartesian Materialism. For him, this Cartesian theatre, as well as Cartesian materialism, is wrong for the reason that it is illusory.

Instead, Dennett provided his own positive view of consciousness, the ‘multiple drafts model'. According to the multiple drafts model, these ideas or perceptions are various narrative fragments or simply, ‘drafts', which are at different stages of editing. For him, some or all of these drafts may come together serving specific functions. They do not go to a specific Central Processing Unit in the brain. They are just being ‘edited' in the brain producing thought. To determine which of the drafts are conscious or can lead to conscious state is to conceive of a Cartesian theatre. To answer the instance where it seems like the stream of consciousness is flowing in a sequence as if in a Cartesian theatre; Dennett claims that the self is the centre of narrative gravity. Consciousness for Dennett would then be similar to a web of discourse, similar to its literal sense when we talk about the web of the spider or the shell of a snail; it works as a house or source of livelihood. To complete the model of consciousness, according to Dennett, is a sort of virtual machine, an evolved computer program that shapes the activities of the brain.

Dennett’s theory of consciousness is a brand of computer functionalism. A computer functionalist account of theory of consciousness claims the way we think is similar to how basic functions and computations make a computer application to program. In this light, Dennett developed a thesis that a conscious machine is possible. By discovering how functions and computations undergo in the human mind, we can then program it to machines.

If the self is "just" the Centre of Narrative Gravity, and if all the phenomena of human consciousness are explicable as "just" the activities of a virtual machine realized in the astronomically adjustable connections of a human brain, then, in principle, a suitably "programmed" robot, with a silicon-based computer brain, would be conscious, would have a self. More aptly, there would be a conscious self whose body was the robot and whose brain was the computer. This implication of my theory strikes some people as obvious and unobjectionable. "Of course we’re machines! We're just very, very complicated, evolved machines made of organic molecules instead of metal and silicon, and we are conscious, so there can be conscious machines — us.

**Similarities and Dissimilarities**

To clearly give a comparative analysis between the two theories of mind, one of Searle’s and the other of Dennett’s, we must enumerate the points where the two theories are similar and different. First, let us discuss the similarities.

1. **Both theories endeavor to answer the question of mind, specifically, how can the mind be described.**

The problem is as old as religion where it is an assumption that God is capable of divine intervention. This intervention implicates the control God has in the world permeating through basic causal factors that affect this world—which includes human decisions. But then, human decisions comprise free will which bears a contradiction to God’s intervention. Of course, the problem that stirs with the concept of God in the middle is out of the question, especially for those skeptics about its very own existence.

This free will and everything that is incorporated when we talk about the mind, or the very
action—thinking, provided a question that is answered by philosophers of mind: what is the mind, or how can it be described. Searle’s and Dennett’s are two theories that are just a part of a larger discourse concerning the theory of mind.

2. Both theories claim to be scientific, specifically, biological.

Since both consider their theory as biological, they follow a scientific back-up, notably are works by Crick and Edelman—whom both are neuroscientists. Thus, some parts of Crick’s and Edelman’s view regarding the brain are accepted, including how the brain neurons cause behavioral dispositions.

More than being similar, Searle’s and Dennett’s theories are largely different and contrary. Here are the dissimilarities:

1. For Dennett, mind is reducible to computational functions while Searle says it’s not.

Searle elaborated consciousness by dividing it into three phases. (1) The first is the actual physical contact wherein stimuli begin to react and neuronal processes start its activity. Neurons fire and at this phase, brain scanner, and other machines that are capable of interpreting neuronal activity, can be used to observe what happens in the body when we think. At this phase, we get the sensation of the action. (2) After the neurons processed and brought about sensation, there comes the feeling of it. A phenomena outside that is purely subjective, and rather than epistemic subjective, it is actually ontologic subjective. Epistemic subjectivity pertains to subjective thoughts that one knows to know. Ontologic subjectivity, however, is subjectively distinct since it is only observed by its thinker. Because of its ontologic subjective nature, it escapes the possibility for it to be under the study of objective science. These feelings, then cause emotions and also causing the third (3), after the sensation is produced by bodily processes, and the feeling is produced in consciousness by these bodily processes, behaviors arise. Behavioral disposition is the most empirically observable of the three. These are the bodily actions we do after we get sensations. Muscles move as nerve endings give commands. Searle’s theory provided a window to answer the old question wherein there is an explanatory gap
between input stimulus (in Searle’s: sensation) and behavioral disposition.

Dennett does not want to adopt Searle’s purely subjective interpretation of consciousness, and scrapped the idea of it. For him, our minds work only within the objective strata. Input stimuli enter the body through the neurons, the brain or spine reacts, then behaviors occur. If we are to use Searle’s draft, Dennett will only consider the first and the third phase. Dennett’s claim tends to forget that there is an old problem, such that there is a gap between the input stimulus and behavior. This gap is mainly rooted from the large difference between simple neuron firings and complex mental activity, such includes having ideas, feelings, decisions, etc. Dennett answered this question, while still sticking to his claim of the computational theory of mind, using the multiple drafts model. And, to how it lies between sensation and behavioral disposition; according to him, there is a virtual machine within our brain that processes these functions coming in and out.34

3. Dennett believes that a conscious machine is possible while Searle believes otherwise.

These two widely opposed theories are both conclusions of Searle’s and Dennett’s pursuit of the correct theory of mind. On the one hand, Dennett, because he treats mental functions as reducible to functions such that we can derive conjectures and formulations to mathematically analyze and predict it, highly believes that we can produce a conscious artificial intelligence. By being ‘conscious’, it does not merely pass some certain test such as the Turing test, but it means that it can act, think, and behave like us, humans. This can be achieved in the time when we understood how the human consciousness works; this then can be engineered and applied to machines producing an artificial intelligence (AI). On the other hand, Searle believes that the problem is whether we can achieve full understanding of consciousness. Without this understanding of consciousness, we don’t have enough formulations for creating AI. Searle is not completely against the idea of an artificially intelligent robot. But for him, we must first tackle the problem of qualia, which, according to him must be the focus for answering the problem of consciousness. Qualia is still an untapped area within the third person discourse; but in the first person, Searle claims that we know of it.35

Scientific or Unscientific

Both Searle and Dennett are trying to be objective as possible when consciousness is being talked about. Both are referring to consciousness as thinking, sentience, and that anything that we talked about when talking about the mind.

But, let us analyze the consciousness they are referring to. Both claim that theirs is scientific. We must dissect the two theories’ being scientific since this attribute gives legitimacy and keeps us close to the empirical. So, are their theories scientific or not? Here are a number of factors on how we can distinguish something scientific or unscientific.36

1. Science tends to progress.
2. Science asks how.
3. It uses a reference frame, thus it relies on measurements.
4. Verification Principle. If it is analytically or empirically verifiable, it is scientific.
5. Popper’s Falsification. Instead of relying on verification, if it can be falsified, it is scientific.37

1. Science tends to progress.

Does Dennett’s or Searle’s theory progresses? Both theories according to the two have their roots from neuroscience, thus the physical and biological origins. We can say that both theories are the progression being talked about in the progress. Dennett’s path, Strong AI, is quite older
than him, and it sticks to the computationalist and the functionalist interpretation of the mind. Critics claim, including Searle, that Strong AI has not really progressed, hence is in a stagnant phase. Largely, this is due to the Penrose hypothesis stating that Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem provides strong evidence against strong AI. Its adherents will deny that and will probably cite ASIMO, SIRI, etc. as empirical proofs for the progress scientists had in creating artificial intelligence. Searle would still point out that these examples of thinking robot does not qualify for being conscious like us since it does not have that \textit{qualia}.

Searle’s theory, biological naturalism, is rather new. He made his theory to be apart from dualism or materialism, although the theory has slight leaning with dualism according to most of Searle’s critics. Searle’s theory is more unique from other theories. It has a focus to neuroscience leaning the theory with materialism; but with neuroscience, Searle admits exclusively subjective \textit{qualia} creating the dualistic picture. Since Searle’s theory places an emphasis on \textit{qualia} and since it has insufficient supports and proofs for it is only accessible through subjective experience, Searle’s theory does not or has not progressed.

But, the two theories are fairly young and it is possible that the two just have not reached the phase where there is an observable progress.

2. Science explains how.

Explaining mechanism is one of the features of science. It illustrates how event A causes event B as well as underlying events that undergo with the whole process. Dennett’s theory, according to him, is scientific on the basis of its biological foundation. Consciousness, for him, is a product of biological processes, generally. But, it is also according to Dennett that religion and other social phenomena are also biological, with the same case as consciousness. This bears light to what brand of consciousness Dennett talks about and how he can see the world. Every factor, including social factors that affect humans are biological and all of these are reducible to functions. That is how Dennett closed the gap between the soft science and the hard science.

Neuroscience can stand on its own when asked to explain how. Strong AI gets its explication of mechanism from the framework of neuroscience; but, it is not accurately the same. The problem with this brand of functionalism is that its process, or its mechanism, is out of sight. It is in a black box, so to speak, hence the term black box functionalism. What we only get are names and definitions cluttered to serve the theory and the mechanism as a conceptual map based from theories of neuroscience. The mechanism derived from neuroscience is twice or more removed from empirical means since it relies on abstract definitions that are only other products from different functionalist theories. Thus, Dennett’s theory, if not, duly lacks the ability to explain how.

Searle attempted to give light on the old problem, finding out the mechanism between the input, or the mental state, and the output, or the behaviors. This is the ontologically subjective factor of consciousness, or simply \textit{qualia}. Searle’s theory’s biological nature comes from his sub-thesis that higher level mental contents are caused by lower level neuronal processes. Lower level neuronal processes act as the input. Higher level mental contents include the \textit{qualia}, and acts as in-between input and output. Behavioral disposition is the output.
We can get a grasp of it, but it is only that what we know to know—it is only epistemic subjective. This epistemic subjectivity can be subjected to third person scrutiny by using neurological tools. But, an ontologic subjective phenomenon, the in-between input and output can only be accessed through the self, the subjective. This makes the mechanism of Searle’s *qualia* rather impossible to identify.

3. It uses a reference frame, thus relying on measurements.

Another factor science has to support its legitimacy is its accuracy and precision due to its use of measurements. Measurements of certain objects or subjects are identified with its relation to standard measurements, such as International System, and basic units.

Important parameters in both Searle’s and Dennett’s theories are immeasurable. We cannot yet subject Searle’s *qualia* or Dennett’s multiple drafts to strict scientific standards.

4. Science can be *verified* as in Verification Principle or *falsified* as in Popper’s Falsification Theory.\(^{41}\)

We always know about consciousness, but how can we verify it? This is a problem we have in pursuing a science of consciousness. But, Dennett, since denying the distinct subjectivity, claims that we can verify consciousness through neuron processes. Dennett’s framework is simple. There are neurons and neuron firings, and then there are the behaviors. That’s just it. Dennett denies a third party that may be named *qualia*, or maybe consciousness. This verification from neuroscience and computationalism is continually tested to successfully create a better and conscious AI. But, Searle claims that what Dennett talks about is not how we tackle the problem of consciousness.

Searle’s theory is impossible to verify scientifically by the third person, whereas in the first person he claims that it is a common sense to us.\(^{45}\) Dennett does not support this as he still question the accountability our senses give to us. The description Searle provides when he talks about our cognition of *qualia*, for Dennett, does not suffice. In a gist, to verify Dennett’s claim on consciousness and its mechanism, we need to heavily rely on the scientifically verified mechanism provided to us by neuroscience and computational operations. While there is a rather still vague connection between Dennett’s theory of mind and neuroscience with computationalism, Searle’s theory has a long way to go to get in close with the traditional science since traditional science currently puts its trust to the third person interpretations.

The case is quite the same in terms of whether the two theories can be falsified or not. There are also difficulties. The big problem lies in the observability of the concepts used in the theories. While, Dennett deals with an unobservable black box functionalism together with an imaginary virtual machine, Searle deals with an exclusively for subjective-observations-only attribute of consciousness.

The fact whether a certain theory is scientific or not is a larger problem in philosophy of science, simply known as problem of demarcation.\(^{46}\) So, the categorization of Dennett’s and Searle’s theory requires clarification to the problem of demarcation. But, if we are referring to the traditional sense of science and put it to the same level with other sciences that has consensus to be considered as scientific such as biology or chemistry, Dennett’s and Searle’s are far from being scientific. It can be that the theories the two are pushing are still at a very young age or the two theories are simple imagination.

Are the two theories really biological? Biology is most commonly defined as science pertaining to the study of living organisms. In its most general sense, it may also include the social factors acting according to the living organism; and,
more closely, treating both as biological since they both talk about theory of mind dealing with a vital factor in a study of life, in general.

But, the current tradition we have of biology, it requires a reductive justification from chemistry. This would mean that proofs and explanations of certain biological theories need to be supported by explanations derived from chemistry such as oxygen fueling metabolism or the Krebs cycle of cellular respiration. With chemistry as a requirement, biology, then becomes a stricter discipline, then cutting off the softer side of science including the social sciences. With reductive justification from chemistry, Dennett’s and Searle’s have too many missing links to create a sufficient explanation of a theory of mind, according to the current tradition of biology.

**Dualism and Non-Dualism**

To know whether a certain theory of mind is dualistic or non-dualistic is to know the mode of explanation that certain theory will undergo. For a certain theory to become dualistic or not means it has accepted principles that are necessary for that theory. Dualism presupposes two distinct attributions or agents that are coexisting, and somehow, interacting while, monism scraps either one of the two attributions or agents. Dualism is unpopular with the scientific community, especially those considering the discipline to be more strict since dualism advances the idea that there is more to what traditional empirical science can understand thus delegitimizing science’s authority; although, not all dualist accepts attributions or agents outside the grasp of science.

Searle’s critics are imposing a label on him stating that he is a closet dualist. Dennett is proclaiming himself as a monist materialist, but a few still describe him as also a closet dualist. Is it really possible then to present a theory of mind without resorting to dualism, in any form?

Dennett claims that his theory is a monist theory simply by denying the existence of the other agent, the *qualia* part of the mind. The sort of consciousness is denied by Dennett and was pointed out by Searle that Dennett is making a counterintuitive claim. So if Dennett denies the existence of another agent unobservable empirically, how is he a closet dualist? Since Dennett should account every question targeted to consciousness, this will have to include questions regarding the stream of consciousness we have, the distinct subjective feeling, or the actual process between neuronal sensations, mental processes (consciousness), and physical behaviors, he is forced to introduce a new concept that is rather removed from the strict empirical standard we get from traditional science. This is his so-called *virtual machine*. Dennett’s virtual machine has slight similarities with Descartes’ evil demon outside our mind. Virtual machine acts as the main processor that directs input stimulus and other properties of consciousness into an empirical behavioral disposition. That creation of another non-empirical entity, even though, according to Dennett the machine is within the territory of computer functionalism, is one signal that a theory is falling to dualism.

Searle denies being labelled as either a dualist or a materialist. He is not a dualist as he insists that his theory is entirely biological. Critics point to Searle’s concept ontologic subjectivity to rest the claim that he is a closet dualist. Ontologic subjectivity, or simply the *qualia*, seemingly is another agent that pushes for a dualistic theory. But, it is not the case that if something is that we cannot find anything about, it is already totally different, thus subject to dualistic variation. Searle insists that this ontologic subjectivity must be accepted as a part or subdivision of our entire biological construct. But, for him, this biological construction, including consciousness and the ontologic subjective property of it, must not be considered as entirely physical—because mental constructs are really not. But, if that ontologic subjective property is rather different
to the point that it can’t pass within the territory of materialism; is the theory implying one brand of dualism, simply property dualism?

In a gist, Dennett, while proclaiming himself as a monist materialist has his theory contain traces of dualism pointing to his concept of virtual machines. Searle, while his theory looks like a dualistic theory, maintains that his concept of ontologic subjective feature of consciousness is not independent from our whole biological construct to the point that his theory will be deemed as dualistic. Although, it is also not entirely physical as what materialists would suppose.

The Chinese Room Implication

According to the current tradition we have of science, it is rather hard to accept Dennett’s and Searle’s theory to be scientific. It is not enough that a theory has employed scientific concepts for it to be considered scientific. It needs to establish scientific and/or empirical connection with the scientific concept it employed. There are also some difficulties to explain comprehensively what consciousness is without being dualistic.

How about artificial intelligence? We have insufficient knowledge when it pertains to artificial intelligence since at the pillars of our questions; we are still in a debacle for certain basic definitions such in conscious or intelligence.

But, Dennett strongly believes that a conscious machine is possible. Artificial Intelligence is possible. This is by fully understanding the complete functional system our thinking process has, that in a sense, we are conscious, and applying this system in a computer program. The process is easy to grasp since tests and developments are currently being made, especially in first world countries like Japan. But, Searle contests these kinds of hypothesis. Searle strongly believes that computer functionalism is not enough to create a conscious machine. He expounded on this claim by using his thought experiment, the Chinese Room. It implies that a machine may mimic or adapt perfectly to an environment, language, or social order like a conscious human being but it does not really understand anything.

To further understand what Searle is really talking about, it is helpful to know the distinction between syntax and semantics. While syntax pertains to the form, in the Chinese Room case it refers to the set of questions and the set of answers going on in the room; semantics pertain to the content, in the Chinese Room case it refers to the meaning of the questions and answers going on in the room and it refers to what the Chinese language really meant. To know this distinction between syntax and semantics is to understand the distance between them.

We can fully grasp the syntax, in Searle’s theory of mind this would be the neuroscience and behavioral disposition; but, we are wading as to the semantics is, only except with ourselves through subjectivity. Since Searle’s concept of ontologic subjectivity is not possible to be understood by the third person, another question enters the query: how can we, as third persons, really know others semantically? Is it just impossible?

What is Consciousness?

After seeing how Dennett and Searle view consciousness, it is now quite clear to me that the two are actually referring to two different things. I named these two brands of consciousness as operational consciousness and sui generis consciousness to clearly distinguish them from each other. First is Dennett’s brand of consciousness. We need to take note what Dennett is trying to talk about when referring to consciousness.

1. It is purely functional, thus it only consists of syntax.
2. It scraps the idea that qualia exists, thus the ontologic subjectivity, as in Searle’s,
which is exclusively and uniquely accessed by the self is also non-existent.

3. It includes in its explanation the presence of a virtual machine that is yet again purely functional and works as a CPU in us.

It can be said that what Dennett is referring to is what I may call an *operational consciousness*. The term operational pertains to process or a series of actions for achieving a result. It reflects the kind of consciousness Dennett is talking about. Operational Consciousness is purely functional, does not accommodate *qualia*, and it must have a sort of virtual machine to act as its main processor. This is also the brand of consciousness a conscious robot must have, if it came to a point where it can ask itself about why it is thinking, why it is afraid, or that certain feeling of pain it is having. The programs are working on its own and developing recycled and almost original scenarios and problem deriving from all of the data contained in the robot. It is also developing reactions it mimics from its environment. The robot is conscious in that example. But, the robot does not have what Searle is talking about: *qualia*.

*Qualia* is the key concept we have of how Searle’s consciousness differ from Dennett. Searle’s consciousness is described as follows.

1. It is not entirely material, but it is not a sort of ghost that is removed from our biological construction. It is an entirely subjective property that is included in our biological construction.
2. It has an ontologic subjective property, known as *qualia*, wherein this property is not observable by the third person, and cannot be as it is different from epistemic subjective—wherein we can report, in a third person, what we have subjectively.

Searle’s theory of mind can be referred to as *sui generis consciousness*. The consciousness Searle is referring to is unique compared to how consciousness is modelled in various theories such as dualism or materialism. It has not necessarily fallen to the set of all physical or material, but it is part of the whole biological construction. This is fairly hard to accept if the whole biological construction is assumed to be entirely physical and objective.

This brand of consciousness breaks itself away from the possibility of a conscious machine. This is due to *qualia*. The fact that consciousness incorporates *qualia*, an ontologic subjective feeling, deems impossible that a machine has consciousness. A machine, even if it already can have feelings as produced by multiple functional processes inside its own CPU, cannot have that ontologic subjective feeling.

What then is consciousness? We have to accept that consciousness has different brands. It is not entirely of us. Consciousness is not only that human consciousness, we distinctively feel.

But, between Dennett and Searle, who both pointed that the consciousness they are talking about is the consciousness we truly have, who is pointing out right? Since the two consciousnesses they have been talking about are different from each other, which brand of consciousness describes human consciousness?

Looking at our consciousness, it really does seem that Searle’s and Dennett’s theory fits. There is only one contradiction left that cannot compatibilize the two theories. One has *qualia* and the other one has none. We can have another point of distinction: life.

Life is a distinguishing factor that demarcates us from non-living things. But, how can we really know that one is distinctively alive? How can we really distinguish ourselves from the non-living things? Biology can straight face answer the question of demarcation between something alive and something not. But, as time passes and technology progresses, this demarcation provided by Biology is starting to fade. Monerans, Protozoans, and Bacteria have the
attributions required to be labelled as living. They grow and they multiply. But, it is also the case of a biological virus, or a computer virus. Is it living? Most biologists will deny it, but it is appealing to accept that these viruses are alive. This can be answered by Searle's brand of consciousness, *sui generis* consciousness. *Sui generis* consciousness can be a distinguishing factor of whether one is alive or not.

This can lead to more problems since *sui generis* consciousness has become the basis of life we will then have to question whether animals or plants have that consciousness. In terms of animals, it is not hard to assume that they may not be any different to us, humans. But, plants have a rather directive method of growth and behavior. There are no signs that it is conscious, in terms of how animals, and us, are conscious. Additionally, it is even harder to base our theories on *qualia* since its very own existence is still being put into question by other philosophers, particularly Dennett.

So maybe, Dennett is talking real, when he is talking about operational consciousness. Treating our consciousness as operational meant also to discard the distinguishing mark we have against non-living things. We are like them (the conscious machines), and they are like us to the point that the only comparison is going to be the presence of human flesh. Everything then is reducible to functions. And, since everything is reducible to functions, everything is also translatable and applicable to be contained in other mediums. Reducing everything to functions is helpful to a theory making it simpler as it discards complex unempirical concepts such as life. Or, that very instance where everything is reducible to functions could be life itself—in Dennett’s terms.

We really have a long way to go when it comes to understanding what consciousness, or specifically what human consciousness really is. We have clues. We are aware of its existence. But, we are having a really hard time describing and defining it. It is largely due to the fact that there are instances in ourselves that we are being deceived by ourselves. The fact that we can always see our nose anywhere we point our eyes is not known by most people because our mind chooses where it looks at. The things we perceive, the way how our mind constructs patterns and combinations for us to direct our perceptions at is another way our perceptions are manipulating us. But, this is normally how our brain works. To understand all about it, in the end, we still have to rely on a stricter discipline and create a science of consciousness. But to create this science of consciousness, Dennett’s theory can safely pass as scientific if it leaves out his virtual machine and focused only on the materialist side of his theory. In this case, his theory will be strictly neuroscientific with an outright denial of the concept of consciousness. This big problem though is that he is leaving out the huge chunk of problem we must actually be talking about, consciousness, the distinct subjectivity of it, and the *sui generis* characteristic of it.

Although, Searle is on point putting an emphasis on *qualia* in the discourse of consciousness, it is rather hard to admit it in a stricter analysis, as in hard science. This is the problem of ontologic subjectivity; we distinctively are aware of it, but we cannot explain or report it in a third person. In that case, we are only explaining the epistemic subjectivity.

In reaction to Searle’s model, how can we really understand consciousness?

1. We can just leave the fact that there are some things left in the subjective, and thus we cannot really understand consciousness in its entirety. The problem that we cannot know consciousness as in a third person will just rest.

   a. We can treat consciousness just as a point of distinction we have against probable non-conscious beings.
b. We can fully understand it through spiritualism, or total self-meditation. It should be noted that this is a common answer from religions and the concept God may occasionally arise. And, it should also be noted that accounts derived from the subjective are dubious and unreliable.

2. We can just drop ontologic subjectivity from the whole theory and treat the epistemic subjectivity as an answer and a medium to know what we know as *qualia*. In this case, we can really understand the forenamed. We report what we distinctively know of our *qualia* little by little until other reports of their own *qualia* can create a big social report where synthesis and analysis can be drawn upon.
   a. Although, this leaves out the very problem Searle is talking about.
   b. In this case, we are still tapping in the dark, since again, accounts from the subjective are dubious and unreliable.

3. Or, we can just altogether leave Searle’s theory in the trash, and scrap the very complex idea of *qualia*.

**Conclusion**

How can we really know consciousness? Is it really impossible to understand it comprehensively given that we have to account *qualia*? Or is it really just a simple, functional system that is going on in our brain?

It is really hard to answer all of those questions given that along the way, we are still clueless about almost everything we find. We lack particular distinctions such as between machines and not machines, thinking and not thinking, or living or not living.

For me, what we know of consciousness can at least become a point of distinction between machines and non-machines, thinking and non-thinking, or living or non-living. This is not defining it, but this is only to make consciousness as an attribution. Consciousness is possible to be present in non-machines, and is not in machines. It is present in thinking and not in non-thinking. And, it is present in a living being, and not in the non-living.

**Machine and Non-Machine**

Machine is defined here as that artificially made object to proceed with several tasks. Consciousness is not present in machines. Thus, it is possible for it to be present in non-machines. But, how about in a case where beings are artificially created and made to be conscious? The answer will rely on the process how it is conscious. Is it operational conscious? If it is just operational conscious, it is considered as a machine; but, if it is *sui generis* conscious, it is not a machine. Artificial *sui generis* consciousness is possible if we use biological raw materials to create a new being. The principle is the same in a science-fiction called *Doctor Who*.[9] Every being that is *sui generis* conscious will always have a biological foundation. There are robots planted with human brains; conscious clones are entirely created from stem cells; and a conscious vehicle (time machine) has some sort of biological heart at its core.

**Thinking and Non-Thinking**

Consciousness entails thinking; again, we are referring to *sui generis* consciousness. Of course, this will face serious problems as even with the concept thinking, problems arise when it comes to entailing it with consciousness since it does seem not to work in all types of human beings. Does it apply on babies? On a person in a coma? Or, simply a sleeping person? Does it apply to particular diagnosed persons? If it will be based on a *sui generis* consciousness, it will apply to all types of human beings. Do note that *sui generis* consciousness does not only entail the
directional characteristic of consciousness. It puts an emphasis on qualia, on ontologic subjectivity. And, it is present on all types of human beings.

Living and Non-Living

This view is most likely unappealing to traditional biologists as this establishes a standard between living and non-living. It is important to note that biology, as a hard science, is largely concerned about whether something is alive or not thus it must rest on their territory. But, there is a diminishing demarcation between living and non-living; something that grows or something that multiples can be regarded as alive. The criterion, of course, is not simple as that; but due to an increasing variety of species and increasing number of artificial beings; the criterion is falling short. Is ASIMO alive? Or maybe, SIRI? Are viruses considered alive? What about computer viruses? Or, what about even more advanced computer viruses?

We must re-establish what distinguishes living from non-living. And, consciousness, particularly ontologic subjectivity, can supply for it. Of course, this will lead to more problems and clarifications such as pertaining to whether plants are ontologic subjectively conscious, or whether animals are ontologic subjectively conscious.

To wrap it up: “Why sui generis consciousness suits better to describe human consciousness instead of operational consciousness?”

To answer this question, I have put a criterion to distinguish human consciousness from other consciousness.

1. **Sufficiency of Explanation.** It must explain what we, in the common sense, know. We are aware that we have consciousness. We think. We have feelings. We have the most basic idea of what consciousness must be.

2. **Pragmatic Picture of Reality.** It must fit in the social reality. Those two theories can have different social implications, but only one can fit in the reality we have.

*Sui generis* consciousness fits with the first criterion. We had our first clue: that entirely subjective experience of thinking. We may not grasp and understand it fully, but we are perfectly aware of it. This subjective experience is left out by Dennett. We cannot just leave out in our explanations what we, in the common-sense, are aware to have. Of course, we can still doubt what we know to know, since there are times that we are deceived by our own senses, but still, we have that feeling of knowing; as what Searle points out.

In the matter of what sort of society the two theories will create, Searle’s will create a demarcation between the conscious and the non-conscious. Dennett’s will do otherwise it will create a surrounding with no conscious distinctions. Everything will just be reducible to functions and everything is just mathematical. This kind of society does really translate to ours.


3 *Cogito ergo Sum* was Descartes’ conclusion in his skepticism, wherein he doubted everything from scientific truths to empirical reality. In his doubting, he came to also doubt his self thus, thinking if his self is really existing. But, in his claim, this very doubting is what makes the self to be existing. Thus, *Cogito ergo Sum* as translated is ‘I think therefore I am’; I think or I doubt, therefore I am, or the self, exists. Rene Descartes, 1641.

4 Rene Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”.


8 Ibid.


12 However, there is a sort of functionalism, *teleological functionalism*, which treats the term ‘function’ differently from how machine functionalism treats it. In a teleological sense, a parameter or a subsystem has a function if it plays a vital role for it to fit in a system it belongs to. In this case, this sort of functionalism does not reduce the system into strict mathematical functions as in machine functionalism.


14 Ibid.


20 Ibid.


23 Ibid., “Multiple Drafts VS The Cartesian Theater”, 111-115.

24 Ibid., 113.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.


29 Ibid., “Consciousness Imagined”, 431-432.


34 Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, 107.

35 Ibid.


37 Note that this is to address the one of the biggest problems faced by science as a field, the problem of induction where it exposed science as relying heavily on multiple verifications to consider a likely truth.
44 Falsificationism is an alternative method for science to eliminate the problem with verificationism. The problem is that even with certain number of verification done to a phenomena, still it can be doubted. While verificationism aims to verify what-is, falsification aims to falsify what-is not. Sven Ove Hansson, "Science and Pseudo-Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2017. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/pseudo-science/.

45 Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, 97-100.
46 Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Approach.
49 Doctor Who is a British science-fiction TV series which depicts the adventure of a time-travelling extra-terrestrial who calls himself ‘The Doctor’. Themes in each episodes usually portrays life and culture of extra-terrestrial which sometimes can put the humans in danger. The Doctor always opted to save the earth and the humans. The series was produced by BBC in 1963 and ended in 1989. It was rebooted in 2005.

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Schopenhauer’s Concept of Suffering and Aesthetics

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Abstract: The fundamental goal of this paper is to explore Schopenhauer’s concept of aesthetic experience and how it ends suffering produced by the will. According to Schopenhauer the will is blind and purposeless; and therefore it is the cause of suffering. He offers three modes of reducing the suffering produced by the will; namely aesthetic experience, compassion, and ascetic resignation from the world. This project will explore one of the three modes; which is the aesthetic experience and will aim to answer the following: What is an aesthetic experience according to Schopenhauer? And how does it end the suffering produced by the will? With reference to the aforesaid, the framework of this paper will be divided into three parts: Firstly, Schopenhauer’s metaphysics will be explored by establishing his concept of the will and by investigating its relationship with suffering. Secondly, his notion of aesthetic experience and artistic production will be elaborated. Lastly, the relationship between the aesthetic experience and the will be identified and discussed.

Keywords: suffering, will, aesthetics

Arthur Schopenhauer is known for his pessimistic philosophy. According to him, suffering is part of life. It is an irremovable aspect of existence. Suffering originates from the will and it is a kind of manifestation of the will. The body is both a representation and the will. In order to remove suffering, its cause (i.e., the will) must also be removed. The cessation of the will provides a form of satisfaction. In order to understand the relationship of the will and suffering, this research will first discuss Schopenhauer’s notion of the world as will and representation.

The World as Will and Representation

Schopenhauer is undoubtedly influenced by Immanuel Kant. His work The World as Will and Representation covers metaphysics, aesthetics, epistemology, and ethics. Similar to Kant’s phenomenon (i.e., the reality that man experiences, which is conditioned by the senses) and noumenon (i.e., the thing-in-itself), Schopenhauer’s philosophy understands reality in two ways. On one hand, there is the ‘world as representation’ and this could be understood as how the world is presented to my or the subject’s own experiences. On this side falls the perceivable reality. It is where reality is presented to our experience. Consequently, like Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, man perceives the world only through the pure a priori forms of intuition and understanding, namely space and time, and the categories. Experience is possible only through space, time, causality, and so on. The objects of perception depend upon the subject. Accordingly, since the objects depend upon the subject’s experience which is only possible.
through space, time, and causality it follows that the subject cannot know what is beyond thereof.

On the other hand, the ‘world as a will’ is understood as the world as noumenon or the “thing-in-itself”. Kant, referred the forenamed as “unknowable”, whereas Schopenhauer considered it as the “will”. The will is that which is represented to us in our experience through space, time, and causality.

Moreover, the will is also manifested in nature. According to Janaway, the single will and its manifestation in nature is “… two sides of a coin, two aspects of the same world.” The awareness of man towards the external reality is different from his inner awareness of his body in an intimate way. For instance, I am conscious of myself and my body in more thorough way than that of what is external to me and I more aware of my own feelings or emotions than that of other people. We have full awareness of our inner selves as opposed to what is external of us. I could fully understand what I would do or what I am thinking about. This comprehension of my inner operations is different from what I see outside. According to Schopenhauer this comprehension is given to me through the will.

Consequently, Schopenhauer claims that “… the whole series of actions, and consequently every individual act and likewise its condition, namely the whole body itself which performs it, and therefore also the process through which and in which the body exists are nothing but the phenomenal appearance of the will, it’s becoming visible, the objectivity of the will.”

The whole reality as it is presented to us in experience is but a representation of the will. Every being, in this case, possesses an inner character which is the will.

Schopenhauer also maintains that the intellect, which is usually considered superior to the will, is but a biological function and therefore it is also in service of the latter. According to him, philosopher before him maintained that the intellect and the will are one. He was the one to recognize that there is a difference between the two. As he stated: “The cardinal merit of my doctrine, and that which puts it in opposition to all former philosophies is the perfect separation of the will and the intellect.” Consequently, Schopenhauer maintains that the intellect is a biological function as opposed to it as a function of the soul. This position situates the intellect as secondary to the will. The intellect is a function of the will.
of the brain and dependent upon man whereas the will is a fundamental character of man. Hence, it is averred that the intellect is subordinate to the will. The will to know is represented in the phenomenal reality by the brain and order for the will to reach its end, the intellect is needed. This kind of consideration makes the intellect the same level as the beating of the heart, the arousal of the sexual organs, sweating of the glands and the other biological operations. Moreover, as it was shown above, that all of this biological functions are representations of one thing, namely, the will. The culmination of all these biological function is seen in the body; hence the body is a representation of the will; it is the representation of the thing-in-itself.

According to Schopenhauer, “My body and my will are one.” Another way of showing the unity between the two is, whenever something interacts with the body, there is an elicited reaction from the will. An example would be mental states, the will to laugh is elicited in me whenever I perceive something of humorous character. An animal, a pet dog for instance, has a will to warmly greet its master whenever its master returns from a period of absence. The will to greet its master is elicited whenever it sees its master. Another would be that of a plant, which has a will to grow towards wherever there is sunlight. The sunlight elicits from the plant a will to grow.

The intellect being subordinate to the will results to the supremacy of the will. According to Bertray, “the will itself, the unintentional will which is discovered in everything, is the creator of the world.” The will can be understood as a striving force in nature or in reality. Man is not the only being that exhibits a kind of willing. The will could also be found in animals, plants, and the organs. Nature exhibits and follows a certain structure. He adds “… the structure of any animal is the result of its will to be what it is.” Likewise, every being in reality follows a certain fundamental organization. Nature is precisely the way it is because it adheres to its own fundamental character. A dog, for instance, is called as such because it wills to be what it is.

Since the will constitutes the underlying reality of the world, Schopenhauer maintains that “we see at once from the instinct and mechanical skill of animals that the will is also active where it is not guided be any knowledge…” We see in every species of animals the will to propagate its existence. Every species has the will to continue its posterior generations. This kind of will is shown through the will to reproduce. It is a kind of striving that beings follow. Whatever an organism may do in order to satisfy itself, it is because of the will. For instance, my thirst for knowledge, hunger for food, and search for entertainment are because of the will.

In the micro level, the will guides human acts however in the macro level, the will “… appears in every blindly acting force of nature, and also in the deliberate conduct of man…” It is not only limited in humans, but rather it is also found in nature. Animals, plants and every being in nature show one form or another of the will. It is blind inasmuch as it does not necessarily follow a final and an absolute telos or end. Whenever, an individual has satisfied one will, the will does not end in one act. For instance, whenever I eat my will to eat may be satisfied whenever I eat but it does not fulfil the striving of the will once and for all. The will continues to strive and it does not have a final and absolute object. According to Harms and Morgan, “Motives can only modify the will in its original determination by its circumstances and relations in space and time, but, … can never direct the will itself or determine its direction.” Whenever my will is directed at something it is because of my intellect or other motives. A plant has a will to grow towards a direction because of an external factor that would elicit the will; in this case it is the sunlight.
Will and Suffering

The will to life is purposeless. It is not directed to a final object; and hence it is blind. Life is merely an empty will; it wills in order for it to continue willing. Animals have a will to propagate its species. This is continuous, which means that there is a cycle of reproduction in nature; one generation breeds and the succeeding ones do the same. As a result, it does not end whenever a certain object has been reached hence, it is continuous. It will continue on for the sake of the species’ existence, but why does the will, will to reproduce? It does so, to continue willing.

Animals have a will to propagate its species. This is continuous, which means that there is a cycle of reproduction in nature; one generation breeds and the succeeding ones do the same. As a result, it does not end whenever a certain object has been reached hence, it is continuous. It will continue on for the sake of the species’ existence, but why does the will, will to reproduce? It does so, to continue willing.

The will is fundamentally the cause of suffering. According to Harms and Morgan, “The will itself is this endless struggle, from which all the unhappiness proceeds.” The will is unceasingly struggling to fulfill its endless desire hence suffering proceeds from it. The will alternates from satisfaction to suffering. Schopenhauer maintains that satisfaction is negative whereas suffering is positive. He says “all willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering.” There is suffering in this world inasmuch as there is a will behind its representations. He maintains that for the most part, life is suffering.

Since the will inevitably leads to life’s suffering, Schopenhauer maintains that most of the particular wills of man fundamentally lead to futility. According to him, the will cannot be satisfied. Its desires cannot be quenched. The will’s inexhaustible desire leads to misery. Schopenhauer maintains that because of this, earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated and futile. Achieving one desire to satisfy the will would in turn bear fruit to another one, and this goes on *ad infinitum*. He describes it as “no attained object of willing can give a satisfaction that lasts and no longer declines; but it is always like the alms thrown to a beggar, which reprieves him today so that his misery may be prolonged till tomorrow.”

The will’s insatiable hunger could also be understood in terms of the body. Since the will is blind, it follows that it is in a state of continuous pursuit to satisfying itself. Consequently, since the body and the will are one, it follows that the body is also in a constant pursuit to satisfy itself. Whenever the will attain one end it is satisfied, otherwise it is suffering. The body, since it is the representation of the will, is also a cause of suffering. The body wills and whenever it fails to attain an end it suffers; consequently, when it is in a prolonged pursuit to its end it suffers. This results to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic philosophy. Similar to Buddhist thought, he maintains that life is suffering. Consequently, since the will pervades nature, then suffering also infused in it. Moreover, the relationship between the will, body, and suffering leads to the renunciation of the self which is evident in Hinduism and Buddhist philosophy.

Man’s intimate connection with the will, ultimately makes him an egoist perspective towards the world. His perspective is always in relation to himself. Although, there are times of compassion and benevolence, man is fundamentally an egoist because of the will. The will always directs man towards an object. The will makes man’s perception towards the world subjective; his perception is always in relation to himself. According to Schopenhauer as long as our consciousness is subjected to the will, and as long as we are subjected to a throng of desires with its hopes and fears or in short as long as we are willing; we will never obtain peace. This leaves us the question: how do we escape suffering?

Schopenhauer gives us two ways through will-less contemplation, or saint-hood. The will-less contemplation is achieved through art whereas saint-hood is a form of renunciation of bodily desires and involves compassion for others.
Art and Will

As it was discussed in the previous sections of this paper, will is the reason for suffering. It is in a constant pursuit to satisfy itself in order to continue willing. Hence, whenever the will fails to satisfy itself there is suffering; likewise, whenever the will is in prolonged pursuit of its end, it suffers. Ultimately, the will always brings with it suffering. Although there may be satisfaction or happiness, nonetheless, it certainly carries with it the possibility for suffering. Furthermore, the will alternates between satisfaction and suffering. Nonetheless, according to Janaway, for Schopenhauer suffering lasts longer. The implication of this is that existence offers satisfaction however, along with this happiness is suffering and for the most part existence is suffering. In other words, existence or life is fundamentally suffering and misery. This leaves us a question: since the will is the reason why existence inevitably offers suffering, is there any kind of happiness not born out of the will? Since willing results to suffering, then it must be distinguished in order to avoid further misery. The possibility of the cessation of willing is gleaned from art. According to Schopenhauer there is a possibility to emancipate one’s self from the endless stream of willing. There is a state or disposition wherein man is no longer in the grips of the will; by then he no longer considers things with subjectivity; it is now purely objective; this is possible through the knowledge of the idea.

In this state, the individual as a subject disappears. When this subjectivity is removed, the individual is no longer an individual. In order to understand this, Schopenhauer uses idea, in the Platonic sense.

The subject perceives reality in a state of constant change. Things come and go; they occupy space which cannot be simultaneously occupied by another. The reason for this is the subject is bounded by the laws of space, time, and causality; and hence what the subject perceives are necessarily contingent and particular; however, this is reality as representation. Consequently, the individual is the reason for its own subjectivity. As it was mentioned, the individual always considers things in relation to itself because of the will; as a result, the individual is always subjective. However, according to Schopenhauer, there is a possibility to access an eternal and universal reality through unique moments. In the eternal and universal reality lies the ideas. Beyond the realm of subjectivity, ideas offer knowledge of the objective. According to Schopenhauer “while the individuals in which it expresses itself are innumerable and are incessantly coming into existence and passing away, it remains unchanged as one and the same, and the principle of sufficient reason has no meaning for it.”

Our subjectivity must be given up in order to achieve knowledge of ideas. Schopenhauer maintains that “… if the ideas are to become object of knowledge, this can happen only by abolishing the individuality in the knowing subject.” The individual, and its subjectivity are relinquished in the process. The transition from a subjective to an objective point-of-view involves an individual losing his individuality. Since one loses his individuality, he achieves a state of objectivity. He describes the state wherein the knowledge of the ideas is achieved “we no longer consider the where, the when, the why and the whither of things, but solely what.” Moreover, we
“sink ourselves completely therein, and let our whole consciousness be filled by the calm contemplation of the natural object.”34 In this state, there is no longer an I. The subject no longer considers things in relation to itself; it no longer maintains a distinction from itself and what is not itself. The individual is absorbed within the whole. Moreover, there is no subject-object duality. According to him:

we lose ourselves entirely in this object… we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror to the object… we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one…35

This is aesthetic contemplation, however, how does this state, aesthetic contemplation, remove one from suffering?

Aesthetic contemplation offers both the knowledge of ideas and satisfaction. The knowledge of ideas gives man an objective state wherein he loses his subjectivity brought about by willing. This objectivity emancipates from his subjectivity. Since he loses his subjectivity, it follows that he also breaks free from the grips of the will. He is no longer directed by the will. He contemplates about art objectively. He no longer considers it with regards to himself. There is no longer an I or an ego that desires an end in order to satisfy itself. It is a will-less contemplation of art. The possibility of happiness and sadness that the will brings with it also disappears. There is no will to bring suffering; although, the implication of this is also the impossibility of pleasure, since the will could either bring pleasure or suffering. The cessation of the will, not only removes the possibility of suffering, but also results to the impossibility of happiness.

There are instances wherein according to Schopenhauer, that is really the case. He says “Happiness and unhappiness have vanished; we are no longer the individual … we are only pure subject of knowledge.”36 However, there are instances that he says it is otherwise. According to him, “… As all suffering proceeds from the will that constitutes the real self, all possibility of suffering is abolished …”37 Consequently the pure state of objectivity makes us feel positively happy.38 Moreover, he adds “The storm of passions, the pressures of desire and fear, and all the miseries of willing are then at once calmed and appeased in a marvelous way.”39 Janaway reconciles this predicament through the distinction of two kinds of happiness. On one hand, there is happiness brought about by willing; on the other, there is the aesthetic kind which is brought about by the ‘cessation of willing.’40 The former instance pertains to the fulfillment one attains whenever one’s particular will is satisfied. Eating, for example, gives one pleasure and fulfillment. However, the pleasure in this case is momentary since the will continues striving. Furthermore, since it continues striving, then it continues to carry the possibility of suffering. On the other hand, the latter case pertains to the termination of one’s will. The peace and fulfillment, in this instance, is not momentary. The cessation of willing emancipates one from the suffering it carries. In other words, the person in this state no longer endures suffering since he also no longer enjoys pleasure. This state is beyond the happiness and unhappiness of the subject. It is purely an objective state.

Conclusion

Aesthetic contemplation is a will-less contemplation. Its value lies within its capacity to detach as from the grips of the will and therefore it offers us the possibility to escape suffering and enjoy a kind of positive aesthetic pleasure. It gives us objective knowledge that removes us from subjective desires; it emancipates us from our subjectivity that brings suffering. It removes the possibility for happiness and suffering however, it offers a positive kind of happiness which is born not from the will, but from art. Consequently, it not only offers a state of aesthetic happiness, a psychological state, but it also has a cognitive function. Aesthetic
contemplation gives us knowledge of what is eternal and unchanging. It does not only offer a state of peace, a cessation of willing, but also it can give insight to objective insight of eternal ideas; hence, it has a twofold value, one therapeutic and one cognitive. The therapeutic value of the cessation of willing signify that one attains peace and happiness. One, in this sense, is beyond the misery and pain that life brings. The cognitive value of it signifies that one can attain an objective understanding of reality. One perceives beyond the dynamic nature of the world of appearances. The cessation of willing, therefore, provides man with a higher understanding of reality and that it offers him peace.

5 Cf. Ibid., 34.
6 Cf. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 100.
7 Ibid., 103.
9 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 108.
10 Ibid.
11 Bertrays, Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Will, 232.
12 Cf. Ibid., 232.
13 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 102.
15 Bertray, Schopenhauer’s Doctrine of the Will, 234.
16 Ibid.
17 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation volume 1., 114-115.
18 Ibid., 110.
19 Frieddrich Harms & Morgan S. Ella, “Arthur Schopenhauer’s Philosophy,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1975): 127; A motive is an external influence wherein it is mediated by the will in order for its end to be accomplished. See also C.L. Bertrays, Doctrine of the Will, 233.
20 Cf, Harms & Morgan, Arthur Schopenhauer’s Philosophy, 130.
21 Ibid., 129.
22 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 196.
23 Cf, Ibid., 196.
25 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 196.
26 Ibid., 196.
28 Cf. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, 196.
29 Ibid., 197.
30 An idea, in a platonic sense could signify the form beyond appearances, similar to Kant’s thing-in-itself. In other words, it is a constant and universal reality underlying the dynamic world of appearances. However, Schopenhauer maintains that these two concepts (i.e. Plato’s ideas and Kant’s thing-in-itself) are different. Although the thing-in-itself can never be objectively known since man perceives it in appearances (hence, it becomes subjective), Platonic ideas, on the other hand, serve as the most objective kind of knowledge that he can ever attain. Schopenhauer claims that “… the Platonic Idea is necessarily object, something known, a representation, and precisely, but only, in this respect is it different from the thing-in-itself… it has retained the first and most universal form, namely that of representation in general, that of being object for a subject.” Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation 1, p. 175.
32 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* 1, 169.
33 Ibid., 169.
34 Ibid., 178.
36 Ibid., 197
37 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* 2, 368 See also Janaway, *Schopenhauer: A Very Short Introduction*, 73
38 Ibid.
39 Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* 1, 197
41 Ibid.

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An Analysis of Viktor Frankl’s Notion of Dehumanization

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Abstract: The phenomenon of dehumanization has generally not been given much attention despite having such a profound impact on the shaping of the contemporary society. Considering the role that dehumanization has played in events throughout the history of humankind, a theoretical analysis is presented in order to have better grasp of the phenomenon of dehumanization and the factors that facilitate it. This study will essentially examine the concept of dehumanization in the light of Viktor Frankl’s philosophy. The researcher shall delve into Frankl’s anthropology and his criticism of the modern sciences. In line with this, the researcher supplemented the research with the ideas of contemporary theorists on dehumanization, namely Jacques-Phillip Leyens, Nick Haslam, and David Livingstone Smith. In this project, the researcher seeks to elevate the study of dehumanization to a more philosophic discourse, which will be achieved through utilizing of Frankl’s philosophical emphasis on human spirituality. In so doing, he has formulated three implications of dehumanization in Frankl’s philosophy, particularly the object, cause, and effect of dehumanization. With this in mind, he concludes that scientific reductionism has contributed to the dehumanization of man, and consequently to the events of mass violence in recent history. In considering such statement, the paper will then give light to a better understanding of both the theory of dehumanization in general and Frankl’s existential analysis and psychotherapy as well.

Keywords: dehumanization, dimensional ontology, human spirit, subhuman, scientific reductionism

Viktor Emil Frankl (1905-1997) was an Austrian psychiatrist and philosopher. Beyond the academe, he became famously known for being a Holocaust survivor. From such gruesome and horrific experiences during his imprisonment in four Nazi concentration camps and his initial affiliations with Sigmund Freud’s Psychoanalysis and Alfred Adler’s Individual Psychology, he was able to form and develop his own school which he proceeded to call Logotherapy, which came to be known as the Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy. The term logotherapy is etymologically rooted from the Greek word “logos” translated as “meaning,” whereas “therapy” means “healing.” Thus, logotherapy is “healing through meaning.” His most influential work, Man’s Search for Meaning (hereafter Man’s Search; originally published in 1946 as trotzdem ja Zum Leben Sagen: Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager, translated in English into Nevertheless, Say ”Yes” to Life: A Psychologist Experiences the Concentration Camp, and then in 1959, From Death-Camp to Existentialism), is essentially a narration of his first-hand experiences in the Nazi concentration camps in
Auschwitz which is substantially filled by implications of his philosophy, and also a concise introduction on the core ideas and principles of Logotherapy.

As implicated in the aforementioned paragraph, the Holocaust has had a profound effect in the formation of Frankl’s doctrine. While it is clear that the central tenets of logotherapy came to exist even before Frankl was admitted to the concentration camps, its theory would not have been as refined as it is now if it were not for his dehumanizing experiences in the hands of the Nazi tormentors. One can see in his personal account of the Holocaust, specifically in the first chapter of Man’s Search, that some of his key ideas were initially realized not only from his personal experiences, but also from the observation of his fellow camp inmates. It thus goes to show that the Holocaust plays a very important role in the philosophy of Frankl.

To come to think of it, it is nonetheless not likely for most people to consider of actually doing such a heinous crime against a person, even against those who they dislike the most. An ordinary person would feel guilty of intending to do harm against someone – much more to a great number of people – otherwise criminality would unimaginably be rampant than it is already. Taking this into consideration, one realizes a state of peculiarity when he contemplates about the incidents of relentless hostility in the past. He might ask: What is the primary motivating factor among these perpetrators that compels them to commit such a despotic act? This is not unusual to man; ever since the dawn of human civilization, we have encountered countless forms of terrible misconduct against a great number of people. But perhaps the Nazis, for an extreme instance, are not much different than we are today despite their tyrannical deeds against the Jewish people.

Going back to the question posed earlier, some scholars of today have attempted to answer it directly. David Livingstone Smith, one of the leading theorists on dehumanization, argues that the possibility of justifying such behavior stems from man’s tendency to dehumanize others. Dehumanization, according to Smith, is a widespread phenomenon throughout the history of mankind. It is also said that dehumanization is the primary motivation of acts of inhumanity, giving way to the contrivance of numerous genocides, mass violence, and the likes. It is without question therefore that dehumanization must not be neglected in the theoretical dimension as this permits man to rationalize events of atrocities. In line with this, there seems to be no philosophical system devoted to the study of dehumanization. Some philosophical traditions have implicit notions of dehumanization, while systematic attempts to systematize such a concept have mostly been done only by social psychologists. Smith argues that the discussion must be elevated into a form of philosophic discourse in order to better understand the phenomenon. Smith, being deeply entrenched in philosophy of the mind and philosophy of psychology, builds a comprehensive analysis of dehumanization.

In this paper, the researcher will primarily be focusing on the philosophical foundations of Frankl’s theory in theorizing his notion of dehumanization. However, utilizing solely his philosophy would be insufficient as he did not directly conceptualize the notion of dehumanization. Despite this, Frankl’s theory contains some philosophical concepts that can be arguably related to the theoretical analysis of dehumanization. Hence, as mentioned earlier, the works of Smith shall be of use to supplement Frankl’s philosophy. While Smith calls for a philosophical and theoretical analysis of dehumanization for the purpose of better understanding the phenomenon, Frankl’s anthropology, specifically his theory of dimensional ontology, is beneficial for the study precisely because it offers a philosophical inquiry on the structure of man, which, in turn, is the subject of dehumanization. In this vein, Frankl’s philosophical and existential analysis is going to...
be utilized in this study. This will include his criticism of modern science as he accuses it of partly being responsible to the dehumanization of man. In this vein, Frankl’s theory, along with the theory of Smith, leads to a philosophical understanding of the phenomena of dehumanization.

**What is Dehumanization?**

As mentioned earlier, the study of dehumanization is one of the more neglected research topics in contemporary scholarship. In other philosophical traditions that touch the study of dehumanization, such is a concept that is modestly given attention to, despite having a fundamental role in the theory itself. Marxism and Existentialism, to name a few, have similar conceptions of dehumanization (or alienation and depersonalization, respectively), but a study of this kind needs to have a correspondence with scientific analysis in order to provide an articulate assessment on the issue. In lieu of this, several contemporary interdisciplinary scholars have already started giving a comprehensive analysis with regard the phenomena of dehumanization. There have been many perspectives utilized in presenting a theoretical study of the phenomena of dehumanization. With this in mind, some scholars had argued that dehumanization is the perception of a person or a group of persons as nonhuman, infrarhuman, and even suprarahuman or a demon. However, as Smith points out, dehumanization is actually subhumanization.

In contrast with other theories, Smith’s analysis offers a deeper analysis of dehumanization as one of his projects is to investigate man’s psychological structure. His interdisciplinary method draws from sociology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science in examining that the phenomena of dehumanization is a historical, social, political, and linguistic event. In his book *Less than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others*, he probes the genocidal events in recent history, such as the African-American Slavery, the Armenian War in 1915, the Holocaust, and the Darfur War in 2003. The possibility of dehumanization goes beyond sociological factors, such as culture and race, but on the nature of the human mind itself. Moreover, his notion of dehumanization is basically the perception of one as subhuman. For him, the events of dehumanization prove that name-calling is not just meant metaphorically by the perpetrators, but it is rather meant literally. In arguing so, he uses two contemporary theories of psychology in order to have a better grasp of dehumanization. One of which is psychological essentialism. He explains:

Psychological essentialism refers to our pervasive, pre-theoretical disposition to think of the world as divided into natural kinds, each of which is individuated by a unique causal essence…We suppose that such essences causally account for the attributes that are typically displayed by members of natural kinds, even though we generally do not have a definite conception of what it is that fills the essence role. The human species, in the essentialist perspective, are considered to be a distinct, “natural kind.” All of the members of the human species are deemed to have the human essence. The essence is described as what is common in a species, and thus what differentiates them from other species. With respect to dehumanization, person is mentally perceived to not be a part of the human kind. Despite appearing and behaving human, he is thought to nonetheless not possess the human essence.
as Platonic and Aristotelian thought. Smith argues that despite of the Darwinian theory’s demolition of the notion of a biological hierarchy through his evolution theory, it is still deeply entrenched in our minds as humans tend to distinguish organisms in terms of “higher and lower kinds.” The higher a being is situated in the hierarchy, the more it has intrinsic value; while it is vice-versa for lower-tier beings. Human beings are placed atop the normative hierarchy, and animals are put in the bottom, but still higher than plants. However, this intrinsic value in beings has moral implications. Those ranked high are treated with the moral compass, whereas lower forms of beings are with less moral considerations. In this vein, this normative moral hierarchy existing in our minds makes possible, according to Smith, the perception of someone as subhuman. Dehumanization therefore becomes the moral justification of violence; perpetrators of dehumanization do not intently harm others regarding their intent and act as evil, rather because they actually think it is not immoral.

With respect to his theoretical account on the psychology of dehumanization, Smith subsequently distinguishes between objectification and dehumanization. Objectification, on the one hand, is the categorical denial of the human essence. As the name implies, the person is reduced into a mere object. In this vein, objectification is also the imperception of one’s subjectivity. It does not however result to violent acts as the objectified is instead usually regarded with indifference. On the other hand, dehumanization is the perception that one is subhuman. In the process of dehumanization, a person is viewed as less than human, and more like an animal. As per Smith, dehumanization thus consists of a two-fold mental process. The first process entails the denial of the human essence, or objectification. Then, the actual phenomenon of dehumanization occurs in the attribution of subhumanity, which is the second process. “When we objectify others we simply deny their humanity,” he reasons, “but when we dehumanize them we both deny their humanity and attribute a subhuman essence to them.” In this vein, dehumanization is the motivating factor of forms of mass violence. More specifically, Smith theorizes that dehumanization, as the attribution of subhumanity, subsequently leads to the justification of aggression as it gives way to the mental authorization of immorality towards the dehumanized. It is so because as they are compared to animals, they do not belong to the moral domain as much as humans do. It is a mental process more intense than the subtler objectification.

The Philosophical Foundations of Logotherapy

As a theory, logotherapy encompasses the fields of anthropology, psychology, and philosophy. Its psychiatric principles are fundamentally based on these systems of knowledge. In this chapter, the researcher will seek to expose the theory behind Frankl’s logotherapy. We shall discuss some of his fundamental philosophical assumptions in progression, namely: his notion of man, the existential properties of human beings, the laws of dimensional ontology, and the critique of reductionism and psychologism in modern thought. Such concepts are essentially interrelated, but all of which arise from his notion of man.

Frankl theorizes that man is constituted of different “dimensions” that represent different aspects of himself. He proceeded to call this the theory of dimensional ontology. The theory of dimensional ontology states that man has three dimensions, namely: the mind (psychic dimension), the body (somatic dimension), and the spirit (noetic dimension). In the spiritual dimension, we find the “uniqueness of the human being.” The dimension of the mind and the body are however subject to laws of psychology and biology, respectively. In this vein, Frankl states that the spirit is essential to human nature, whereas the psychosomatic
dimension (or the mental and bodily dimension) is only a contingent part of man. In other words, man is basically a spiritual being that has a body and mind; it is in the spirit that he is “genuinely human.”

The division between the spiritual dimension and the psychosomatic dimension is absolute, yet they are just different parts of the whole which are interwoven with each other. Thus, man is a complex multidimensional being. In this case, the natural sciences alone, which analyze beings only in the ontic level, are not sufficient in providing a complete understanding of the nature of man. More so, a single branch of science cannot deal with all the dimensions of the human being. Consequently, Frankl argues a need for a multidimensional analysis in order to understand the multidimensional being. He states that existential analysis generally offers a form of multidimensional analysis inasmuch as it is complementary with every dimension of the human being. Moreover, this multidimensional analysis specifically views man from various perspectives. Likewise, it does not entail that this form of analysis presume that these dimensions are separate in the literal sense. Rather, these ontological dimensions represent one and the same man, seen in various angles.

Moving further, Frankl goes on to emphasize the need for an existential analysis as opposed to a one-dimensional scientific analysis as he deals with another problem of presenting a theoretical analysis of the structure of man with regard the unitary principle of his being. He explains his account by giving an analogy through the polysemic nature of art:

…and where dwells the unity of the person? Where is being in the specifically human way, like a ceramic fused from rifts and cracks, from qualitative leaps, asserted and pushed through? As is widely known, art has been defined as unity in spite of multifariousness. In the same way, there is an anthropological unity in spite of ontological differences, in spite of the differences between different modes of being. The signature of human existence is the coexistence between the anthropological unity and the ontological differences, between the unified human manner of being and the diverse constitutive elements of being, of which they are a part. In short, human existence is unitas multiplex, to borrow from the Thomists. But the concept does justice neither to pluralism nor a monism as that which we encounter in Spinoza’s ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Let there be stated in the following an imago hominis “ordine geometrico demonstrata,” and image of the person sketched out that operates by way of geometrical analogies. This concerns a dimensional ontology.

Frankl wonderfully draws a picture in the above paragraph a portrayal of the nature of man: the unifying principle of man lies in his plurality; it is in his complex, “multifarious” nature that he becomes a person. It means that there can be no single dimension that can account for the existence of man. The account of the being of man is through the one and the many – the former as the anthropological unity and the latter as the ontological difference. In further explaining his notion of man, Frankl resorts to a geometrical approach. With the ontological differences in mind, he makes particular use of the “geometrical concept of dimensions as an analogy for qualitative differences which do not destroy the unity of a structure.” In this approach, he mentions two laws in dimensional ontology. The first law of dimensional ontology states:

One and the same thing, projected out of its own dimension into different, lower dimensions than its own, portrays itself in such a way and manner that the projected figures contradict one another. For example, I project a drinking glass, which geometrically speaking is a cylinder, out of three-dimensional space onto the two-dimensional levels of a ground and side profile, resulting in a circle in one case and yet a rectangle in the other. Over and above this, the projection results in yet another contradiction insofar as in
the two cases a closed figure is depicted, while the drinking glass is actually an open vessel.\footnote{36}

The first law of dimensional ontology elicits that when an object is examined in various perspectives, the totality of the object is disregarded. As a result, the differing perspectives lead to contradictory conclusions. A man, for instance, viewed in the lens of psychology, is a series of neurological feedback mechanisms and psychic structures.\footnote{37} However, when seen as a biological being, he is seen as amalgamation of organismic processes on the cellular and organic level.\footnote{38} When put into parallel these differing scientific analysis of the same organism, it seems that there is no connect as to how it can be analyzed as a different being. As seen in figure 1, using the geometrical analogy we see the same three-dimensional figure as triangle-shaped in one perspective, and a circle on the other. The first law of the theory of dimensional ontology does not view this seemingly opposing views as contradictory, but states that these scientific analyses only portray a limited “truth” to the rather much more complex being.

Figure 1: first law of dimensional ontology\footnote{39}

On the other hand, the second law of dimensional ontology states:

Different things projected out of one and the same dimension into one and the same lower dimension portray themselves in such a way and manner that the depictions are equivocal. For example, I project a cylinder, a cone, and a sphere out of three-dimensional space into the two-dimensional space of a ground-plane, resulting in a circle in every case. Now if we concern ourselves with the shadows that the cylinder, cone, and sphere cast, then shadows are said to be ambiguous in that they are the same; it cannot be decisively determined whether a cylinder, a cone, or a sphere is what cast the shadows.\footnote{40}

In the second law of dimensional ontology, Frankl explains that different three-dimensional objects, when viewed at a limited perspective, may appear to illustrate one and the same figure. However, this is apparently erroneous as one can see in a wider perspective that a cone is much different from a sphere (refer to figure 2 for an illustrated example). Frankl, in providing an example of this, notes that Fyodor Dostoevsky and Bernadette Soubirous are seen in the psychological dimension respectively as “nothing but an epileptic and a hysteric with visual hallucinations.”\footnote{41} However, as it goes to show, one was a great novelist while the other a mystic saint.

Figure 2: second law of dimensional ontology\footnote{42}

After having exposed the anthropological theory of Frankl, the researcher shall proceed to discuss his critique of one of the prevailing intellectual movement of his time in continental philosophy, and consequently his advocacy for a “spiritualized” psychotherapy. In the formation of his theory, Frankl had introduced the spiritual dimension to psychotherapy. Alongside this, he had criticized, albeit modestly, the psychotherapy of both Freud and Adler in claiming that they had a reductionist approach to anthropology. He argues that despite the divergent theories of his predecessors’ psychological theories, they share the same anthropological perspective on a deeper
level. He notes: “psychoanalysis, in the final analysis, only acknowledges libidinal things,” whereas “individual psychology reduces the mental world.” Here, Frankl argues that these psychological theories were guilty of reducing man as mere products of drives and instincts, and thus to biological and psychological mechanisms. In contrast, Frankl pioneered a humanistic form of psychotherapy wherein man has the capability to respond freely to the conditions of life and the power to transcend over them; he contends that this is possible through the spiritual dimension in which its possibilities are not enclosed and mediated by laws, unlike the psychosomatic dimensions. However, the problem lies in the reductionist theories being blind to the human spirit. In Frankl’s own words:

I would define reductionism as a pseudoscientific approach which disregards and ignores the humanness of phenomena by making them into mere epiphenomena, more specifically, by reducing them to subhuman phenomena. In fact, one could define reductionism as sub-humanism. To give an example, let me take up two phenomena which perhaps are the most human ones, love and conscience...Now, reductionism is liable to interpret love as a mere sublimation of sex, and conscience merely in terms of the superego. It is my contention that actually love could not be just the result of the sublimation of sex because, whenever sublimation takes place, love has been the precondition all along...And conscience is assigned if need be to oppose precisely those conventions and standards, traditions and values which are transmitted by the superego. Thus, if conscience may have, in a given case, the function of contradicting the superego, it certainly cannot be identical with the superego.

Frankl here argues that if one were to disregard the dimension of the spirit, he becomes reasonable to reduce human activity into mere acts of drives and instincts – a subhuman phenomenon. He notes that this becomes problematic in modern science, which he calls the "age of the specialist.” According to him, the specialist has the tendency to reduce the organism according to the laws of its scientific discipline in order to make way for its development through the imposition of its knowledge. “In principle,” Frankl states, “science must methodologically disregard the full dimensionality of reality and be based upon the indispensable fiction of a unidimensional world.” Moreover, in practice, he even treats his patient “as if he existed only in [a single] dimension.” In this vein, reductionism becomes a necessary component of science in order for it to further its study.

If such is the case, one tends to see man not just in theory, but even in reality as “but of a caricature, an automaton of reflexes, a helpless victim of his reactions and instincts, a product of his drives, heredity, and environment.” This however is opposed by Frankl. Rather, he asserts a pluralism of the sciences through the dimensional study of the ontologically diverse man. He contends that an adequate analysis of man must substantially involve the study of man in his three-dimensional reality. Likewise, it must specifically include the analysis of the spiritual dimension, given that from such his essence resides. He did not entirely discredit the psychological, biological, and even sociological factors that affect man, yet he generally did not give much attention to the scientific approach of theorizing man as compared to the study of the spirit. As a field of psychiatry, Frankl’s logotherapy seeks “healing through meaning” which he has based upon his theory of the rehumanization of psychotherapy.

Dehumanization in Frankl’s Philosophy

After having exposed the theory on dehumanization of Smith and the philosophical background of Frankl’s logotherapy, the researcher then proceeds to present a juxtaposition of both studies for the
understanding of Frankl’s notion of dehumanization. In this part, the researcher will show three major aspects of dehumanization shown in Frankl’s ideas, namely: the spiritual dimension as dehumanized, dehumanization in the sciences, and finally, scientific reductionism leading to the Holocaust. These three respectively have been formulated as the object, cause, and effect of dehumanization in Frankl’s philosophy.

As the researcher has discussed, Smith’s theory views dehumanization as the mental perception of one as a subhuman animal. The process of dehumanization is rather complex; the process is twofold. The first consists of the categorical denial of the humanness of the person; the second is the attribution of a subhuman essence. Moreover, he becomes regarded as animal-like, rather than as a machine. Conversely, one of the primary objectives in the previous chapter was to expose Frankl’s anthropology. In his theory, human spirituality was given emphasis, having the ability to respond freely from external and even internal forces. Thus, it is where his freedom and responsibility, and meaning and values can be found. In this regard, despite being cognizant of the importance of the psychosomatic dimension in the formation of man, Frankl’s account elicits the spiritual dimension as what constitutes the very essence, or the humanness of the human being. Being neglected of this dimension however, he is subjected only to his instincts and drives, and thus reduced to animals. Likewise, there is no room for freedom and responsibility, and all the existential properties of man, including the power of self-detachment and self-transcendence. In Frankl’s own words, man is regarded as merely a subhuman phenomenon. According to him, subhumanity is the reduction of the humanness of man, and regarding his phenomenon as mere epiphenomenon. Being reduced to the psychosomatic dimension, man will be regarded as only products of biological, psychological, and even sociological determinants. He explains what it means to be reduced into such:

Our existence in our bio-psychological domain is more or less determined. Namely, it is subject to environmental and genetic influences, the laws of physical causality and chemical processes. For example, in the dimension of the psyche, our character is shaped by past experiences and new learning in the environment. Therefore, in terms of their possibilities, both our bodies and minds are closed systems, whose functioning can be easily interrupted by external or internal factors, such as chemical imbalance, disease, or death. 

Hence, being accounted for as a closed system, all human activity can be explained in terms of animal activity. Neglected of the spiritual dimension, the subhuman animal is merely an ontic structure. Conversely, Frankl notes that an animal has a biology and psychology. In explaining an organism according to the field of biology, it is said to function through “complex biochemical, neural, etc. processes.” He states, “[these processes] can be more or less substantiated, touched, measured, altered, predicted, or controlled.” On the other hand, psychology as a science explains the behaviour of an organism as the sum of all of its “cognitive abilities, such as attention, perception, information processing, cognitive schemas, affect, which are directly influenced by the environment and learned behaviour.” In relating the two fields of study, this is how a human being is reduced into a subhuman animal. For him however, the possibility of being determined through the laws of biology and psychology is only applied to animals, and not humans. In such case, the reduction of man into a subhuman phenomenon is because they are determined, hence not free.

Despite being perceived as a subhuman and likened to animals, it would be unnecessary to make an inferential leap to identify the reduced human being into an animal, that is to say, belonging to the ranks of dogs, monkeys, etc. Rather, he is reduced only into a subhuman
animal for still appearing human. Smith would agree with this since he argues that the dehumanized man undeniably looks human, yet he is nonetheless removed of his spiritual dimension anyway because of the denial of the “uniquely human” essence. It is thus appropriate to categorize the dehumanized as a subhuman animal. Although Frankl did not explicitly use the term “dehumanization,” they both have philosophized on the concept of subhuman. Frankl means subhuman as the result of man being reduced into the dimensions of the animal, which the researcher has shown to be certainly related as to how Smith understands dehumanization.

Moreover, Smith did not particularly understand dehumanization as the reduction of the spiritual dimension as he means it as ultimately the attribution of a subhuman essence. It is because he did not theorize an ontology. However, he did make particular use of the philosophical theory of compatibilism in relation to the problem of free will, which is undeniably of profound significance to the study of dehumanization (as shown in the anthropology of Frankl). The theory of compatibilism states that freedom is possible to coincide along with a determined world. It is opposed to the “free will versus determinism” debate as it argues that freedom is rather compatible with determinism. To explain, some philosophers have reasoned that determinism, the idea that man’s actions are caused by internal and external factors, posits that free will does not exist. Smith contrasts this by arguing that the very fact that man can choose to react or not react to his conditions. A man may choose to, say, not to eat even if he already feels hungry just he can do so.

In relation to Frankl, the theory of compatibilism certainly corresponds with his theory that man, through his spiritual freedom, is able to respond from the determinants of his psychosomatic dimension. With this in mind, Frankl’s phenomenological theory supplements Smith’s theory primarily because it incorporates an ontological understanding of man. In doing so, Frankl’s theory analyzes the particular aspect denied in the person. Considering this, it is the spiritual dimension that is denied, along with it the very human essence. In the process, man becomes regarded as a subhuman phenomenon. The apperception of man’s spiritual dimension thus entails the perception of him as a subhuman animal. In other words, dehumanization is the reduction of man into his psychosomatic dimensions, which leads him to be viewed as subhuman. To synthesize Frankl’s ontology with Smith’s theory of dehumanization, the phenomenon of dehumanization, more specifically the process of denying the humanness of man, is the perception that he is subhuman.

After having shown the spirit of man as the object of dehumanization. One of the corollary questions in Frankl’s philosophy now then is: “What/who perpetrates dehumanization?” In the lens of Frankl, it is the modern sciences. His initial criticism of Freud’s psychoanalysis and Adler’s individual psychology regards them as representative of science. Later on, he broadens his perspective and generalizes it to modern science as a whole. Blind to the spiritual dimension of man, he argues that they become reductionist theories. In this vein, science conceives man as subhuman. It reduces human phenomena into epiphenomena – a sum total of biological, psychological, and sociological factors, namely drives, instincts, heredity, and environment. It is because, as explained earlier, reductionism is necessitated in science to regard man according to the dimension of its study and the corresponding scientific laws to consequently make way for its study. For instance, psychology views man only through its perspective, which essentially focuses on the mind in ultimately understanding and explaining his behavior.
that man in his totality can be grasped completely through this specific science. The same applies to “biologism” to the study of biology, and “sociologism” to sociology. This is the progression (and perhaps regression, at the same time) that happened in modern science. Frankl notes that such is the case as the contemporary man lives in the age of the specialist; he reasons that the method of science tends to “relativize” everything according to its one-dimensionality. However, the problematic issue here is the factual acceptance of this scientific idea, not just in hypothetical or theoretical terms. In this regard, science does not dehumanize per se, but rather it enables the possibility of dehumanization once the theoretical reduction of man has been applied in practical reality. As per Frankl, the sciences actually do accept this as fact, thus dehumanizing the human being.

With this in mind, the natural sciences are inevitably founded on philosophical presuppositions; scientific theories always have a fundamental philosophical structure. Scientists however, as also mentioned earlier in Frankl, are irreflective of this. In relation to Smith, he notes that scientists, like psychologists, are usually incompatibilists. To explain, one kind of incompatibilism is hard determinism. As opposed to compatibilism, the theory of hard determinism deems freedom and determinism incompatible. As they believe that the world is deterministic, it logically follows that free will is non-existent. In considering this statement, Smith agrees with Frankl that the sciences, in denying human freedom, reduce man into merely an epiphenomenon. In further analyzing Frankl’s criticism of the modern sciences, it can also be said that his critique can only be applied not just to the natural sciences, like biology and philosophy, but in the human sciences (geistwissenschaften) as well, including philosophy. Frankl notes that whereas the corresponding science of the psychic dimension and somatic dimension are psychology and biology respectively, the object of philosophy is the spiritual dimension.

Unfortunately however, in philosophy, man is still apparently dehumanized in some philosophical theories. As shown, Frankl combats Freud’s psychoanalysis, for one, which is deeply connected with philosophy. Evident in his critique, Freud is said to be a major player in the reduction of man. More so, the existentialist phenomenological movement, pioneered by Heidegger wherein Frankl is philosophically coming from, essentially criticizes traditional metaphysics for conceptualizing a notion of man that is static. Such dehumanizing theory is perhaps one of the reasons why existentialists, and generally postmodern philosophers, deviated from this kind of thinking. As a response to reductionist philosophical and scientific theories, sought to rehumanize his philosophy and psychiatry.

Conversely, incompatibilism is a philosophical position which is employed to scientific theory; Smith opposes this doctrine because he opines that there is such a thing as free will, which in turn implies that he conceives incompatibilism as a form of reductionist theory. In this vein, dehumanization, according to both Frankl and Smith, is present in the sciences, may it be natural or philosophical. They dehumanize man in their own way as he becomes reduced and totalized into his psychosomatic dimension. Viewed through the lens of Frankl, scientific reductionism is part of the source of the possibility of dehumanization. The denial of the uniquely human phenomena, particularly the meaning and values found in the spiritual dimension, enables man to be seen as a mere subhuman animal. Such an insight through the lens of Frankl is distinctive to the study of dehumanization, corresponding to the idea of Smith.

**Scientific Reductionism Leading to the Holocaust**

It has been argued earlier that man’s reduction in science greatly contributed to his dehumanization in actual reality. After all, scholars theorize in order to know the truth. In claiming that man is
nothing but the determined response toward his biological, psychological, and sociological conditions, they have unknowingly reduced man into a subhuman animal. In this vein, Frankl relates the dehumanization of sciences to his personal experiences in the Holocaust. He argues that the Holocaust is caused by the dehumanization in science and philosophy.

If we present a man with a concept of man which is not true, we may well corrupt him. When we present man as automaton of reflexes, as a mind-machine, as a bundle of instincts, as a pawn of drives and reactions, as a mere product of instinct, heredity and environment, we feed the nihilism to which modern man is, in any case, prone. I became acquainted with the last stage of that corruption in my second concentration camp, Auschwitz. The gas chambers of Auschwitz were the ultimate consequence of the theory that man is nothing but the product of heredity and environment — or, as the Nazi liked to say, of 'Blood and Soil.' I am absolutely convinced that the gas chambers of Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Maidanek were ultimately prepared not in some Ministry or other in Berlin, but rather at the desks and in the lecture halls of nihilistic scientists and philosophers.

Being treated as merely a sum of instinct, heredity, and environment, Frankl contends that man becomes susceptible to nihilism. This nihilism, according to him, is the view that the world and man’s experiences are devoid of any objective meaning. With this in mind, scientific reductionism is a contemporary form of nihilism; the refusal to perceive the spiritual dimension of the sciences meant that man is simply a “matter in motion.” Hence, the deterministic view of anthropology makes the probability of events of mass violence likely. In other words, dehumanization becomes the motivating factor of violence. More so, it does not just motivate, but rather becomes a form of moral and rational justification of violence. The Holocaust, being the exemplary historical event of mass violence, was made possible by the cognitive perception of one as subhuman. Frankl, being a Holocaust prisoner-slave himself, has directly experienced dehumanization. Some of the personal narration of his experiences includes his identity being reduced into just a number, being beaten ruthlessly by the Nazi, and having little to eat despite working in harsh weather conditions all day. Based on the above passage, these events were made possible due to the conception of man as merely “blood and soil.”

Smith conversely argues that the categorical attribution of the subhuman essence entails moral implications. The dehumanized is viewed to have less participation in the moral domain, or even having no part at all. For Smith then, dehumanization enables one to inflict harm to another because the possibility of being likened to an animal essentially becomes the justifying ground for immorality. This, in turn, becomes the motivation behind the historical events of genocide, slavery, war, etc., as evident in the African-American slavery, Holocaust, and similar episodes of mass violence. Particularly, he cites the report of Morgan Godwyn, an Anglican clergyman and human rights activist of the 17th Century. According to Morgan, the Englishmen perceive “the Negro’s, though in their figure they carry some resemblances of manhood, [are] indeed no men.” Moreover, they are “Unman’d and Unsoul’d; accounted and even ranked with brutes.” Such passage, for Smith, is an account of man being reduced from his human essence. Albeit having resemblance to the Englishmen themselves, the African slaves were conceived of as a subhuman animal.

In synthesizing both philosophers, Frankl and Smith are in agreement with each other in terms of theorizing that the view that dehumanization sanctions violence towards the victim. On the one hand, Smith argues that it is the attribution of a subhuman essence that constitutes dehumanization. Frankl, on the other hand, through the imposition of his theory of dimensional ontology, states that it is the denial
of the human spirit that reduces him into a subhuman phenomenon. Moreover, he reasons that reductionism and nihilism in the sciences affects man’s cognition in reality. Such a dehumanizing theory ultimately sanctioned violence against man. In this vein, the Holocaust was a consequence of dehumanization not just in theory, but in fact as well.

To give a historical evidence of the development of this nihilism leading to dehumanization in the sciences, it commenced during the modern period wherein scholars have criticized medieval philosophy for having an anthropocentric view of reality, i.e., that humans are *imago Dei*, or made in the image of God. Moreover, many scholars in Europe have embraced Auguste Comte’s theory of positivism which basically puts forward the idea that truth is only found in the empirical sciences. According to positivistic philosophy, knowledge that is beyond empirical evidence is nothing but false truth. In this vein, he rejected metaphysics claiming that it cannot be verified by the sciences. Alongside this, he became a pioneer of sociology in seeking for a scientific study of the society. Another intellectual movement which is hugely related with the theory of positivism is materialism. As a reaction to idealism, materialists agree with positivists inasmuch as knowledge must be empirically verified. These theories have led to a deterministic approach of man in asserting a scientific study of man. In relation to this, Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, started the debate between “nature versus nurture” as the theoretical framework of analyzing man, and thus losing sight of human freedom. In linking these historical intellectual events to the study of dehumanization, these theories have reduced man into his “biological make-up.” This analysis affirms that scientific reductionism is one of the precursors of historical events of violence. In the lens of Frankl, the reductionist and deterministic approach led to a nihilist view and approach towards man. In effect, man’s desanctification made him subject to violence; scientific reductionism was an opportunity for violence to be sanctioned.

**Conclusion**

There is a vital need in the contemporary scholarship to study the phenomena that motivates mass violence. David Livingstone Smith argues that the study must have some form of philosophical intervention in order to have a better grasp of such a complicated phenomenon. In this regard, he utilized the philosophical underpinnings of two contemporary psychological theories, namely psychological essentialism and moral psychology. Through these, he was able to advance the idea that dehumanization is ultimately the attribution of a subhuman essence to the person. According to him, the perpetrators of dehumanization, in perceiving the victim, deny them of having the human essence in its fullness, despite appearing and behaving the same as them. This perception of subhumanity makes possible the moral and rational justification of mass violence, with the events of the Holocaust and the African-American slavery as the suitable example for a concrete historical evidence.

In the first part, the researcher has basically discussed the anthropological, existential, and philosophical foundations of Frankl’s Logotherapy. According to his theory of dimensional ontology, man is composed of three dimensions, namely the psychological dimension, the somatic dimension, and the spiritual dimension. The possibility of the oneness of man however arises from the very fact that he has a diverse nature. Despite his multi-dimensionality, Frankl asserts that the spiritual dimension constitutes the “humanness”, or the human essence of a person. The psychosomatic dimension, on the other hand, is merely a contingent part of man. Moreover, in the human spirit, Frankl theorizes the three phenomenological assumptions, namely the freedom of the will, will to meaning, and meaning in life. In the first, he notes that man has the
ability to freely respond from psychological, somatic, and sociological determinants. Second, man also has the power to respond to an objective purpose, or meaning. For Frankl, this meaning is the primary motivation of man in living, not pleasure nor power. And third, in relation to the second assumption, he argues that there is an objective meaning in life. This meaning is unique in every particular context and situation, and thus man must realize such meaning in order to discover the best possibilities of his being.

In the second part, the researcher exposes the nature of man in relation to sciences. Through the use of geometric concepts and principles, he was able to formulate the laws of dimensional ontology. It basically advances the idea that the sciences, in principle, must methodologically disregard the multi-dimensionality of man and view him only through a single dimension that is with accord with its scientific laws for the purpose of developing itself. Consequently, this led Frankl to criticize scientific reductionism for asserting that man is determined by his conditions and is merely a product of instincts, drives, heredity, and environment. In doing so, one becomes negligent to actual human phenomena, which is found in the spiritual dimension. The denial of the spiritual dimension for Frankl reduces man into merely a subhuman phenomenon. With this in mind, he specifically criticizes the psychological theories of his predecessors Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler for being guilty of such reductionist and deterministic approach.

In the third part, the researcher has put into parallel the two previous chapters in order to understand Frankl’s notion of dehumanization. This led him to formulate three implications of dehumanization in Frankl’s theory, namely the spiritual dimension as dehumanized, dehumanization in the sciences, and scientific reductionism leading to the Holocaust. Regarding the first, man is dehumanized when he is denied of his spiritual dimension, reducing him into his psychosomatic dimension. In this vein, the spiritual dimension is the object of dehumanization in man. Second, the sciences, may it be natural science or human science, are a cause to the dehumanization of man; science itself has dehumanized man in the theoretical world. However, this dehumanization of man in theory ultimately led to the dehumanization of man in fact. In relation to the previous, the third speaks of the dehumanization of man entailing moral implications. The dehumanized man became prone to be a victim of violent and oppressive behavior. The Holocaust then, for Frankl, ultimately commenced “at the desks and in the lecture halls of nihilistic scientists and philosophers,” or, put simply, the effect of dehumanization.

These implications of dehumanization in Frankl’s theory presented us a profound and distinctive insight and perspective in understanding such phenomenon. As was said earlier, there is a need to have an intellectual and theoretical discussion regarding the events of mass violence. However, as it turns out, the theoretical world itself has actually contributed to the very possibility of these events in recent history by way of theorizing that prompted the desanctification of man. In this vein, the researcher concludes that scientific reductionism has led to the dehumanization of man, ultimately giving a form of rational and moral justification to discrimination, oppression, and violence. There is therefore a deep interconnected relationship between the academe and social reality as the former apparently comes to affect the latter. With this in mind, this relationship must not be neglected by scholars in praxis.

The imposition of Frankl’s ontology has definitely given us a better grasp of the human person, which, in turn, is beneficial to the theoretical analysis of dehumanization. Frankl’s theory supplements yet again Smith’s theory in terms of theorizing on the concept of the subhuman. For Smith, dehumanization as subhumanization is merely the denial of the uniquely human essence and subsequently the
Attribution of subhuman essence. However, Frankl’s theory adds that the subhuman essence is constituted of being reduced into a determined, unfree being. In other words, the denial of the uniquely human ability to respond from his conditions (freedom) and to a meaning and value (responsibility) is the perception that he is subhuman.

2 Ibid.
3 Batthyany, *What is Logotherapy and Existential Analysis?*
6 These social psychologists are specifically Herbert Kelman, Jacques-Phillip Leyens, Nick Haslam etc. *Ibid.*
8 David Livingstone Smith finished his post-doctorate in Philosophy in the University of London. Currently, Smith teaches at the University of New England. Moreover, he is one of the founders and directors of *The Human Nature Project* as his specializations and interests are generally in philosophy of science and philosophy of psychology. More specifically, he has worked on topics such as self-deception, dehumanization, the psychology of war, and Freudian theory. Sussex Publishers, *David Livingstone Smith Ph.D.,* accessed March 20, 2017, https://www.psychologytoday.com/experts/david-livingstone-smith-phd.
9 Smith, "Dehumanization, Essentialism, and Moral Psychology," 814.
21 Those ideas, Smith states, are the “Platonic principle of plentitude (the notion that, necessarily, everything that possibly exists actually exists) and the Aristotelian law of continuity (the claim that properties vary continuously rather than discretely).” *Ibid.*, 10.

Frankl, The Pluralism of the Sciences and the Unity of the Person, 6.


To explain further, here is Pope John Paul II’s notion of epiphenomenon: “Consequently, theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the dignity of the person.” Pope John Paul II, "Truth Cannot Contradict Truth," Address of Pope John Paul II to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, October 22, 1996, accessed March 3, 2017, http://www.newadvent.org/library/docs_jp02tc.htm.


Smith, "Dehumanization, Essentialism, and Moral Psychology," 821.


In the same vein, Frankl particularly criticizes the theory of determinism, calling it as “pan-determinism,” which essentially argues that the “acts of the will, natural events, or social changes are determined by preceding events or natural causes.” He however notes that “between stimulus and response, there is a space – response.” Marshall, Prism of Meaning, 10.

Frankl, “Existential Analysis and Dimensional Ontology,” 137.


Marshall, Prism of Meaning, 10.

Frankl, The Pluralism of the Sciences, 3.

‘Thus,” according to Franklian scholar Hayashi, “reductionism is typically a “totalizing” mode of thinking.” See: Hayashi, The Roar of Awakening, 169.

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Gabriel Marcel’s Existential Fulcrum in the Everyday Commuting: A Primary and Secondary Reflection of a UST-bound Commuter

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Abstract: The foremost subject of this paper is Gabriel Marcel’s Existential Fulcrum, along with the overarching goal of being able to identify and provide discourses of its relation to the phenomenology of commuting. The objective of the paper is to construct connections as to how the daily experience of commuting is relevant in realizing and knowing one’s existential being in the light of Gabriel Marcel’s philosophy. The everyday travelling through public transportation in today’s time has been customary for people especially those in the workplace and even to students. Accordingly, this paper shall be a moving factor to appreciate the time that one allots during commuting to make it a moment of realizations, specifically of reflection through which how Marcel considers it to be. Through examining two philosophical fields namely phenomenology and existentialism, the study will trace the convergences of the two to answer how could an individual know of his full existence through reflection during the hours of commuting.

Keywords: existential fulcrum, phenomenology, commuting, reflection

Commuting in a general sense means to travel from one place to another as a daily or regular routine. However, for us Filipinos, customarily, commuting is related with the use of public transportation such as trains, jeepneys, buses, and even tricycles. Commuting is very common to everyone especially those who are in the working class and of course to students. This accustomed act of commuting which often times serves as a mere pattern for peoples’ daily survival if only given philosophical attention to, could really be of great significance to one’s living. Hence the very objective of the paper is to be able to look at commuting as a phenomenological occurrence in light of Gabriel Marcel’s philosophy.

The only child of Henry Marcel a government official, diplomat, and a well-known curator, and Laure Meyer, a Jew, Gabriel Marcel was born on 7 December 1889. He lived as a critic, dramatist, and a philosopher for eighty-three years. He was interested in music, drama, and philosophy. Both his parents provided the foundation for his philosophical thought. His father is considered to be a lapsed Catholic and a cultured agnostic who does not even care to have his son baptized. This attitude of Henry results of him not allowing engaging at religious conversations at home.¹

Marcel’s philosophical project was noticeably distinctive as it touches both existentialism and phenomenology.² Hence, his philosophy is the perfect fit in analyzing and applying an everyday lived human experience in the understanding and

communicating of oneself. Another reason why his thought is very close to mankind is that he makes himself available to common people by using ordinary language to comprehend his points straightforwardly and by using concrete daily experiences as examples to further provide explanations. It is also unique of him to tackle themes such as reflection, hope, and fidelity which are essential especially in today's time. However, the paper will only be focusing on specific topics and instances to limit the ideas to be discussed.

Marcel's philosophy of the existential fulcrum will be applied to a Fairview-UST bound student commuter. The act of everyday commuting will be treated in a phenomenological sense as a tool for a student's realization of his self. This will spring from the very philosophy of Gabriel Marcel. The paper shall enumerate and discuss “reflective elements” which are present and experienced in the daily act of commuting. These reflective elements are founded on its relation with the different themes of Marcel's philosophy. With its fullest research and study, this paper intends to apply Gabriel Marcel's philosophy of the existential fulcrum to the activity of everyday commute by answering what are the significant links between the aforementioned philosophy and the experience of commuting.

**Main Discussion**

In a very demanding environment today, man has been participative with the challenges of everyday living. As an incarnate subjectivity, man's body is continuously interactive among other beings which also have their own personal bodies as well. This active co-existence among men has established a collaborative connection that shares ideas, thoughts, and feelings that in time would develop to be new relationships. However, in the everyday course of survival, we tend to forget to look at the bigger picture of life. These are the relationships, events, and actions that we have forgotten to deal with a philosophical and reflective attitude such as simply having the opportunity to study in a prestigious university, studying for exams, and even simply writing a term paper. A college student's situation is an example of a life immersed into the *broken world*.3

The academic field has required scholars of the various requisites which shall determine their intellectual capacity such as exams, papers, and recitations. However, these requirements are not only demanded inside the four walls of the classroom, but also beyond the learning arena, students battle with school works in our safe haven, our home. But in the case of students who live far from their university, what happens with the journey from school to their respective houses? To travel from one place to another on a daily basis requires a period of time. Commuting has been a day by day companion to most of college students, especially those who live at the Fairview area.4

Waking up two hours and a half earlier to prepare for school by eating breakfast, taking a bath, and cramming for the last night's task that was left undone due to heavy-eyed weariness from late night studying, are just some of the activities that a college commuter face every single day. The struggle to go to school does not end here, rather it starts when one waits for the right AUV or Action Utility Vehicle or some call it fx that has a signage of Buendia, Quiapo, or Vito Cruz. But after having found one, the question is, is there an available seat? And if there is one, is it for me, or for the lady beside me who was there even before I arrived and waited much longer than I did? Everyone has the same objective- to be able to get a ride.

The very first “reflective element” in which I would like to discuss the fact that as a student and an individual, I am not the only one who is struggling to get a ride. This I shall call the reflective element of *consideration of the Other*. During peak hour of 7 A.M., a sea of people is striving for their respective trips on their way to
the office, work, and schools while during 5 to 6 P.M., everyone is rushing to get a ride home. And, I belong to that sea of waiting people. Everyone has the same intention but each has a different story. If one would take time to examine the abundance of these people’s presence in specific waiting places, he would be able to allot a moment to look at how the busy world regulates the daily routine of people by the hands of time. For students, teachers, and those in working offices, they are expected to be within the premises on or before the starting hours. Hence, a pursued college student along with other competing commuters will make it before his class starts by being able to get a ride on his way to UST.

Finally, to have a seat in a Quiapo bound AUV is the best feeling that a Thomasian could have to start his/her day right. But along this assurance of a journey is, again, the reflective element of the consideration of the Other. However, this is a more intimate reflection not only considering the physical distance between me and the other passengers but especially the given fact that, being in the same transportation vehicle, we have something in common. This mutual relation may not be the same destination but somehow, it may be the same route that we share. In a typical AUV, a number of ten to eighteen passengers (in the case of vans) are gathered to travel the same itinerary. While I share the same seat with these people, they appear to be strangers to me but not until I leave the vehicle. I may not know their story but they would serve as building blocks to how I could enrich my identity.

An article by Mervin Jay Fernando published at The Inquirer.net entitled “The Five People You Meet in a Jeepney” portrays the variety of people that one may encounter in a jeepney ride. He classified the following as: 1) A few good men 2) Get a room 3) PUJ royalty and 4) Exploited youth. The fifth part of the article, “Reflection on the Galvanized Iron,” provided the author’s thoughts on this observation. According to Fernando:

Filipinos pride themselves in saying that the jeepney is found only in the Philippines. It is a source of pride for us; it is part of our culture. However, as you alight from the jeepney, it seems nothing has changed. Though they are not in their seats, the people you encounter inside the jeepney are the same folks you see in our society: a few good men; opportunists; and inconsiderate individuals.

Another significant other that is an essential reflective element in the phenomenology of commuting is of course, the captain of the ship; the driver. Having them around most of the time is often taken for granted. Some passengers get mad at them and even reprimand them in public when they are not brought to where they would like to get off without even first considering the very fact that these drivers are just following the law and that they are only doing what is ought to be done because they are also workers. This is a very distressing truth that most passengers continue to do up to date, and having the aforementioned attitude results only to exercising primary reflection towards these people.

Primary reflection tends to dissolve the unity of experience which is first put out before it. Marcel defined primary reflection as dealing with the realm of the problematic. Thus, when we are faced with this kind of trouble, the solutions are provided right in front of us. In the case of drivers asking us our whereabouts, primarily we could respond, “Dyan lang po sa UST.” “Bayad po dala lang ng UST kakasakay lang po.” but if we would look deeper and really ask ourselves, “Saan nga ba talaga ako pupunta?”. This question is a concern of one’s presence of higher contemplation; secondary reflection. On the other hand, the function of secondary reflection is “essentially recuperative; it reconquers that unity which primary reflection dissolved.”
Hence going back to the very objective of the paper- to able to look at the daily act of commuting as an opportunity to reflect and contemplate on the everyday living moments we have taken for granted, we look into a deeper understanding of this daily habit. Especially as a student, being sent to school by our parents is a mystical journey and the everyday travelling through public transportation is a part of that expedition. Thus, the money we spend on fare is also something that is significant not only objectively but more importantly, something that is personal.

The money we pay for our trips is the sole fruition of our parents’ hard work. A thirty-five peso fare from Fairview to UST is a big part of my education. It is one of the many ways of how our parents show their support and love for us and our education. But this money has a two-fold role in realizing one’s existential being in this paper: first, as a personal bond between me as a student and my parents and the money being a tool for my education and second, an emolument for my trip which would be an instrument to help the driver with his profession and his family. These people behind the steering wheels also have families to support, thus the money we rightfully pay to them serves as a helping bridge between two people. Money may seem to bevaluably significant today because of how people treat it to the extent of it being an exchange to someone’s life but money in this paper is dealt as something philosophically reflective, which people of present time mostly have neglected.

After having discussed the physical reflective elements such as, 1.) people whom we share the act of commuting with, 2.) the driver, and 3.) money as (a) an icon of our parents’ support to our education and (b), an emolument for our trip, the second part of the paper shall examine the non-figurative reflective elements. I shall begin with the route that a commuter from Fairview to UST-bound travels.

There are a number of destinations that for most people is either the first stop or the last stop. Along with these destinations is a story of the place. From Fairview to UST, there are three main areas that a commuter travels. One is the 12.4-kilometer Commonwealth Avenue. Predominantly, Commonwealth Avenue is known to be the widest highway in the Philippines. But along with this spacious road is an extensive narrative of how people in this location live.

Commuters are given the opportunity to have a peek on how these people strive to the demands of everyday living by selling goods along streets, such as bottled water, fruits and vegetables on push carts and the like. To be a witness on how different people live in a certain moment is a rare chance that some may have experienced but did not live with that experience. The status of life is really evident along streets. There are the unfortunate ones that sleep on paper cartons amidst the polluted boulevards and sadly, children also bear with this kind of living. If one would observe such situation from comfortably sitting in a public vehicle and being able to look at these people from the window, one would be full of hope for their situation, and by praying for them, one has offered a part of his availability for these people.

Marcel defined hope as that which provides strength for someone to continue to be himself in availability for other people. Hence, this kind of hope springs from humility. When one gives a moment to reflect upon this, he lets himself be there for the other. This kind of reflection that one may gain from a daily experience which is often times taken for granted, is what Marcel tries to impart as his existential fulcrum. That, it is through these day-to-day encounters with others that one may be able to know more of himself in relation to his availability to other people. From a perspective of a student commuter, the stagnant traffic of the flood-prone España Avenue has been a great teacher in awakening one’s inner self.
for the reason that there is more to it in just being a boulevard, but rather it could be a path towards one’s personal reflective assessment.

**Conclusion**

I would conclude my paper in sharing a metaphor that is very much significant with the phenomenology of commuting. This metaphor is about a stoplight. Primarily, a stoplight has three indicating lights: red for stop, orange for slow down, and green for go. This metaphor of the stoplight has been a daily reminder for me for four years since the school where I graduate my secondary education has always posted this on classrooms.

But this stop light is fashioned as: **red** for stop to make a decision, **yellow** for slow down and think of your actions, and **green** as go for the right decision. This is a part of truth that Marcel would like people to understand from the little actions like the act of commuting. If we would take time to reflect while on the road, we could say that, life is like the daily act of commuting. It is a journey with bumps and stillness along the way, yet when we pass to certain locations and finally reach our destination, we somehow have enriched ourselves with a spec of the vast truth and reality. Hence this passage supports the said claim:

According to Marcel, truth is only a single aspect of reality, and is not the whole of reality. Truth may emerge from reality, but reality is more than truth. The fulfillment of truth, or the totality of all truths, may produce an inclusive reality. The universe may realize itself in the fulfillment of truth. However, the universe may also include things which are lacking in truth. Truth is both immanent and transcendent.9

Hence the truth in the phenomenology of commuting may just be a fragment of the grandiose reality but somehow teaches us the things that we could only for ourselves.

Marcel also argues that philosophic thought is reflective in that it may not only be concerned with the nature of human existence but may also be concerned with evaluating its own mode of being concerned with the nature of human existence. Reflection may be a process of recalling or reexamining our past experiences in order to understand them. Reflection may transform experiences into concepts. Marcel emphasizes that feeling is not passive, and that feeling is participation. However, participation is more than feeling. Participation is active engagement in the world.10

The philosophical project of Gabriel Marcel is the kind of philosophy that our present generation needs to learn. People of today have been living in the mode of having and have forgotten to live essentially with the mode of being.11 We have been lying comfortable in the rabbit’s fur without the courage to look at the eye of the magician. The broken world has been a home for broken people and broken relationships that are caused by being unavailable to others. We have neglected to take time to reflect on our lives. Thus, Marcel’s philosophy is a reminder to everyone.

However, one’s existential fulcrum is not attained with a one-time reflection only. Rather, the knowing and realizing of one’s existential fulcrum is when we continuously cultivate ourselves for ourselves and for others. As Marcel once wrote in *The Mystery of Being*:

A really alive person is not merely someone who has a taste for life, but somebody who spreads that taste, showering it, as it were, around him; and a person who is really alive in this way has, quite apart from any tangible achievements of his, something essentially creative about him; it is from this perspective that -we can most easily grasp the nexus which, in principle at least, links creativity to existence…12
Hence, Gabriel Marcel’s philosophy is a call to look back into ourselves so that we could look at life not just as fleeting moments but as phases of reflection and contemplation that it is through our little daily acts like commuting that we are somehow exposed to the vast, beautiful, and meaningful reality lying right under our noses. If we only have the time and effort to look, then we would know.


2 It is noticeable how Marcel uses situations in life as examples from where one could reflect upon his existence. One of the examples he mentioned in The Mystery of Being is when one tries to look for his watch in his pocket only to find out it is not there, one experiences a shock, or a small break in the chain of his everyday habits. His philosophical method itself consists in “working…up from life to thought and then down from thought to life again, so that [one] may try to throw more light upon life”. Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, Volume 1, trans. by G.S. Fraser (Chicago: H. Regnery Company, 1960), 41 and 78.

3 Marcel illustrated the broken world as the situation characterized by a refusal (or inability) to reflect, a refusal to imagine and a denial of the transcendent. There are three types of “unity” in the broken world according to Marcel: 1.) Increased socialization of life, 2.) Extension of the powers of the State and 3.) This world has lost its true unity probably because privacy, brotherhood, creativeness, reflection and imagination, are all increasingly discredited in it. Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1, viii, 36-37.

4 Located at Quezon City, Fairview has been known as one of the busy districts in the north of Metro Manila with its various malls, parks (e.g. La Mesa Eco Park), food parks, schools, colleges, and other offices and business establishments.


6 Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1, 93.

7 Ibid, 83.

8 Hope is the final guarantor of fidelity (a belief in someone); it is that which allows me not to despair, that which gives me the strength to continue to create myself in availability to the other. But this might appear to be nothing more than optimism—frequently misplaced, as events too often reveal—that things will turn out for the best. The person who hopes does not accept the current situation as final; however, neither does she imagine or anticipate the circumstance that would deliver her from her plight, rather she merely hopes for deliverance. See Brian Treanor and Brendan Sweetman, "Gabriel (-Honore) Marcel," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2016, accessed 24 December 2016, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/marcel/.


10 Ibid.

11 Both having and being are modes or ways on how we encounter and relate with the world. “Having always implies an obscure notion of assimilation”. Hence, the mode of having is our usual approach in dealing with the world as we ought to provide solutions to problems, like “What route should I take going to the mall?” It is somehow an objective attitude towards the world. On the other hand, the mode of being is a deeper and more concerned dealing with the world. “When one approaches the world with the attitude of ‘being’, that world appears as something I participate in. I am immersed in it and it appears to me not as an object, but as a presence.” See James P. Grace, "Philosophical Basis for Abandonment," in opcentral.org, 1986, accessed 24 December 2016, http://opcentral.org/resources/2015/01/13/james-p-grace-a-philosophical-basis-for-abandonment/.

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**Abstract:** Albert Camus sought to envision his works to express negation, affirmation, and love in a progressive manner. Negation found its expression in *The Myth of Sisyphus*, *The Stranger* and *Caligula*, while affirmation was conveyed in *The Rebel*, *The Plague*, and *The State of Siege*. Love, however, was left unexpressed due to Camus’ untimely death.

When Camus died on January 4, 1960, a draft of an autobiographical work entitled *Le Premiere Homme* (The First Man), was found inside his suitcase. This work was supposed to be part of the third phase of Camus’ works which purportedly discuss about love. The main aim of this research project therefore is to expose Camus’ notion of love and prove its significance in his philosophy of affirmation. It will make use of the triads included in Camus’ projected works – finished and unfinished – in extracting the meaning of love and in proving that love has a vital role in his philosophy. The work desires to address the main problem in three ways: firstly, to discuss Camus’ philosophy of affirmation; secondly, to elucidate his notion of love by extracting its meaning from *The First Man*; and thirdly, to bridge the two by attempting to articulate the role that the notion of love plays in the development of his philosophy of affirmation via the articulation of the close connection of Camus’ political intentions and activities to his philosophical thoughts.

**Keywords:** Camus, love, affirmation, internationalism

“Absurdity is king, but love saves us from it.”  
Albert Camus, *Notebooks 1935-1951*

In a speech given by Camus during his 1957 trip to Stockholm to receive his Nobel Prize for Literature, he explained in detail the projection of his works.

I had a precise plan when I started my work: I wanted first of all to express negation. In three forms. As a novel: this was *The Stranger*. Theatrically: *Caligula*, *The Misunderstanding*. Conceptually: *The Myth of Sisyphus*. I couldn’t have spoken of it if I hadn’t lived it; I have no imagination. But for me, that was Descartes’ methodical doubt, if you will. I knew one could not live in negation and I declared that in the preface of *The Myth of Sisyphus*; I foresaw affirmation, again in three forms. As a novel: *The Plague*. Theatrically: *State of Siege* and *The Just Assassins*. Conceptually: *The Rebel*. I already glimpsed a third layer, around the theme of love. These are the projects I have in motion.\(^2\)
From the speech cited above, three main points may be gathered: (1) there is a pattern in Camus' works, i.e. the endorsement of a specific thought comes in triads of a novel, theatrical act, and conceptual text; (2) Camus' philosophical thoughts are greatly influenced by his life, it could thus be said that his unfinished autobiographical work entitled The First Man will reveal more of Camus' philosophy and; (3) Camus' works are interrelated and progressive as each phase layers down the foundation for the next phase, ultimately arriving at its final destination. It can be argued therefore that firstly, from the fact that Camus' works are interrelated and progressive, there is an overarching theme beyond the absurd. This being said, the absurd no longer becomes the central theme in Camus' work, but rather serves as the context. The overarching theme will be argued to be the topic of the third and final layer of Camus' work – love.

In this paper, I will make use of Camus' unfinished autobiographical text to expose the beginnings of the third layer of Camus' works.

**The First Man**

When Camus died from a car accident on January 4, 1960, included in the wreckage was a 140-page-manuscript of an autobiographical work intended to be his best work. It was not published until 1994 – thirty-four years after his untimely death, for the reason that Camus' daughter, Catherine Camus, thought it best to wait out the publication of this work for three reasons: (1) to follow her mother's wish, (2) to wait for the political climate to settle down, and (3) to not allow Camus' enemies to use the work as “another stick with which to attack him.” The First Man would be more appropriately called a draft rather than an unfinished novel but it is perhaps this fact that contributed to its beauty as a work, for in this novel, Camus is nothing but honest and raw – where there is none to be filtered nor concealed. Its unfinished state should not discredit the quality of the work however for as stated in the “Notes and Sketches” section of the published manuscript itself, “…the book must be unfinished. Ex. And on the ship bringing him back to France…” The fulfilment of Camus’ intention to leave the book unfinished may be untimely but plenty may still be gathered from what was left.

The novel originally entitled Le premier homme, became a best seller in France, selling over one hundred thousand copies over the first few months of its release. Apart from its literary grandeur however, it could be said that The First Man is the work that could make it most possible to identify the core of Camus’ thought by the fact that Camus’ life, as stated by the man himself, greatly influenced his philosophical thoughts.

The First Man was published unaltered with all corrective notes, sketches, and scribbles still intact. It is divided into two sections: Recherche du pere (Search for the Father) and Le fil (The Son or The First Man), both being incomplete. A more scattered, unrefined and merely outlined chapter is also included in the “Notes and Sketches” section, and this is entitled “The Mother.”

As described by many, The First Man is a work that gives a detailed account of a man’s journey to adulthood, his love for his family, and his search for his father. Moreover, it is the first installation to the third layer of Camus' works. It is here where love as understood and meant by Camus is lyrically expressed as (1) a love that is earthly and concrete, and (2) as a love directed towards all of humanity.

**The Expression of Love in The First Man**

As mentioned above, The First Man is an autobiographical work; the novel, however, was written as if it was still a literary piece, with pseudo-names for the different persons actually depicted. Thus, Camus took form in The First Man as Jacques Cormery, a man born in poverty to an illiterate mother and a father who died in action when he was merely a year old.
It can be said that there are two central characters in *The First Man*: Jacques, and his father. Although Jacques’ father is illustrated as dead most of the novel, he has been kept alive through the accounts of others, through memories of him that are sometimes portrayed in a present tone. If one were to consider Jacques’ father as the representation of Camus’ own, it can be said that the latter played an important role in the formation of one of the former’s notion of love. There is another more inconspicuous central character however and the importance of this character will be made even more pronounced as the novel progresses—supposedly. This third character is the mother.

Both the mother and the father contribute greatly to how love is depicted, more so with the former inasmuch as it was even indicated in the Notes and Sketches section that the third chapter entitled “The Mother”, will speak of “loves”. In this research, the “loves” which Camus hinted at will be proven to refer to a love of life that finds expression in two forms—a concrete and earthly love and the love of humanity.

**Love of Life as a Concrete and Earthly Form of Love**

*The First Man* is rich with the imagery of the sea, the forests, the feel of the wind, the effect of heat, the splash of the rain, and many more. Jacques Cormery, having grown in a household of poverty under the tyrannical rule of an illiterate grandmother, took on simple pleasures in life which one could consider earthly. This is the first expression of Camus’ notion of love—a kind of love that is earthly and concrete.

In *The First Man*, the insistence on the existence of the now, and of the absence of anything beyond life lived on earth was best heard through Jacques’ contemplations upon his mother’s lifestyle and attitude.

Remembrance of things past is just for the rich. For the poor it only marks the faint traces on the path to death. And besides, in order to bear up well one must not remember too much, but rather stick close to the passing day, hour by hour, as his mother did somewhat by necessity no doubt. There are two things to note in the excerpt above. One is the distinction between the rich and the poor, the other is the mention of death and the insistence of living in the present.

The life of the rich can be viewed as a life filled with escapism and delusions of meaning. The rich indulge in many activities that often make them forget the futility of life—where remembering things past equate to remembering adventures or happy memories. In contrast, the life of the poor is a life where one is forced to face the meaninglessness of life, of the futility of all acts.

There were many accounts of Jacques’ family’s toil for daily survival. Jacques’ grandmother handled all the finances of the family as well as the distribution of it, and she was entirely economical about it. She would buy clothes and shoes a couple of sizes too big so they could be used longer, and would forbid Jacques to play soccer because it wore out his shoes faster. One instance which served as highly memorable for Jacques was the time when Jacques’ grandmother looked for the two-franc piece that ‘fell’ on the ‘toilet’. His grandmother’s unhesitant move to look for the two-franc piece in the toilet made Jacques realize his family’s need for every franc.

As a young boy, Jacques was unable to grasp the gravity of their poverty. He was not able to make sense of all actions committed in response to poverty—at least not until he had lied about dropping two francs in the toilet. When he saw his grandmother washing her hands after searching for the money, Jacques “understood (that) it was not avarice that caused his grandmother to grope around in the excrement, but the terrible need that made two francs a significant amount in his home.” This state of poverty can easily be connected to living in the present, and constantly being reminded of death.
The poor have not any other choice but to “stick close to the passing day, hour by hour,” because every hour, every day, counted for a new kind of labor in order to survive. The poor toil every single day and yet nothing changes; such is futility. The novel’s message does not end here however, for it is also through this poverty, through experiences of futility where one is able to embrace and love life through nature and earthly pleasures.

Every person in Jacques’ household has a simple pleasure which he/she indulges in whenever he/she can afford it. For Jacques, it is going to the beach, playing with his friends, and running around under the sky – be it rainy or sunny. For Jacques’ grandmother, it is watching silent films on rare occasions that they have saved up for one viewing. For Jacques’ partly mute and partly deaf Uncle, Ernest, on the other hand, it is hunting. All these are earthly and simple pleasures that make loving life more than possible.

In the following excerpt, one will be able to note the love attached to engaging with nature:

In a few seconds they were naked, a moment later in the water, swimming with clumsy vigor, shouting drooling and spitting, daring each other to dive or vying as to who could stay underwater the longest. The sea was gentle and warm, the sun fell lightly on their soaked heads, and the glory of the light filled their young bodies with a joy that made them cry out incessantly. They reigned over life and over the sea, and, like nobles certain that their riches were limitless, they heedlessly consumed the most gorgeous of this world’s offerings.13

Here, there is yet another allusion to the meaningfulness of life by mentioning the lifestyle of the rich. It could be argued that this would imply an escapism in response to futility or more concretely to poverty, but it would be more appropriate to argue that these earthly pleasures – engagements with nature, particularly – are answers to futility.14 As mentioned previously, it is insisted that one should live in the present. It is also implied in this insistence that there is nothing beyond life on this earth. How else should one embrace the present, embrace life on this earth, other than by basking in the glory of what it contains – of all things earthly and finite? Of loving life through the fruits of the earth, be it natural or manmade? The recognition of futility will make one go beyond escapism and into an acceptance that culminates in the love of life. It is not merely a utilization of what one has been provided with, but an appreciation.

The concrete and earthly form of love is not only a love directed towards nature, but also to persons. The Greek notion of love called eros or the love pertaining to that which is passionate and romantic, oftentimes sexual, best describes this form of love. And this could be noted in the few charged lines expressing Jacques’ longing for eros:

In this dark place he would close his eyes, and, breathing the familiar smell, he would dream. Something obscure was stirring in him, something irrational, something in his blood and in his natures. At times he would recall the sight of Mme. Raslin’s legs that day when having knocked over a box of pins in front of her, he knelt to pick them up and, raising his head, saw her parted knees under her skirt and her thighs in lace underwear. Till then he had never seen what a woman wore under her skirts, and this sudden vision made his mouth and dry and caused him to tremble almost uncontrollably.15

These lines, along with a few others in other chapters are suggestive of Camus’ future affairs,16 and supportive of the earlier stated loving of life through immersing one’s self in earthly pleasures.

The Love of Life as the Love for Humanity

One of the main dilemmas in the novel is uncovering facts beyond Jacques’ father’s life as a soldier. This has been met with much difficulty on the part of Jacques because no one in his household ever talked about him nor did his
mother ever tell him anything relevant about his father whenever he would ask her. In fact, it was mentioned more than a handful of times that Jacques’ mother no longer remembers her husband in the sense that memories of their life together were no longer vivid. This fact made Jacques perceive this as his mother not allotting time for the remembrance of his father. Thus he himself as well had never known the man, never thought of him longingly as his father, nor felt anything towards him until he was forty years old.

In the love of life expressed as the love for humanity, there are yet again two layers: concrete and specific love directed at persons, and a more abstract and general love towards humanity as a whole. In the first layer, love takes the form of a love directed towards one’s family or friend. What makes this love distinct from the earthly form of love is that instead of passion, what characterizes this love is a form of subtle devotion.

_The First Man_ is dedicated to Camus’ mother, who is said to “never be able to read (the) book,” because she is illiterate. As the novel progresses, Jacques gradually comes to the understanding that he had loved his mother dearly and had longed to feel the warmth of her love. In a conversation with Victor Malan, Jacques’ cherished friend, Jacques claimed that when he loves, he loves with faults included, saying further:

I love or revere very few people. As for the rest, I’m ashamed of my indifference to them. But for those I love, nothing and no one, neither I nor certainly they themselves, can ever make me stop loving them. It took me a long time to learn that; now I know it.18

The kind of love being mentioned here is a concrete form of love that is referred to by the Greeks as _storge_.19 _Storge_ requires a feeling of familiarity but is also known to not be loudly nor frequently expressed and instead comes naturally to a person. This is the kind of love Camus, as Jacques, expresses for his family as well as for his cherished friends and his mentors.

These forms of love – i.e. the concrete and earthly love likened to _eros_, as well as the subtle devotion in the form of _storge_ – are not the primary concern of this research however for there is not much to elaborate upon these kinds of love. What holds prime importance is the other kind of love greatly influenced, as apparent in the text, by Camus’ father (or Jacques’ father, Henri, in the novel). This love, in contrast to the earlier stated forms, is collective for it encompasses the whole of humanity.

As mentioned earlier, Jacques had not spared any thought nor longing for his father for forty years prior to him visiting his grave. Moreover, upon arriving in the cemetery and speaking to the caretaker of the graves, Jacques portrayed his utmost indifference towards his father when the caretaker had expressed sympathy upon hearing of Jacques’ loss, by merely replying, “I was less than a year old when he died. So, you see,” 20 internally thinking that “he could not muster a filial devotion he did not feel.” 21 His loud indifference shifted to anguish however when he had seen his father’s grave, even more specifically, the two dates summarizing the latter’s years of being alive into twenty-nine.

And the wave of tenderness and pity that at once filled his heart was not the stirring of the soul that leads the son to the memory of a vanished father, but the overwhelming compassion that a grown man feels for an unjustly murdered child.22

This is a line that holds primary importance to the kind of love that this research will focus on. Here, one will take note that Camus envisioned a form of love higher and vaster in scope than _storge_ or _eros_. It is an all-encompassing, and truly collective love for all of humanity. What should be emphasized in the lines above is the explicit distinction between the feeling shared within a relationship like that of a father and a son, being subservient to the compassion towards one man.
to his fellow man. Here, one is given a glimpse of the form of love I argue to be the intended theme in the third layer of all of Camus’ works: a collective love that will serve as a response to life’s absurdities. This form of love may be further justified by the narrated events of Henri Cormery’s experiences in war screaming of indignation towards the injustices inflicted by one human to another.

Jacques recounts what he had learned from M. Levesque, his school’s principal as well as a man who shared posts with his father during the war in Morocco. It was said that when M. Levesque and Henri were about to relieve the sentinel at the bottom pass, they had instead seen two corpses killed inhumanely – heads turned towards the moon, necks slashed, and mouths stuffed with their own sexual organs. At this, said M. Levesque, Henri was beside himself, saying their enemies were not men because “a man doesn’t let himself do that kind of thing! That’s what makes a man or otherwise…”

It cannot be denied that Henri possessed a deep compassion and love for his fellow men, for, just the thought of man killing another in a manner that can never be deemed just, outrages and befuddles him. This is seen more so at yet another recount of what Henri did when men kill their fellow man.

An impactful memory of his father for Jacques was the time when an agricultural laborer named Pirette was sentenced to be executed for having allegedly robbed and killed his employers and their three children. Henri was said to have gotten up at night to attend the punishment. When he arrived home however, Henri “was livid… he went to bed, then got up several times to vomit, and went back to bed. He never wanted to talk about what he had seen.” The actions of Henri are consistent with what was earlier stated. He abhors injustice and the phenomenon of killing one’s fellow human confuses him, more so brings him despair. This is perhaps what was meant when Camus wrote that Henri was “a hard man and a bitter one, who had worked all his life, had killed on command, had submitted to everything that could not be avoided, but had preserved some part of himself where he allowed no one to trespass.” That part which Henri is said to preserve is his love for humanity which tries in earnest to act in accord with this so long as it is possible. This collective and pervading love was what Jacques or Camus also inherited.

In one instance, young Jacques embodied this inherited distaste for violence when, driven by the ‘duty of a man’, Jacques engaged in a donnade – a duel of fists with the aim of settling a quarrel where:

…the honor of one of the adversaries was at stake, either because someone had insulted his parents or his ancestor, or had belittled his nationality or his race, or had been informed on or accused another of informing. Had stolen or been accused of it, or else for the more obscure reasons that come up every day in a society of children.

Jacques engaged in a duel to defend his honor after Munoz, his classmate, whispered that Jacques was a ‘teacher’s pet’ for the whole class, including M. Bernard, to hear. The donnade is a ritual that Jacques and Munoz felt obliged to undergo. What is important to note in this specific scene is that the inevitability of this fight exposed Jacques’ reluctance to participate in imposing harm towards another.

His execution of the said ritual can be likened to what was earlier exposed of his father. His father had committed acts which he would otherwise have avoided had he the choice. He acted out of duty, or rather, by the sheer fact that they were inevitable. Jacques, as well, recognized that conflict and violence are at times inevitable but with this acknowledgment came a recognition of the fact that its inevitability does not equate to one’s acceptance or preference of it. When Jacques had successfully landed a hook to Munoz’s right eye, rendering Jacques the victor, more than being glad over his triumph, he was saddened. After witnessing the effect of violence
on his foe, Jacques realized that “war is no good, because vanquishing a man is as bitter as being vanquished.” 27

In the progressive development of all forms of conflict and injustices, Camus also finds himself questioning the occurrence of these events.

By the time he had come of age, world events around him were such that his execution was no longer so unlikely a possibility, and reality no longer assuaged his dreams, but on the contrary was fed during a very [precise] number of years by the same dread that so distressed his father and that he had left to his son as his only clear and certain legacy. 28

Some may say that what is expressed here is a personal anxiety towards an imminent danger, that this speaks more of the absurd than of a love towards humanity. It may be true in a sense, but it does not solely speak of an absurd world bound to end at any minute. In a closer reading one will be able to detect the urgency in tone of a question arising from an incomprehensible occurrence: man endangering other men’s lives. This question arises because for both Jacques and Henri, man should love his fellow man instead of fight him.

This notion of love can be said to spring from Camus’ firsthand experience or witnessing of the injustices brought on by social conflicts and war. In The First Man apart from the author portraying the search of a man for his father, it can also be viewed as the author’s attempt to understand war and the conflicts arising from socially-constructed differences along with expressing his confusion for the existence of such wars when one could just love life – as expressed through nature or in humanity. It is thus once more exposed that Camus’ philosophical thoughts are so rooted in his life that even his political activities and activism is an actualization of his philosophy.

Camus’ Notion of Love and his Philosophy of Affirmation

Camus’ Political Stance and its Implications to His Works

In 1933, Albert Camus began his political commitment by joining the anti-fascist Amsterdam-Pleyel movement. In the following year, he joined the Communist Party as a propaganda agent among the Arabs. 29 Later on, Camus severed his ties with the Party in 1935 as a reaction to its “playing down of colonial injustices and therefore a reduced interest in, among others, the Arabs of Algeria.” 30 Although inaccuracies were noted by some commentators such as Conor Cruise O’Brien who argued that it is more probable for Camus to have left the party in 1937, 31 the fact still remains that Camus left the party that ignored injustices and favored the interest of one group over another.

In the previous sections of this paper, it was shown and proven by a close and thorough reading of The First Man, that Camus’ notion of love is a love of life expressed in two ways: a passionate and the love for humanity. The former expression can be said to be a product of Camus’ childhood and his early indulgence of the fruits of nature and various passions, while the latter can be connected to Camus’ political intentions.

Camus wrote his first work, a collection of essays later to be published as Betwixt and Between, in 1935, his first play in 1936 and, in 1938, had written his second play entitled Caligula and had also began preliminary work on the elucidation of the Absurd to be found in The Myth of Sisyphus. 32 As apparent in the dates of his activities, Camus was politically active prior to his literary career. Camus’ interest and eager participation in the throes of politics, and his passion to support the fight against injustices prior to his career as a writer, imply a deeper meaning to his works. In reading Camus’ works, it could be argued that one must heed the social and political context in which they were formed.
A discussion of Camus’ political views is relevant to this research project therefore, since Camus’ aspirations for Algeria is vital to his entire philosophical oeuvre which, according to John Foley, can be said to rest on the idea of ‘Mediterranean humanism’, moderation, ‘limits’, etc. These are the underlying themes that irrevocably connect Camus’ literary and political intentions.

**Tracing the Love of Life in Earlier Works**

Camus’ works are interrelated and progressive. To justify this, one need only trace the thoughts and concepts found in later works in the earlier ones and vice versa. These specific characteristics make unearthing and concretizing the final phase of Camus’ work feasible such that the ideas contained in *The First Man* may be discovered in the earlier works albeit not as concretely. Thus this research project will be true to the hermeneutic circle such that the whole will be understood in accordance to the parts, and the parts’ meaning understood in the context of the whole.

**Negation**

As stated beforehand, the first phase which is known as negation is expressed in three ways: lyrically in *The Stranger*, theoretically in *The Myth of Sisyphus* and theatrically in *Caligula* and *The Misunderstanding*. Conor Cruise O’Brien, preferred to refer to this phase as the phase of the Stranger, which may be more fitting since the Stranger is he who experiences negation in an individual level, and the first phase precisely demonstrates this.

Negation is the acknowledgment of the absurd which springs from the relation of man who ceaselessly seeks meaning, and the world who falls deaf to these cries. This acknowledgement is a negation inasmuch as there is a removal of a possibility of and meaning itself in a perceived meaningful world and existence.

Negation is a problem that calls forth a proper response. If one were to stop at negation, the logical response would be suicide – physical or philosophical. Camus rejects suicide and does not see it as a solution to the absurd and sees it rather as an escape. The two forms of suicide are not solutions to the absurd for they merely eliminate one aspect of the problem. In physical suicide, what is removed is the individual seeking meaning, resulting to the problem remaining unsolved. Conversely, philosophical suicide removes the meaninglessness of the world and replaces it with a God and/or an idol. This solution does not address the problem at hand inasmuch as the formula of the problem is changed but the original problem is still lurking unseen. The response that Camus provided in *The Myth of Sisyphus* and *The Stranger* instead led to the opposite: a primitive form of an affirmation of life. Upon the realization of the absurdity of life, one is expected to become the Absurd Man who embodies the characteristics of Don Juan, the actor, and the conqueror. The Absurd Man is one who prefers quantitative over qualitative experience and remains lucid in the present, foregoing any thought of a life beyond the current one. These characteristics boil down to the emphasis on two things: the here and now.

In *The First Man*, negation was expressly portrayed in the lifestyle of the Cormery family and their neighborhood. Affirmation, in turn, was manifest in the attitudes of Jacques and the people around him. It was shown in the novel that poverty necessitated an outlook that made one remain in the present and gather many experiences that are concrete and worldly. One area influenced by this outlook is the Cormery family’s view on religion.

Actually religion had no part in their lives. No one went to Mass, no one invoked or taught the Ten Commandments, nor did anyone refer to the rewards and punishments of the hereafter… It was not a matter of ignorance on (Jacques’ grandmother’s) part. For she had seen many die around her… But that was just it: she was as familiar with death as she was with work or poverty, she did not think about it but
in some sense lived it, and besides, the needs of the moment were even more urgent for her than they were for Algerians as a whole, who by their daily cares and their common lot were denied the funerary piety that flourishes in civilizations at their height… For Uncle Ernest, who lived by his senses, religion was what he saw; that is, the priest and the ritual… As for Catherine Cormery, only she with her gentleness might have suggested faith, but in fact that gentleness was her faith… She never spoke of God. In fact, that was a word Jacques had never heard spoken throughout his childhood, nor did he trouble himself about it. Life, so vivid and mysterious, was enough to occupy his entire being. 37

Religion was exposed to be treated in a practical level in the novel. It was a practice of culture rather than an adherence to an actual belief, rendering concepts such as the afterlife foreign to the Cormeries.

The novel highlighted the here and now in every section, emphasizing the character of the Absurd Man. In the previous section, the accounts on Jacques’ family’s poverty was understood to lead to a love that is concrete and earthly further accentuating the present. In this chapter, this concrete and earthly love will be traced in Camus’ earlier works, beginning with The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus, and Caligula.

The Love of Life as an Earthly Love in Negation

The Stranger is a novel littered with symbolisms. To grasp the message of this novel, one needs to read between the lines. Some important elements to note and analyze are the sun, the sea, the observer standpoint, Meursault’s conviction, and the trial itself. 38

The sun or the heat, rather, plays a vital role in the actions and moods of Meursault, affecting, in turn, the events that unfold in the novel. At times, the heat is a source of comfort. It is calming and can easily lull Meursault to sleep. At other times, it does Meursault a lot of good, refreshing him and making him happy. On the day of his mother’s funeral however, the sun was harsh and Meursault felt nothing but discomfort and annoyance for it. During the funeral, Meursault says that while the evenings in the countryside may be a ‘sad relief’, “today, with the sun bearing down, making the whole landscape shimmer with heat, it was inhuman and oppressive.” 39 He was dizzy and he was having a headache. After the funeral, the sun was portrayed in neutral or joyous tones. The sun was yet again described to be harsh when Meursault had seen the Arab in the spring. “The sun was the same as it had been the day I’d buried Maman, and like then, my forehead especially was hurting me, all the veins in it throbbing under the skin.” 40 This explicit showcase of a connection implies a signification.

According to Syed Irfan, the English translators of Camus’ The Stranger made a grave mistake when they had translated “Aujourd’hui, maman est morte” into “Mother died today.” 41 This mistake was partially amended however, when Matthew Ward retained the word “Maman”, in his translation, making it, “Maman died today.” Nevertheless, Irfan still argues that the translators still fault Camus’ work when they had failed to retain the original sentence structure of the first statement of The Stranger. The correct translation for “Aujourd’hui, maman est morte,” is “Today, Maman died.” 42 It is this arrangement which enables the reader to understand three things: (1) Meursault is a man who lives in the present, (2) his relationship with his mother is not that of one who is distant with her and, (3) Meursault’s day was disrupted by his mother’s death – symbolically representing the abrupt awareness of the absurd. The importance of this specific structure and its implications can also fortify the connection between the event of Meursault’s mother’s death and his killing of the Arab wherein, as mentioned previously, the heat of the sun was just as intense, his dizziness and headache just as bad and finally, his day disrupted just as abruptly – only now expressed unambiguously:
The trigger gave; I felt the smooth underside of the butt and there, in that noise, sharp and deafening at the same time, is where it all started. I shook off the sweat and sun. I knew that I had shattered the harmony of the day, the exceptional silence of a beach where I’d been happy.

It can be surmised then that the heat symbolizes the mild indifference of the world to its occupants seeking reason and order. When the sun is not harsh, there is normalcy but at times the heat will be immense, and actions will be rendered meaningless – such as Meursault’s indifference to his mother’s death, his killing of the Arab, and his detachment during his trial. This is how the absurd human condition is illustrated in the novel – like the ‘why’ that suddenly arises amidst one’s routine. It should be stated however that the absurd can be distinguished as a human condition, on one hand, and as a state of consciousness on the other. If the heat symbolizes the absurd human condition, then the attitude of Meursault during his trial represents the absurd as a state of consciousness.

The trial of Meursault is an expression of the absurd inasmuch as the judge, the lawyer, prosecutor, and the press were all in search for the meaning behind Meursault’s attitude towards the passing of his mother and his killing of the Arab when there was none. While the prosecutor applied his own meaning to Meursault’s actions, the latter remained impassive, accepting the fact that there is no meaning to be found in his actions. They just happened. This here, is an illustration of the absurd state of consciousness – a state wherein one is aware of the absurd human condition without trying to modify it, resulting to accepting it instead.

The symbol of the sea, on the other hand, will be shown to be the expression of the earthly and concrete form of love.

The main scenes in the first part of The Stranger contained two things: the beach and Marie. The day after Meursault returned to Algiers, he decided to go for a swim. If one were to analyze the order of the events, the beach is always mentioned after an encounter with the absurd. It seems to imply that the beach, or nature in general, is one way of keeping one’s self grounded after an encounter with the absurd. In the first part of the novel, the state of absurdity and the absurd human condition were not yet fully recognizable. Meursault’s consciousness of the absurd still tethered in other words, but after every episode, nature and the sea are shown to be constant sources of reprieve.

During the funeral of Meursault’s mother for example, when the director talked to Meursault about what his deceased mother used to do when she was alive, reminding him albeit indirectly that she is no longer there, he turned his attention to his surroundings instead, appreciating its majesty and thinking of his mother in relation to what he saw rather than what he was hearing. This may be interpreted as an attempt to stay in the here and now – to not be swayed into responding negatively to absurdity.

The death of Meursault’s mother symbolized a sudden encounter with the absurd. In Caligula as well, the death of Dursilla, Caligula’s sister whom he had fallen in love with, became the trigger for Caligula to become aware of the absurdity of the world. Most of his subjects were thinking that he had a sudden change of behavior due to Dursilla dying per se, but it has been said by him explicitly that it was not about that:

Now, I know. This world, as it is constituted, is not bearable. Therefore I have need of the moon, or of happiness, or immortality, of something which is demented perhaps but which is not of this world… I also know what you’re thinking. What disturbances for the death of a woman! No, it’s not that. I believe I recall, it’s true, that some days ago a woman that I loved died. But what is love? A slight thing. This death is nothing, I swear it to you. It is only the omen of truth which makes the moon necessary to me. It’s a truth entirely
simple and entirely clear, a little thing, but difficult to discover and heavy to bear. In the excerpt above one can distinguish the main difference between how Meursault and Caligula responded to the absurd. Meursault’s response was that of someone turning his attention to the here and now while Caligula’s was that of a nihilist playing God – wanting to achieve the impossible by exercising as much freedom in order to deny his unfreedom. According to Cruickshank, “the motives of (Caligula’s) revolt – a desire for lucidity and readiness to act in accordance with the truth he finds – would have Camus’ approval, but the methods of his revolts are utterly wrong.” Caligula resulted to killing many of his subjects for the most trivial reasons, torturing them and treating them like objects meant to bend to his every whim. Caligula had an awareness of the absurd but he could not accept it.

In *The Stranger*, the insistence to stay in the here and now through the appreciation of nature in the face of absurdity was even more pronounced in the second part of the novel wherein it could be said that Meursault is now lucid in terms of the absurd as a human condition and a state of consciousness.

As mentioned earlier, Meursault’s trial is also symbol of the absurd human condition and Meursault’s demeanor during the trial, an illustration of the absurd as a state of consciousness. When the absurd was descending on him in the form of the verdict, he once again resulted to focusing his attention on his surroundings. In the end, all I remember is that while my lawyer went on talking, I could hear through the expanse of chambers and courtrooms an ice cream vendor blowing his tine trumpet out in the street. I was assailed by memories of a life that wasn’t mine anymore, but one in which I’d found the simplest and most lasting joys: the smells of summer, the part of town I loved, a certain evening sky, Marie’s dresses and the way she laughed. Does this not remind one of Sisyphus, condemned to roll a rock atop a mountain only to have it roll down again for all eternity? Sisyphus is the true Absurd Hero according to Camus and although there are many opinions as to the reason behind Sisyphus’ condemnation, there are two main themes in them: a defiance of the gods, and a passionate love for the earth and living.

Sisyphus defied the gods by refusing to be subjected to them in like manner with Meursault’s rejection of religion. In one of the speculations on the reason behind Sisyphus’ punishment, on the other hand, his love of life became the culprit.

Emphasis should be placed in what Camus enumerates whenever the joys of the Absurd Heroes are discussed. Nature as well as the concrete and tangible manifestations of life, material objects and personified desires are always the contents. In *The Stranger*, apart from the recurring scenery of the sea, as mentioned previously, Marie, the personification of Meursault’s carnal desires, is another frequent element worthy of note.

When Meursault was visited by the chaplain as a final attempt to make the former believe in God in order to liberate himself from sin, the chaplain had insisted that the only salvation from the anguish of life was God saying, “but deep in my heart I know that the most wretched among you have seen a divine face emerge from their darkness.” Meursault’s response to this, in a way, summarizes the experience of the absurd, saying:
I had been looking at the stones in these walls for moths. There wasn't anything or anyone in the world I knew better. Maybe at one time, way back, I had searched for a face in them. But the face I was looking for was as bright as the sun and the flame of desire – and it belonged to Marie. When I had searched for it in vain. Now it was all over. And in any case, I'd never seen anything emerge from any sweating stones.  

The chaplain was suggesting a response to the absurd in the form of a philosophical suicide but Meursault answered differently – the love of life in the form of Marie who embodied all his passionate desires.

Apart from the imagery of nature and the sea, Meursault's love of life is also exhibited in his carnal desires, i.e. women. A scene with Marie was always intimate and pertaining to eros. As mentioned in the previous section, eros is a love that is passionate and romantic, oftentimes sexual. It does not go deeper than that and this was proven when Meursault reacted indifferently to Marie's proposal of marriage – accepting it without a hint of zeal. Marie was nothing more than an object of sexual desire for Meursault – an earthly pleasure always readily there, reminding him of his love of life. This was a response preferable to philosophical suicide but it is apparent in Meursault's later statements that this is not the most correct response. At one point, this love of life through desires may be sufficient but it will come to a point when one will realize that the fulfillment of desires is not the answer to the absurd. “I opened myself to the gentle indifference of the world. Finding it so much like myself – so like a brother, really. I felt that I had been happy and I was happy again.” In The Stranger, The Myth of Sisyphus and Caligula (albeit it being implied through the illustration of what should not be done in response to the absurd), the most proper response to the absurd is the acceptance of it.

The first step is the acceptance of the negation, affirmation is to come afterwards – as expressed in The Plague, The Rebel, The State of Siege and The Just Assassins. Although negation is the predominant theme in the first phase of Camus’ works, as is evident from what has been shown above, there were still traces of Camus' projected theme as well as the concepts I argue to be the content of the said theme. The love of life also finds expression in two forms in these works: the love of nature and the love for humanity. Although the more abstract and general form of love directed towards the whole of humanity is harder to trace in this first phase, this predicament is understandable and even acceptable since the focus of the first phase is the individual facing the absurd. Camus’ works are progressive apart from being interrelated and at this point, it should be clarified that the love aimed towards the whole of humanity is an end product of man’s acceptance of the absurd. Its lack of presence in the first phase therefore is a necessary condition of progress. A new question arises: how does one go from a solitary revolt in negation to a collective affirmation? The answer lies in Camus’ dictum, ‘I rebel – therefore we exist.”

The Love of Life as a Love for Humanity in Affirmation

In the age of negation, it was recognized that human life is a necessary good. “To say that life is absurd, one must be alive,” says Camus. Suicide is not a response to the absurd because it removes an element of the formulated problem rather than solves it. When it comes to murder however, the lines are yet to be cleared. As was evident in the demeanor of the protagonists of the works in the phase of the Stranger, murder along with other questions of morality are more or less met with an air of indifference. In The Stranger and Caligula, for example, the murder of the Arab in the former and the mass execution of the citizens of Rome in the latter had not rendered its offenders remorseful. The murders they have committed were made to look like mere details to prove a point – the way to answering absurdity. But again, this is part of the progressive response to the absurd.
The moment life is recognized as a necessary good, it becomes so for all men. One cannot find logical consistency in murder, if one denies it in suicide… In view of that confrontation which they both render impossible, murder and suicide are the same thing; one must accept them both or reject them both.60

In solitary revolt, what is rejected is suicide but once this rejection has been established one will necessarily proceed to the rejection of murder. This is the same principle contained in the dictum, “I rebel – therefore we exist.” To rebel, according to Camus, is to say yes by saying no – to affirm one’s worth by refusing submission into intolerable conditions and treatments inflicted on him by others. This rebellion, at first glance seems to be yet another solitary act but upon further scrutiny, one will come to the realization that apart from the affirmation of an individual’s worth, the worth of other men is affirmed as well.

One rebels when he feels justified and this justification arises from the affirmation of one’s worth. One’s worth is derived from his identification with humanity such that there is a recognition of proper ways of treating men and a recognition of the difference in one’s reception of treatment. As stated by Lana Starkey, a rebellion is always for ‘something’ and this ‘something’ could be understood as ‘equality’ and ‘self-respect’.61 It is through rebellion therefore, where one reveals a part of man that should always be defended. It is also in rebellion where solidarity is founded, and solidarity the only thing that justifies rebellion.

The transition from a solitary revolt to a rebellion done in solidarity therefore can be summarized in the excerpt below:

In absurdist experience suffering is individual. But from the moment that a movement of rebellion begins, suffering is seen as a collective experience – as the experience of everyone. Therefore the first step for a mind overwhelmed by the strangeness of things is to realize that the entire human race suffers from the division between itself and the rest of the world. The unhappiness experienced by a single man becomes collective unhappiness. In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the ‘cogito’ in the category of thought: it is the first clue. But this clue lures the individual from his solitude. Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his first values, I rebel – therefore we exist.62

In The Plague, the transition from negation to affirmation – solitude to solidarity – was lyrically illustrated through the stages of action of the citizens of Oran who found themselves trapped in a plague-stricken city. More than this however is the expression of the form of love aimed towards the whole of humanity. In the second phase, the general and more abstract form of love for humanity is more palpable in comparison to any of the works in the earlier phase but less complete juxtaposed with the third phase.

The Plague centered upon the struggle of the citizens of Oran to counteract the plague. In this work it is shown that it was only through empathy – the realization of common struggles – where the citizens of Oran were able to be in solidarity with one another. This phenomenon is consistent with what was reasoned in The Rebel wherein rebellion is ineludibly tied to solidarity and implies the affirmation of commonalities across humanity. The collective revolt manifested by the citizens of Oran in the last leg of the plague as well as the rebellion elucidated in The Rebel can be said to be preludes to the end of Camus’ philosophy: the formulation of a community of internationalism built on moderation, justice, and love.

Love as Springing from Indignation Towards Injustices

In the section discussing Camus’ notion of love as extracted from The First Man, it was stated that one impactful story heard by Jacques about his father was the time when the latter rose early in the morning to witness the public execution of
Pirette, only to return home traumatized, vomiting ever so often. This memory had been recounted in two other works: The Stranger and Reflections on the Guillotine.

In The Stranger, the memory of Camus/Meursault’s father’s attendance of the public execution led to a reflection of a condemned man, waiting in line to be one who would be publicly executed himself. In this novel one can say that the opinion articulated with regards to public executions is from the perspective of one who will be a victim of it. It is therefore not surprising that Meursault, while thinking about being set free, said, “I would make up new laws. I would reform the penal code. I realized that the most important thing was to give the condemned man a chance.”

What Meursault was proposing was that the ‘patient’ still be given hope – a chance to escape death. The guillotine, Meursault mused, gave the criminal no chance at all. No hope of surviving after staying under the sharp blades of the guillotine. These words were truly words of a man in the death row, shaken by the guillotine due to his future direct experience with it. In the Reflections on the Guillotine however, the view was that of an observer who, by way of research and analysis of a witness’s account, brought into light the death penalty as it is in reality rather than discuss it in abstract terms and euphemisms. In the perspective of the observer, the death penalty is still a horrible ritual.

In the Reflections on a Guillotine, it was revealed that Camus’ father was actually in favor of the death penalty at first but after witnessing a public execution firsthand, he had just discovered the reality hidden under the noble phrases with which it was masked. Instead of thinking of the slaughtered children, he could think of nothing but that quivering body that had just been dropped onto a board to have its head cut off.

Here, Camus argues that if executions were able to unsettle the citizens it aims to protect to the point of vomiting, how would such a ritual bring forth peace and order in a community? In The First Man, the point of view is still not of the one who witnessed the execution, but it was also no longer that of a mere observer. The articulation of opinions based on facts were not elucidated in a detached manner. In the First Man, it was mentioned that after Jacques heard of his father’s experience, he too was affected. Despite not being a witness to the execution itself, just the mere imagination of it nauseated him as well.

If one were to examine the reaction of both Camus’ father and presumably Camus himself as represented by Jacques Cormery, the nausea felt towards the execution of a person regardless if that person was a criminal or not is a sign of a physical rebellion itself. The indignation towards murder – a new murder in response to an old one – is so immense that the body itself has expressed its disapproval. The body rebels because it recognizes that human life is a necessary good. One should therefore not recklessly reduce a person into his crimes. A similar outcry can be seen in The Plague. When Tarrou tells Dr. Rieux of the time he had experienced the ‘plague’.

Tarrou backtracked to his youth by speaking of his father, who he described as a good-natured man sticking to the middle way. His father was a prosecuting attorney of the death row but up until Tarrou’s father invited Tarrou to watch one of his trials, he had not given much thought to what occurred in trials, thinking of them only in vague and abstract terms. For Tarrou, witnessing that trial was equivalent to the coming of the plague.

The only picture I carried away with me of that day’s proceedings was a picture of the criminal. I have little doubt he was guilty – of what crime is of no great matter. That little man of about thirty, with sparse, sandy hair, seemed to be so eager to confess everything, so genuinely horrified at what he’d done and what was going to be done with him, that after a few minutes I had eyes for nothing and nobody else. He looked like a yellow owl.
I would like to emphasize the recognition of the criminal being tried as a human being rather than as a bundle of body parts that had committed a crime worthy of being punished ‘justly’. The common element in all these recounts of a renewed view on the death sentence is the view of the criminal as a human being; of understanding the death penalty not in abstracts nor euphemisms, but as it is in reality. This could be traced back to the thoughts ingrained in The Rebel wherein killing is one of the concepts that required a reevaluation. It is included in the ‘limits’ that one must acknowledge in order not to become a nihilist that permits murder due to the indifference towards life, or a totalitarian whose passion for life is so strong that it produces criminal excess. One should avoid these two extremes and instead adapt an attitude of moderation or la mesure which is vital in what he envisions to be what a community should be like.

Camus on Algeria and the Arab

In a collection of essays entitled The Algerian Chronicles, one will note that in contrast to the setting and tone of Camus’ other writings wherein there are portrayals of a beauty and prosperity embodied only by those persevering amidst destitutions, the Algeria contained in this collection of essays is bluntly depicted in its misery and poverty – an Algeria minus the ornate descriptions and euphemisms. These essays, along with his previous political activity and intentions can be argued to be one of the proofs that Camus does not glaze over the real Algeria.

One of the criticisms on Camus is the scarcity of the traces of any direct relation to the communists and the Arabs of Algeria in his work. According to critics, his efforts as the propagandist of the Arabs in the Communist Party are almost unheard of. In fact, Kamel Daoud, an Algerian writer, wrote a novel in response to Camus’ The Stranger wherein, according to Daoud, the Arab was reduced to a nameless casualty – an instrument to proving a point.

It happened, and everyone talked about it. People still do, but they mention only one dead man, they feel no compunction about doing that, even though there were two of them, two dead men. Yes, two. Why does the other one get left out? Well, the original guy was such a good storyteller, he managed to make people forget his crime, whereas the other one was a poor illiterate God created apparently for the sole purpose of taking a bullet and returning to dust – an anonymous person who didn’t even have time to be given a name.

Daoud aimed to provide an identity of the Arab by giving him a name, a history and a family. Daoud argued his claim of Camus’ reduction of the Arab by laying down three points: (1) the Arab’s namelessness and instrumentality; (2) the relation of the Arab, whom he had named Musa, to the prostitute that Raymond abused and; (3) Meursault’s conviction as being the result of his indifference to the death of his mother rather than for the murder of Musa. Daoud also provided a new way of reading The Stranger – as an allegory of the French occupation of Algeria. According to him, the prostitute who Musa had been written to dutifully avenge symbolized Algeria, “plowed by customers and passersby, reduced to dependence on an immoral, violent pimp.” Accordingly, Daoud exposed the dualisms within the novel – the French and the Algerian, the original inhabitants, and the settlers.

Daoud emphasized the symbolic nature of the presence of both Meursault and the Arab in the beach, saying:

What was your hero doing on that beach? And not only that day but every day, going a long way back! A century to be frank. No, believe me, I’m not one of
This is clearly pertaining to the arrival and settlement of the French in Algerian soil. What should be highlighted are the phrases: “it doesn’t matter that he was French and I’m Algerian, except that Musa was on the beach first, and it was your hero who came looking for him.” The argument here is not as to who had the right to be in the beach or Algeria according to ethnicity but rather who was there first and who had invaded? According to Daoud, Musa, just like all the other original inhabitants had merely waited for Meursault, the symbol of the settlers, to leave. They knew it was inevitable. This was expressed in a memory of children staking claims to European neighborhoods once the settlers have left. They did not view the French as Algerian, not even as French-Algerian. There were distinctions. Camus wrote these distinctions, Daoud did as well. But the purpose of these distinctions differed, the latter intended this distinction as a claim to identity and property – a right to land, and independence – the former, to express one thing: internationalism – unity in diversity.

*The Meursault Investigation* along with other works and criticisms of the same nature, argue that Camus’ writings on Algeria are categorically too French – “putting too refined and metropolitan a French into the mouths of his Algerian characters.” In reading Camus’ works one cannot help but think that the author is a Frenchman, and his writings, of France, but it will be understood later on, that this fact is in line with the direction of Camus’ thoughts and works. It should also be noted that in *The Algerian Chronicles*, one will be able to better see and believe that Camus did not view the Arabs and Berbers as strangers.

Earlier on, I had enumerated Daoud’s main arguments on Camus’ reduction of the Arab in *The Stranger*. Included in these points was the fact that Meursault was convicted not for the murder of an Arab, but for his indifference towards his mother’s death. Daoud viewed this as a reduction of the Arab, Conor Cruise O’Brien, on the other hand, saw the fact of a trial being held against a Frenchman killing an Arab, in itself, an expression of a “generalized human sentimentality.” In this situation, expounded O’Brien, the setting becomes that of a European town dealing with an Arab and a Frenchman not as separate classes, but as members of a homogenous population. The trial and conviction of a Frenchman killing an Arab with a knife, therefore, is an asseveration of a myth of French Algeria. In contrast, the reality of the European-Arab relation was retained. Thus, the Arabs remain nameless. O’Brien, like Daoud, understood this namelessness as a reduction of the Arab to one who is not a man, additionally viewing this as Camus’ inability to confront the problem of the European-Arab relation, resulting to the manifestation of a harbored historical guilt. This, according to O’Brien, is relevant to forming an opinion on one of the roles often ascribed to Camus i.e. the conscience of the West. *The Stranger* is a dramatization of the Western conscience, conceded by O’Brien, however, it also contains the conscience’s hesitations and limits, greater still, in the colony. On the other hand, I argue, that *The Stranger’s* place in the margin between myth and reality is a means of confronting the problem of the European-Arab relation.

Camus’ political aspirations for Algeria were for them to not gain independence from France. Many have criticized Camus for this stand but not many have tried to understand where he is coming from.

Albert Camus is a *pied-noir*. He is neither French nor Algerian, but at the same time he is both French and Algerian. He is seen as an outsider by Algeria because of his French origins, and by France as a stranger because of his Algerian roots. This ‘neither-and-both’ status of Camus however has made it possible for him to embrace
both cultures and to witness the possibility of cultures intermingling. When Camus says that Algeria should not be given independence from France therefore, he says this as a member of a minority who did not come to Algeria by conquest, but by being born there. Camus’ belief that he descended from the refugees who came to Algeria in the wake of the loss of Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian war in 1871, is also significant to Camus’ formed stand against the independence of Algeria. He had forgone the division between France and Algeria and had viewed Algeria as being capable of having more than one culture without it having to lead to building distinctions. Multiculturalism and internationalism, which were what the myth of a French Algeria in The Stranger was signifying, were what Camus was pining for.

If one were to study the notes found in The First Man outlining the content of the novel, one could presume that Camus’ vision of internationalism was intended to be concretized in the third part of the novel which, if the first line in the draft were to be any indication of its main topic, spoke of ‘loves’.

In the original draft, Camus also added a marginal note to the above excerpt: “he dreams it during his siesta,” quite probably pertaining to Jacques who is Camus himself. The above excerpt, albeit being fragmental, cannot be denied to be related to what Camus has written in his other essays such as The New Mediterranean Culture, those included in Resistance, Rebellion and, Death, and of course The Algerian Chronicles. It speaks of a vision of land settlers who are diverse and yet are united. Where previous known divisions, and distinctions of values vanish. In this setting, Jacques’ mother’s silence becomes the only thing that is worthwhile and this could only be a reference to love.

All throughout The First Man, Camus associated love with Jacques’ mother. This theory may also be supported by the importance of the mother in most of Camus’ works and the fact that the third part of The First Man which was supposed to be about loves was entitled, ‘The Mother.’ The love being pertained to here is the second form of love: storge, but more on the love for the whole of humanity. This all boils down to the conception of solidarity, justice, moderation, and affirmation. In an international and multicultural setting, the first men, men of a different and unrefined dawn, are born. These men become the settlers of the land belonging to no one and everyone at the same time. They embody ‘the new Mediterranean culture’ – a culture which is international, multi-cultural, and all-embracing.

**Conclusion**

**Camus’ Philosophy of Affirmation Leading to a Community Built on Love**

Albert Camus began his philosophical project with a discussion of the absurd as theoretically expressed in The Myth of Sisyphus, lyrically in The Stranger, and theatrically in Caligula. In the three works stated above, the absurd is understood to arise from the relation of the irrational world and the person seeking meaning. In this sense, absurdity is both a state of consciousness and a human condition with the former referring to a person’s lucidity of the latter – the perpetual tension between man and the world. Following negation or the absurd, is affirmation which, as opposed to philosophical and physical suicide, is the correct response to the absurd.

The philosophy of Camus began with the general meaning of life and ended with its particular forms. It started with a negation, then
affirmation, and ultimately, love. To understand these transitions without a survey of Camus’ entire oeuvre, one may refer to his letter addressed to a man in despair as recorded in Notebook III instead:

We can despair of the meaning of life in general, but not of the particular forms that it takes; we can despair of existence, for we have no power over it, but not of history, where the individual can do everything. It is individuals who are killing us today. Why should not individuals manage to give the world peace?

From the above excerpt, it can be acknowledged that the facticity of the absurdity of life in general cannot hinder one from fully participating in the here and the now. Camus’ philosophy does not call for amorality and indifference. It instead calls for the exact opposite. The Absurd Hero is one who prefers quantitative over qualitative experience, the concrete and the temporal over the hereafter. To be conscious of the absurd is nearly equivalent to affirming life. Furthermore, the affirmation of an individual life necessitates the affirmation of the life of all. The dictum “I rebel – therefore we exist” expresses the transition from solitary revolt to rebellion in solidarity. This is Camus’ philosophy of affirmation: persistence in living while remaining lucid, rebelling not only in solitude, but also in solidarity with others. The response to the absurd requires an ascension therefore. From the Absurd Hero to the Rebel and the Rebel to the First Man. In other words, from an individual rebellion to that of the whole, from negation to love.

Rebellion and solidarity are ultimately rooted on the love for all of humanity. As uncovered in The First Man and Camus’ earlier works, love in the context of the absurd finds its expressions in two forms: (1) earthly, concrete and passionate and, (2) subtly devoted to humanity. In the second phase (affirmation), the reason for solidarity was shown to come from the realization of common struggles. In the third phase, the reason evolved and had become broader, making solidarity a necessary result of the recognition of man’s humanity. Man is a finite being subjected to the absurd human condition yet man need not despair nor be led to nihilism. While metaphysical hope should be abandoned, there is still hope in mankind because man is in full control of history – of the here and now. Camus’ philosophy of affirmation is not only an affirmation of life or a transcendence of the absurd. It is the call for a love of life as expressed not only as concrete and earthly but more importantly, as the love of and for humanity. This research project has illustrated that love plays a vital role in Camus’ philosophy of affirmation. It is through love where one can remain lucid and affirm life. In solitude, this is achieved through passions; in solidarity with others, through a quiet devotion strengthened by the recognition of shared common struggles in the first level, but more importantly, love stirs justice and moderation through the recognition of sameness – of humanity. Dichotomies are demolished and views are leveled. Gone is the relationship between the marginalized and the majority – all are marginalized in the face of the absurd.

The third phase of Camus’ work which revolved around the concept of love may never be fully grasped, but through the traces that Camus left in his earlier works, it could be inferred that the third phase, if the progressive assent of his works to a more political nature would be considered along with the said traces in the earlier works, will contain Camus’ ideas and justifications for a community built on love, justice, and moderation i.e. a multicultural and international community.
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Cf. Camus, *The First Man*, Editor’s Note.

Ibid., 297.

Ibid., King, Editor’s Note.

Ibid., 309.


Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 51.

Camus, *The First Man*, 97.


Camus, *The First Man*, 269.


Ibid., 1.

Ibid., 3.


Camus, *The First Man*, 22.

Ibid.


Ibid., 82.

Ibid., 66.

Ibid., 153.

Ibid., 155.

Ibid.


Ibid.

In reference to Camus’ claim of breaking ties with the Party in 1935, O’Brien says that “it does not seem however that Camus can have broken with the Party in any distinct way at this date since the following year finds him at the head of the Maison de la Culture in Algiers, which was under the control of the Communist Party. It seems more probable that he broke with the party in 1937.” Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 58-59.

42 Ibid., 302.
43 Camus, The Stranger, 59.
45 "He told me that my mother and Monsieur Perez often used to walk down to the village together in the evenings, accompanied by a nurse. I was looking at the countryside around me. Seeing the rows of cypress trees leading up to the hills next to the sky, and the houses standing out here and there against that red and green earth, I was able to understand Maman better." Camus, The Stranger, 15.
47 Camus, Caligula, 8.
49 In the end however, it may be argued that Caligula had accepted it for when the assassins came to rid him of his life, he laughed as if in acceptance of the consequences for all that he did. Similar to how Meursault later on, would be wishing for an angry mob to greet him when the day of his execution arrives. So while Caligula’s methods of revolt were not proper responses to the absurd, in the end, he had come to accept it.
50 Camus, The Stranger, 104.
52 See Ibid, 119-123.
53 Ibid, 120.
54 Camus, The Stranger, 119.
55 Ibid.
56 Camus, The Stranger, 122-123.
57 Camus, The Rebel, 22.
59 Camus, The Rebel, 14.
60 Ibid.
62 Camus, The Rebel, 28.
63 Camus, The Stranger, 111.
65 Camus, The Plague, 228.
66 Ibid., 230.
67 Camus, The Rebel, 6-7.
68 The Algerian Chronicles was only recently unearthed, published, and translated (2013). It is a collection of essays on the economic and political situation in Algeria, written by Camus in a span of twenty years from 1939 to 1958.
69 Cf. Foley, Albert Camus: From the Absurd to Revolt, 145.
70 O'Brien, Camus, 11.
72 Ibid., 62.
73 Ibid., 63.
74 Ibid., 60.
75 O' Brein, Camus, 11.
76 In the essay, Crisis in Algeria, Camus wrote, 'I want to point out that the Arab people also exist. By that I mean that they aren’t the wretched, faceless mob in which Westeners see nothing worth respecting or defending. On the contrary, they are a people of impressive traditions, whose virtues are eminently clear to anyone willing to approach them without prejudice.” Albert Camus, The Algerian Chronicles, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 90.
77 See O'Brien, Camus, 23.
78 “What is softened and distorted, by being made non-colonial, is the nature of the French rule. For the rest, relation between Europeans and Arabs are not sentimentalized.” Ibid., 23.
79 In support of Pierre Nora’s claim. See Ibid., 25.
80 See Ibid., 27.
81 See Foley, Albert Camus: From the Absurd to Revolt, 142.
82 See Ibid., 143.

83 In a critical essay entitled, The New Mediterranean Culture, Camus states that there is only one culture and this is the culture that “finds life in the trees, the hills, and in mankind.” It could be said that this culture that Camus speaks of is one wherein the people have a love of life expressed through nature and humanity – a culture that foregoes manmade differences and celebrates commonalities. Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays, Vintage Books ed., ed. Philip Thody, trans. Ellen Conroy Kennedy (United States: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 197.

84 Camus, The First Man, 311-12.

85 See Ibid.

86 Ibid., 319.

87 Another similar passage can be found in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death: “I continue to believe that this world has no ultimate meaning. But I know that something in it has a meaning and that is man, because he is the only creature to insist on having one. This world has at least the truth of man; hence he must be saved if we want to save the idea we have of life. With your scornful smile you will ask me: what do you mean by saving man? And with all my being I shout to you that I mean not mutilating him and yet giving a chance to the justice that man alone can conceive.” Albert Camus, Selected Essays and Notebooks, ed. and trans. Philip Thody (England: Penguin Books, 1979), 255; Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death, 28-9.

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Redeeming the Lost Teleology: 
St. Thomas Aquinas’ Stand on the Beast’s 
Place in the World

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Abstract: What is an animal? A philosopher might consider it simply a sentient being. However, when someone asks, “What is an animal in relation to man?” The answer is not a simple definition but an actual and practical response on how the beast and man, a vegetative-sentient and a vegetative-sentient-rational being, exist together in the created world. Moreover, this question of relation led to dichotomy of views. In this study, the researcher will attempt to understand critically one of the philosophers, who made a stand towards the place of beast in relation with man, the Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas of Aquinas and to clarify his stand against the prejudices of some animal rights activists. Furthermore, this will also be a contribution to the discourse on man-beast relation. The study will revolve around these three sub-problems: (1) an inquiry on the beast’s powers and relation with man where oppositions on whether animals have rights or should be treated morally is in question; (2) a discussion of Aquinas’ stand towards animals in general and its relation with man and; (3) the conclusion which deals with responsibility, ends, and relational unity between man and beast.

Keywords: animal ethics, man-beast relation, relational ecology, teleology

The life of human beings is interrelated with animal life. Despite the difference in rational prowess, it is inevitable that a relationship will flourish between them, because they exist and partake within the same realm—in the world—where they can encounter each other in their whole being. In the evolutionary perspective, human beings emerged from the primate family, e.g. chimpanzees, baboons and monkeys. The australopithecines, who lived from 3-4 million years ago, were one of the known ancestors of humankind who dueled with prehistoric beasts in order to survive. Thus, human beings first encounter with animals is born out of savagery that in order to survive man must kill the beasts vice-versa. For instance, the Homo Neanderthal hunted for wooly mammoths and as for smilodons or sabretooth cats, they preyed on man during the Ice Age. However, the history of mankind is not always a clash between man and beast, especially during the stone age. Although, during the time of Homo Sapiens they used dogs to track down the hunt, it was during the stone age, particularly Mesolithic age, that man and beast work hand in hand to sustain each other i.e. domestication of animals. During those times, man’s food, particularly crops, were tilled by cows and cattle, while man fed them for their sustenance. Indeed, man’s foremost relationship with animals was more of surviving rather than an intimate relation. But, the irony is that animals
though not hunted anymore served as stock foods for man. Man raised pigs for their meat as well as cow, chicken, and horse. This is a manifestation of a ‘parasitic’ or ‘one-sided’ relationship, for man gains labor and meat from the animals while the beast gains nothing.

The emergence of guns in the 14th century paved way to more animal encounters, particularly a violent one, wherein animals were shot either for food or sport. During this time, there is what they called an open season wherein hunters graze the forest to shot any creatures. Those shot were hung in their cabins as trophies reflecting skill in hunting. Of course, this hunting extends at the skies above and the sea below which led to the extinction of various animal species e.g., the dodo bird and the elephant bird. Before, man often hid from the beasts but it seems that there is a role-reversal — the predators are being preyed.

The beast, in relation to man, is more than just mere utility without innate worth i.e. besides the sustenance provided by the former, the latter cannot just presume the beast’s worth similar to things. With reference to this problem, various philosophers and thinkers struggle to clarify the dilemma whether the beasts deserve either hostility or care. In order to redeem the forgotten worth of the beasts in the hierarchy of beings, the researcher will utilize St. Thomas Aquinas’ stand on the relationship between man and the beast. According to him, every creature follows a specific telos or purpose. This is emphasized in Aquinas’ fifth way concerning the existence of God.3

Based on the statement above, the place of the beasts in the hierarchy of beings should be delved deeper to veer away from the fixated categorization of the beasts as mere instruments without innate worth or a misappropriation of their real worth in the grand design.

The Existence of an Animal Mind

In order make a meaningful and genuine encounter between man and beast possible, the researcher will first explicate the existence of an animal mind, which is essential in dealing with human mind in order to facilitate address and response between man and beast. There were numerous theories which either support or contend the existence of an animal mind. Scientists such as France de Waal, Colin Allen, and Marc Bekoff conceded the existence of animal minds by arguing that animal behaviours are carriers of signs,3 springing forth from a complex formulation by a particular mind similar to human capability to perform complex actions. On the other hand, philosophers such as David Hume, Voltaire, and Aristotle agreed in such existence that animals can perform complex task [requiring a particular degree of intelligence] compared to machines e.g., a bird building a nest, which can calculate the precise angle of the nest base, except for St. Thomas of Aquinas, Kant and Descartes who, in unison, denied the capability of rational thinking as compared to degree of human rationality.

Rene Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, despised the existence of animal minds. According to him, animals are just mere machines doing the same functions and actions again and again. Furthermore, the reason why he detested the existence of animal minds is due
For it is rather remarkable that there are no men so dull and so stupid (excluding not even the insane), that they are incapable of arranging various words together and of composing from them a discourse by means of which they might make their thoughts understood; and that, on the other hand, there is no other animal at all, however perfect and pedigreed it may be, that does the like. This does not happen because they lack the organs, for one sees that magpies and parrots can utter words just as we can, and yet they cannot speak as we do, that is to say, by testifying to the fact that they are thinking about what they are saying; on the other hand, men born deaf and dumb, who are deprived just as much as or more than, beasts of the organs that aid others in speaking, are wont to invent for themselves various signs by means of which they make themselves understood to those who, being with them on a regular basis, have the time to learn their language. And this attests, not merely to the fact that the beasts have less reason than men but that they have none at all.

Voltaire contended that how come animals adapt to specific obstacles like the bird who built its nest connecting to the wall without a sense of rationality. If one speaks about a mechanical movement which is done already and follows its systematic approach like gears, what is the point of teaching dogs to do chores like hunting and a mundane example, bomb detecting. Furthermore, animals being taught has the tendency to commit mistakes and to refurbish these mistakes e.g., training of K9 units does not immediately transform dogs to be expert bomb sniffers, instead there are instances when dogs detect non-dangerous things other than bombs. Thus, from the statements above, there is an element of learning, which minds like human beings possess. Such element presupposes, a sense of development and dynamism. Animals are not just mere mechanical and irrational bodies, rather they are dynamic and rational ones.

On the other hand [a scientific perspective], France de Waal, a primatologist, explained the existence of animal minds in using argument of
According to Waal, which can be paralleled to Elliott Sober’s stance:

The theory of evolution is adequate to attribute to the existence of animal minds. Wherein man and animal shared similar properties like a common ancestry with animals, especially primates and their phylogenetic tree or evolutionary changes are not that distant, i.e., despite the evolutionary changes in man there are still substantial traces of its ancestry with animals.7

Compared to other animal species, primates, particularly chimpanzees, resemble an individual human being. The chimpanzees are proficient in learning especially in problem solving skills which can be at par with human beings. “Recently in 2012, a chimp named Natasha was considered the smartest chimpanzee. One of her skills, which exemplifies her capacity for problem solving, is escaping her cage with electrical wires without getting fried numerous times.”8 Such ability is of primal consideration for cognitive researches because those non-human entities learn and engage in complex and flexible behaviors which resemble man. The mind barometer of an animal is not in the same degree as a human mind, but the resemblance and capability of the former is a matter to consider in a discourse of philosophical cognition.

On Animal Communication

In order to engage a relation with the beasts, there should be form of communication between man and beast. In the previous discussion about the animal minds, animals do not speak the language of man who utters and writes words to convey a message. However, animal does not really have to possess the ability to communicate words through human language for it has a language of its own. Scientists formulated different accounts of communication where the beasts and man can engage: biological accounts, information-based accounts and intentional accounts.

The ‘biological account’ of communication is “a relationship between two organisms such that a change in the state of one organism causes a change in the state of another organism.”9 This means that when the moment an organism affects the other and if there is a sort of response from the latter, a communication already took place. For example, when an individual tried to capture a chick from its mother hen, the hen will chase the individual away. The message conveyed is obvious for it was showed through action that evoked a reaction. This is a minimal consideration for communication in order for any engagement to happen.

On the other hand, the ‘information-based’ account considered communication as sending and receiving of signs vice versa. The relation is that the informant gives a code to a receiver which will decode the message. However, not all codes can be considered as information Fred Drestke upheld that “information rid uncertainty from the receiver, such that the probability of some affairs increases given the signal.”10 Thus, the primary goal of information is to clear obscurity e.g., the bees made circling movements to inform the swarm of a potential beehive. Accordingly, for Kristin Andrews, similar to the biological account the information-based account require a focus on the receiver, “the sender expects that the receiver receives the message.”11

The last account is ‘intentional communication’ and it was devised by H.P. Grice. It happens when an individual does not just concerns oneself to the meaning he/she wants to convey but also on the thought that the receiver should understand the message conveyed. For instance, man in helping an injured animal will put into context his/her approach towards such, so as to reduce the stress and pain rummaging it and
thus, aiding to its recovery. However, this sort of intentional account is only possible for beings with sophisticated mind like man, according to Grice, man can reflect on his/her actions and not for animals. Thus, the researcher will uphold another intentional account of communication i.e. ostension which does not require a complex cognition. In such account, “a simple pointing to or eye contact elicits a sense of communication,”12 This occurs when man look at the eyes of a bull, the bull will feel a sense of threat towards such contact prompting the bull to attack the man. Thus, despite the asymmetry of rational prowess, man and beasts can engage in communication, moreover, in a relation.

**On Animal Suffering**

Every time there are morbid presentations of animal cruelty, where wild animals were dismembered, whether seen from television or actual, contentions like “The animal is suffering” or “Why kill those innocent creatures?” are being elicited. Perhaps, it is out of sympathy that man believes that animals experience pain and do suffer. However, animals experiencing pain and suffering is problematic due to the fact that they do not possess ‘phenomenal consciousness’. According to Fred Drestke and M.Tye, “phenomenal consciousness consists in a certain sort of intentional content (analog, or non-conceptual) being available to the belief-forming and decision-making systems of the creature in question.”13 Animals do not possess complex systems which can lead to belief-forming and decision-making. Furthermore, phenomenal consciousness can lead to introspection of one’s experience or reflection which is a higher-form of thinking i.e. an individual can reflect regarding his experience of something whereas animals experience the moment without any introspection.

Despite the fact that animals fall on the non-phenomenal level of consciousness and lower order of thinking, it does not dismiss that animals do experience pain and suffering and such is a proper object of sympathy. Pain, according Caruthers, is a perceived ‘secondary quality’.14 This means that pain is situated in a specific space or area of the body. This ‘feeling’ is not mental confirmation of such phenomenon but a physical affectation of a stimulus. Hence, unlike what is in the previous paragraph, despite the animals’ lack of phenomenal consciousness, such creatures, physically experience pain. For instance, a dog infested by ticks and fleas experiences pain because of the insect bites even though it cannot reflect on the insects’ existence.

Moreover, there is no general distinction on a creature’s response towards pain whether the consciousness is phenomenal or non-phenomenal. Whether phenomenal consciousness introspects in such experience or the non-phenomenal consciousness engages in such experience, the response towards the ‘feeling’ of pain is simply to minimize it. The response towards pain is a matter of “first-order response”15 i.e. immediate and pre-rational. For example, both man and animal will strive to alleviate the pain in their stomach due to hunger by eating something. Thus, the experience of pain is shared both by phenomenal and non-phenomenal consciousness.

Upon proving that the experience of pain includes non-phenomenal consciousness [animals], a question emerges: “Where does sympathy towards animals enter?” It was discussed a while ago that animals possessed non-phenomenal consciousness; it cannot introspect and reflect on its experience of pain or even feel miserable and pitiful towards itself. That is the very reason why such are object of sympathy for man for animals despite the pain they experience does not fully realized via introspection the gravity of pain. Man, on the
other hand, can utter all sorts of meaningful cries and lamentations concerning its pain and can introspect its gravity. It is also for that reason that man feels a sense of sympathy towards those animals, the pain the latter experience are reflected by man or in a simple sense, man empathized the creatures suffering.

**Dialogue between Aquinas and the Beast**

St. Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy and theology dealt primarily on man’s conquest in reaching the *Ultimate Truth* i.e. God and the non-human animals were supplement for the success of the former’s conquest. According to Mclaughlin, “The framework of Aquinas’ teleology and nature provides only an indirect ethical concern towards the non-human animals and excludes a possibility to be included in direct ethical concern.” There are numerous instances by which Aquinas discussed the nature and end of the beast in *Summa Theologiae*. These can be found in the following sections: “On the Question of Murder”; “On the Work of the Fifth Day”; “On the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence”. Within these questions, there is an emphasis that the relation of the non-human animals with man in the mentioned questions were only as supplementary beings for the elevation of the latter.

“On the question of murder”, it was posited whether it is justified to kill living things, especially animals. Aquinas answered:

> There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection.

For Aquinas, it is justified to murder living things since man is beyond it in the order of being and as long as it is used for its very purpose. As God said, “everything that moves is meat for you.” In this statement, the non-human animals are considered as instruments for man’s sustenance.

The third question supports the preceding statement which deals with man’s governance of the world. According to Aquinas:

> …animals are naturally subject to man proven in three ways: in the order of perfection; on man’s being the image and likeness of God and; on the animal’s participative prudence of particular acts in relation to man’s universal prudence towards practical matters.

Since man governs naturally over the creatures beneath the order of perfection, one can do anything to the animals as subjects to their objects. That is the common view of Aquinas’ stand towards treatment of animals, they are just things without any particular worth, only their utility. However, I argue that this is a shallow reading of Aquinas because they only see the apparent in animal violence and mistreatment, instead of the underlying reason for such treatment.

As discussed, the notion of the order of beings according to their order perfection is an essential element in the determination of mastership of man over the beasts. In that case, the notion of man possessing the soul which is ‘ratio-sentia-vegetative’ one compared to the beasts which ‘sentia-vegetative’ and for plants which is only ‘vegetative’ draws the line of gradation and governance. But this does not mean that lesser beings are of lesser importance. For instance, since plant is a lesser being compared to man, why not just destroy it for there is no benefit from its vegetative power, man has its own. Conversely, it cannot be the case for two reasons: First is the notion of divine plan, where everything were created for a specific telos that is paralleled with the powers of soul. Second, the predominant power
of the soul in a specific being has a greater manifestation compared to the least dominant power e.g., what is predominant with man is his rational power, for animals their sentience coupled with heightened natural instinct and for plants wherein their vegetative powers can sustain the whole world. Every being possesses a particular telos that only they can harness. “Furthermore, creatures are good only by participating in God’s own goodness. However, for Aquinas all beings participate in God’s goodness in diverse ways. This participation determines the level of their perfection.” So man cannot just disregard the existence of the lower beings for they participate in the divine plan.

Based on the elaboration above, one can see a relational bond among beings wherein their existence, their mode of existence, and their ends are paralleled or in synched with the divine plan. Subtracting plants from such unity will give complications in the divine equation, where man in the physical sense will die of hunger or suffocation. But what does diversified modes of existence mean to the treatment of the beast? Will it vanquish the cruelty towards them or otherwise? If we mean cruelty wherein animals are slaughtered for sport or for nonsensical reasons, Aquinas’ guaranteed that every being is united through participation in the divine plan. Thus, murdering the lesser beings just for ‘play’ is just a waste of energy and inhibits the carrying on of the divine plan. But if we mean cruelty that is purposive and parallel to the carrying on of the divine plan, such act of slaughter is justified. Man should be focused on the end that he is aiming for and so do the other beings, even animal attacks on humans are justified because it upholds their telos of that which is survival. It is not that man does not care directly about animals but he/she cares in an indirect manner while following his/her telos.

Conclusion

The relation of man and beast is a puzzling one for they don’t speak the same language to communicate one’s desire. The latter does not have the intellect to project a purpose that is born out of reflection compared to the former. However, following Aquinas, as long as both upholds the purpose they are embedded with, they in the point of view of the divine plan, shared a mutual relation. Animal cruelty might be a taboo for animal rights advocates or liberationists, but in the perspective of a culture or belief this is a fulfilment of a plan [Divine Plan] that is worth the sacrifice.

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2. St. Thomas of Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, volume 1, part 1, question 2, article 3, 796.


5. “In order to examine into the truth, it is necessary once in one’s life to doubt of all things so far as this is possible.” Rene Descartes, Principles of Philosophy (Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982), 3.


10 *Ibid*.


15 “What causes us to think and behave as we do when we are in pain will be the first-order perception of a secondary quality of the body, just as happens in other animals.” *Ibid.*, 111.


17 St. Thomas of Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, volume 2, part 2, question 64, article 1, 5009.

18 *Genesis* 9:3.

19 St. Thomas of Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, volume 1, part 1, question 96, article 1, 2149.


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On the Relevance of the Categorical Imperative in the 21st Century

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Abstract: The ethics of Immanuel Kant has the Categorical Imperative as its main tenet. Kant provides us the principles which could serve as guides by which we can judge the moral nature of our actions. He argues that an action is ought to be determined by practical reason i.e. anchored on a good will. Kant avers that if the will is ought to be good, it must not be motivated by any cause or end. In this light, this paper seeks to explore Kant’s categorical imperative and to highlight its relevance in the 21st century wherein there is an evident moral confusion. To do this, I will first discuss the immanent moral decline brought about by the prevailing ideologies, especially the utilitarian attitude of man that tends to ignore the destructive tendencies of science and technology. Second, I will proceed on investigating the principles of categorical imperative. Finally, I will establish the indispensable need of man in the 21st century not only to understand, but also to enrich himself according to his practical reason, duty, and good will which are the very elements of the categorical imperative.

Keywords: categorical imperative, practical reason, utilitarianism

Long before our present time, there has already been a serious decline in morality. This is mostly attributed to the proud claims of science and to man’s reliance on technology. Accordingly, it was in the modern period (from 16th century to 19th) century when science gained its momentum. It was granted with so much right and reputation that one would certainly debunk a claim unless it has undergone the rigors of scientific investigation. The belief that everything can be explained by science has a strong resonance to people reaching even those at the margins, because at last we can now have answers to the mysteries of being, life, and even of God.

On the other hand, the first half of the 20th century marked the turn towards a more personal and subjective inquiry for philosophy. Unlike the aim of science, i.e. certitude, philosophy in this era demands to go back on the meaning of existence, human conditions, and dignity or value which is identified as existentialism. It took stand against the ‘depersonalizing’ effects brought about by too much reliance on reason, which finds its comfort in science or objective truth. However, this ‘turn’ in philosophy did not appeal on a massive extent (except in the circle of philosophy or humanities), because many people were unwilling to give up the belief that science or a certain technique can be a solution to human adversaries. This is manifested in our dependence on technology. Nowadays, we are reliant on the forenamed in almost every aspect of our lives. For instance, in doing our school or office work, we simply go to internet to search...
for answers without having us think and exert effort, which in the long run paralyzes our capacity for critical thinking. This and so many other depersonalizing effects brought about by our love for technology are slowly becoming immanent in our midst. Indeed, our use of technology greatly affects our attitudes and behaviors which changed the moral landscape of our time.

In relation to the discussion above, I will argue that the current ethical dilemmas we encounter can be understood and analyzed by exploring Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. To do this, I will answer the following questions: (1) How did Kant pursue on laying the foundation of morals as an a priori? (2) What is the Categorical Imperative and how did it proceed as an a priori? (3) How can the categorical imperative be of relevance as a moral guide at present?

Laying the Foundation of Morals

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks to find a universal and immutable law by which we can determine the morality of human actions and at the same time, to which we can anchor our moral life. It is upon this that Kant would later on build the concept of the categorical imperative. For the purpose of this paper, we shall look closely on the foundation of his ethics at large.

It is natural for man to desire to be happy. We may admit it or not, all of human actions aim at realizing this end. As Kant infers: “Without any view to duty all men have the strongest and deepest inclination to happiness, because in this idea all inclinations are summed up.” 1 This statement reaffirms that happiness is no less than equivalent to self-satisfaction. However, men perceive happiness differently and associate it to distinct ends. Additionally, each person has their own way on how to achieve it. Hence, it has brought moral confusion on the notion happiness which explains why there are conflicts and disunity among ethicists and moralists.

Kant particularly fought against utilitarianism. Utilitarianism was premised on the idea that one has to determine his action according to how it will yield to the benefit of the “greatest possible number of people”. It advocates that what gives pleasure to most people, whose interests are affected by one’s choice, should be preferred above all. 2 Moreover, Kant viewed utilitarianism as material ethics because of its teleological character. Since utilitarianism’s goal is the pleasure of man, it includes all objects that might satisfy his desires. No one could discourage nor obstruct man to attain his end and ideally others’ as well. Hence, for utilitarianism, “the ends justify the means.” This maxim means that as long as you attain your goal whether through good or bad action, it is justified.

Kant dismissed utilitarianism as a plausible basis of morality, because it cannot determine the moral import of an action. Its end is to acquire ‘objects of pleasure’ for self-sufficiency and happiness. However, these objects are contingent. 3 They are subject to change and even decay, which means that in the course of time, they can become latent and useless. Likewise, the attitude of man in relation to these goods can fluctuate and at worst, in some instances, the inclination towards these objects of pleasure fade away. 4 Hence, similar to the latter, emotions and inclinations cannot provide us moral standards.

With the aforementioned conditions concerning goods, it becomes apparent how detached these are to the subject i.e. they are only known to man through his experience. On the other hand, emotions and inclinations may not be detached from us yet we are spontaneously affected by the goods we are inclined to, as a natural reaction to whatever surround us or strong inclination towards things and the world at large. Hence, they are
not to be esteemed to furnish universality and permanence or immutability, which characterized Kant’s notion of categorical imperative or the natural law that guides and directs our actions. Obviously, it runs contradictory to utilitarianism, with qualities of temporality, particularity and contingency.

Kant suggested that we must find an absolute standard for morality. In fact, this matter is evident, yet often unrecognized and ignored. Since morality presupposes universality, it must be accessible to all men. This explains why Kant viewed morality as \textit{a priori} i.e. can be known through reason alone. Our moral compass must not come from experience, because experience \textit{per se} does not give us universal knowledge only those which are particular and subjective. Correspondingly, our moral compass must reside within us and it is our task to make it actively present. This concept can be paralleled to the conscience of Christian faith which serves us our guide or where we based our notion of morality. On another note, morality presupposes immutability, which implies that a good determined by us should always be good in reference to time. For instance, you have seen a house in your neighborhood with doors open and with no one inside. Given the house is no ordinary but a mansion, thence with luxuries all over, you ask yourself: "Will I enter and get objects for myself?" The moral import of that action is certainly bad and will always be. This explains why the moral worth of our actions are \textit{a priori}, hence universal and immutable.

In general, the \textit{Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals} is an offshoot towards the categorical imperative of Kant. And for us to better understand the categorical imperative, it is but necessary that we follow Kant’s point of departure.

### The Categorical Imperative

In the previous section, it was established that for Kant, moral knowledge is \textit{a priori}. Additionally, for him, reason guides the will. In line with this, I will address this question: “What role does ‘will’ play in the execution of moral actions?”

Kant states: “Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a \textit{good will}.” This implies that a will without conditions, exceptions, intentions, and qualifications can only be the real good. For instance, the will does not intend to help, love or give, more so, it does not aim to attain for the goods like the ends of utilitarianism. But it is the will as it is. Kant opines: “The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because it is willing, i.e it is good of itself.” Henceforth, when the will is bad, the act is immoral. In similar manner, when the will is good, the act is moral. There is no further qualification needed, there is no good act that is good at some moments and bad in another, inasmuch as the will cannot be good or bad at the same time.

Kant further characterized the will by saying that it must always be in accord with reason, as reason has its object the \textit{a priori} practical truths. The will alone cannot distinguish what is good from bad. It needs reason for guide and direction. Reason and will must work together. All moral actions proceed from the combined force of reason and will. With the demise of any of which, we cannot possibly account moral responsibility to a person.

Now, we turn our attention to how the will in itself can be a ‘barometer’ to determine the quality of this will. Kant first distinguished the will as categorical as opposed to hypothetical.
To say that the will is hypothetical means that it is teleological or that which has an end.\textsuperscript{10} On the other hand, to say that a will is categorical means that it is done according to what one thinks is "ought to be" done.\textsuperscript{11} Like morality, the idea of duty is \textit{a priori}. Kant characterized duty as emanating from a good will that is good in itself, that is, a will devoid of teleological potency. Kant proposed an ethics that is founded on the categorical imperative. For him, one's duty should not be grounded on any cause or purpose, but for fulfilling that duty alone. In relation to this is the postulation of this question: "How do we know our duty or that which we ought to do?" Kant answered this through the idea of the 'universal law'. As he said: "I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law."\textsuperscript{12} For instance, the idea of killing someone as a revenge to whatever destruction he/she has caused you is perceived as justifiable because you see that person as a threat to your well-being. With reference to this, Kant would posit if we were to allow killing as a form of revenge we then must allow it to be done by every one. Certainly, we would not want to see people killing each other as a revenge for we would be involved in a vicious cycle of killing, violence, and cruelty. Killing, in a sense, cannot be alleviated to a universal law.

Additionally, another variation of the categorical imperative is Kant's idea of treating others as always 'ends' in themselves. At the very outset, Kant rejected the idea of acquiring objects to satisfy one's pleasure and by which, in the utilitarian perspective, moral action can be determined. On a similar level, to think of a person as a means to satisfy your pleasure is to reduce that person to any other objects. With reference to this, Kant will remind us that a good will does not become good because of its end, even it satisfies the greatest possible number of people i.e. the maxim of utilitarianism.

**Conclusion**

The categorical imperative of Kant presupposes freedom. We have the freedom to know and experience the natural law within us, which boisterously resonates what we ought to do. With this, Kant highlighted the significance of coming up with an objective underlying morality. However, it should be noted that he is not prescribing a kind of moral theory. Categorical imperative is accessible to every rational being, because first and foremost it is \textit{a priori}.

Kant’s ‘deontological’ ethics will never come to passé, for it is making visible what is eternally present. The problems in morality at present are not really the lack of moral values, rather lies on our tendency to look ‘outside’ us i.e. from experience, causing us to end up conceptualizing our own ethics ourselves, which are often instructive and material. For Kant, the world is in a constant flux and so, to base our morals on what the world gives, is to live in contingency and temporality. As a result, our concept of the ‘good’ will always be limited and worse, unrefined.

At the end of the day, Kant reminds us that morality is a \textit{personal endeavor}. We cannot rely on any socially constructed moral norms to such extent that we cannot rely on religion in living a moral life. It always goes back to how much effort we are willing to render in the service for good and truth.
3 Kant, *op. cit.*, 64.
5 *Ibid*.
6 *Ibid*.
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Levinas on *Socio-Political Responsibility and Beyond*: An Interview with Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia

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**Abstract:** Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia is the Convenor of the first International Conference on Levinas to be held from July 13-15 July 2017 at the University of Santo Tomas. In this interview with a former student, Dr. Garcia recounts how he came up with the idea of organizing the conference and shares his insights on the thought of Levinas, particularly, on the notion of *ethical responsibility* and its relevance to the national situation.

**Keywords:** Leovino Ma. Garcia, Emmanuel Levinas, *ethical responsibility*, socio-political philosophy, Philippines

In a face-to-face interview last 12 May 2017, Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia responded to the following questions posed by his former student, Franz Joseph Yoshiy II.

**Come 13-15 July 2017, you will be convening the first ever International Conference on Emmanuel Levinas in the country. How did you come up with the idea of organizing a Levinas conference?**

**Dr. Garcia:** There are two philosophers whom I have been studying and teaching for some time now. I worked on a Ph. D. dissertation on Ricoeur from 1973 to 1981. From 1982 until the present, I’ve always given a course on Ricoeur. But when I was doing my dissertation on Ricoeur, (I think I told you this story) there were two friends who were also preparing dissertations, an Indian Franciscan on Levinas and a Dutch on a Chinese philosopher. So, during that time, I was also discussing the philosophy of Levinas with Sydney, my Indian Franciscan friend. When I came back from studies, I also began to give a course on Levinas around 1983. At that time, most of the sources were still in French until *Éthique et Infini* (1982) was translated in 1985 but I was already using it as a textbook for my course. Ricoeur and Levinas were close friends; they are different but they have similarities. I’ve always dreamt of organizing an international conference on Ricoeur which I realized in November 2015.

And so, that led to the next conference on Levinas. I contacted Prof. Roger Burggraeve, Professor Emeritus of the Catholic University of Leuven in 2016 and he immediately agreed. Another reason that encouraged me to go on with this conference is of course, to help clarify the issues on the death penalty and the extrajudicial killings. In 2007, I received an endorsed request from some thirty students headed by Fleurdeliz Altez to give a course in UST on Levinas. And that is how I started again to teach here in 2007 just a year before the COMIUCAP Conference. Since then I have alternated giving a course on Ricoeur and a course on Levinas and other courses in UST.
Why study Levinas? Perhaps, you could tell us what inspired you to take up Levinas as one of your research interests?

Dr. Garcia: Levinas is the philosopher whom we need for the 21st century, because he makes us appreciate difference, how to think difference as equality, I really think he is a fascinating philosopher, like Ricoeur. In fact, they complement each other. Levinas stresses the Other while Ricoeur emphasizes Oneself. Ricoeur interprets Levinas as hyperbolical because the present society is so I-oriented. That is why Levinas stresses the Other. But Ricoeur's position is that you must also look at yourself as an Other, so *oneself as another*, the title of one of his books.

Let us talk about Levinas' philosophy and try to situate it within our present context, particularly here in our country. Levinas talks about ethical responsibility towards the Other. The moment we encounter the *Face of the Other* – it commands us: “thou shall not kill.” But then, at the same time, this *Face*, in its nakedness and vulnerability, invites us to murder it, to kill it. As I see it, this is a paradox. Is my understanding correct? And, could you please elaborate on these very important topics – that of ethical responsibility, the *Face*, murder etc. – in the thought of Levinas.

Dr. Garcia: The Face doesn’t invite us to kill it. But because of its nakedness and vulnerability, we are tempted to kill it. If you are not ethical, the tendency would be to hurt it. The command “thou shall not kill!” has a positive aspect. The Other is also pleading with you to respect it, to take care of it, to be with it, not to abandon it. At the beginning of *Totality and Infinity* Levinas says that violence is not only to kill but to frustrate the substance, the possibilities of somebody. What is unique about Levinas’s philosophy is that it is not only an intersubjective philosophy but a social-political-ethical philosophy. It is not just between I and the Other, but also about the third party, the many Others. That’s why I insisted that Burggraave concentrate on this social-political-ethical responsibility. Then you will see that it is not a naïve philosophy but a really balanced philosophy which appreciates organization, technology, and compassion to bring about a just and peaceful society. What was termed at the beginning, as the totalization of things is not basically bad if this is done to promote the dignity of people.

Given your elaboration on Levinas' notion of ethical responsibility, would you agree that his thought is more relevant than ever – particularly, with the present situation here in the Philippines – there is a rampant violation of human rights, extra-judicial killings?

Dr. Garcia: Yes, it is very relevant. We all need to reflect on our ethical-social-political responsibility to Others. For Levinas, before defending my rights I must first defend the rights of the Others, because justice begins with the Other. We must not act only because our rights have been trampled. We must defend the rights of the Others. The humanism of Levinas is not a humanism of the I but a humanism of the Other.

Is this the reason why the upcoming conference has as theme “Levinas: On Socio-Political Responsibility and Beyond? The conference finds itself in a very timely situation.

Dr. Garcia: Yes, very timely not only here but for all the world. We see people becoming afraid of differences, becoming “allergic” to Others. Global politics have become very populist and demagogical. One happy note is that Emmanuel Macron who became the President of France was for some time an assistant to Paul Ricoeur. Some journalists have noted that the reason why Macron won is because he may have
remembered Ricoeur’s idea that the more a society becomes complex, the more solutions cannot be simplistic, fundamentalist, Macron won because the extreme left and the extreme right did not want to make people come together and talk about their differences.

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Dr. Garcia during the pre-conference workshop on Levinas last 12 May 2017 (Photo by Franz Joseph C. Yoshiy II)

**My profoundest gratitude to Dr. Garcia for his kindness and generosity in granting me the opportunity to do this interview with him and for polishing the original manuscript. Likewise, I wish to thank Mr. Reuben John B. Valentin for his help in transcribing this interview.**

**Dr. Leovino Ma. Garcia** is one of the foremost philosophy professors in the Philippines. He is the country’s leading scholar on the philosophies of Paul Ricoeur and Emmanuel Levinas. He holds a doctorate degree from the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. For promoting cultural relations between France and the Philippines, Dr. Garcia was bestowed the rank of Knight, Order of the Academic Palms in 1989 and the rank of Officer, Order of Arts and Letters in 2008 by the French Government. He was also bestowed the rank of Commander in the Order of Leopold II by the Belgian Government in 2012 for promoting cultural relations between Belgium and the Philippines.

Dr. Garcia convened the international conference on Paul Ricoeur here in the Philippines last November 2015. On 13-15 July 2017, Dr. Garcia will once again convene another international conference – this time on the philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. He currently teaches at the University of Santo Tomas and Ateneo de Manila University. The University of Santo Tomas Graduate School recently awarded him the St. Thomas Aquinas Professorial Chair in the Humanities for Academic Year 2017-2018.
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